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Author’s Note 
Many of the places discussed in this thesis have been known by multiple names during different 
time periods or by different groups. For the sake of consistency, I have defaulted to the most 
commonly used name even when doing so may be anachronistic. The notable exception to this 
rule was my decision to refer to Artsakh using its Armenian name rather than the more 
commonly used Nagorno-Karabakh. While Artsakh roughly falls within the borders of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, it is my belief that the two are separate and I believe my 
naming convention helps make that distinction. Furthermore, I believe that the choice of name 
should be left to the people of the region, who have elected to refer to it as Artsakh. 
With accurate information hard to come by—both because of the recent nature of the topic and 
because of deliberate attempts to obscure the truth, I have had to rely upon some non-traditional 
sources to inform my research. Both the Azeri and Armenian governments restricted traditional 
journalism in order to present a favorable picture of the conflict, making many of the articles 
describing the course of the war inaccurate. As a result, I have occasionally used social media 
posts as a source about the course of the war, particularly when each side was in control of a 
particular place.   
Lastly, while I make no secret my belief that Artsakh should be independent, it is my firm belief 
that what follows is an objective account of the history of Artsakh and the struggle between 
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Early on the morning of September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan launched an attack along the 
entire length of its border with the de-facto Republic of Artsakh—known to many internationally 
as Nagorno-Karabakh. By the end of the day, sixteen Armenian soldiers had been killed and over 
a hundred were wounded along with an unknown number of Azeris, the first casualties in a war 
that would claim the lives of approximately 4,000 Armenians and 3,000 Azeris.1 While clashes 
along the line of contact between Artsakh and Azerbaijan had been routine for decades, it 
quickly became apparent that Azerbaijan’s most recent attack was something far more violent 
than the normal skirmishes. As Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev announced on October 4, 
Azerbaijan intended to keep fighting until Armenia agreed to—or was forced—to withdraw from 
Artsakh entirely. The fragile balance that had held since a 1994 ceasefire ended the first 
Nagorno-Karabakh War would be forever altered. 
 That 1994 ceasefire had been the culmination of almost six years of fighting between 
ethnic Armenians and Azeris preceding and following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
majority-Armenian population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—which had long 
attempted to reverse the Soviet Caucasian Bureau’s 1921 decision placing the region under the 
control of Azerbaijan—took advantage of the gradual increase in political freedoms of the late 
1980s to mount one of largest grassroots political movements the Soviet Union had ever seen. 
With cries of Miatsum!—“Unity!”—tens of thousands of Armenians demonstrated in the streets 
of Stepanakert and up to a million marched in Yerevan petitioning the Soviet government to 
                                                 
1 “Pashinyan says about 4,000 Armenian troops killed in Nagorno-Karabakh.” TASS. April 14, 2021. 
https://tass.com/world/1277921; RFE/RL Staff. “Azerbaijan Says Nearly 3,000 Troops Killed in Nagorno-Karabakh 




transfer Artsakh from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR. When the Soviet authorities 
rejected the idea, the Armenians of Artsakh took matters into their own hands and held a 
referendum for independence on December 10, 1991. With Artsakh’s Azeri minority boycotting 
the vote, the referendum passed with overwhelming support—a margin of 108,615 to 24.2 
However, this declaration of independence also fell on deaf ears and Artsakh remained a de jure 
part of Azerbaijan. 
Even before the official dissolution of the Soviet Union, the conflict between Armenians 
and Azeris had already escalated from hostile resolutions to violence and even massacres. In 
February 1988, the Armenian community of Sumgait was subjected to three days of brutal 
violence that left dozens dead and resulted in thousands of refugees. In January 1990, another 
wave of anti-Armenian pogroms in Baku killed scores more. By the time the Soviet Union 
officially dissolved in 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan were already in the midst of a brutal war 
over Artsakh. Despite initial losses, Armenian forces eventually succeeded in retaking control of 
most of the territory that had formerly been Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as well as 
seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan. In May 1994, with both sides exhausted by the war 
effort, a ceasefire was brokered that ended the fighting, but did little to resolve the underlying 
sources of the conflict. Over the next twenty-five years, several attempts to bring about a 
peaceful solution to the conflict would be made, but neither Armenians nor Azeris were willing 
to withdraw their claim to Artsakh and no deal could be reached. 
 In the intervening years with a tense but relatively stable situation along the border 
between Artsakh and Azerbaijan, both Armenia and Azerbaijan underwent significant internal 
change. For Azerbaijan, the change was driven by the development of its burgeoning oil and gas 
                                                 
2 de Waal, Thomas. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: New York 
University Press, 2013, 175. 
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industry. Between 2001 and 2019, the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) collected over 
$138 billion in revenues.3 While the fund’s stated mission is to generate perpetual income for 
future generations, much of the fund’s surplus was transferred to the government of Azerbaijan’s 
budget for general use. By 2010, over 50% of Azerbaijan’s budget was funded by transfers from 
SOFAZ, representing over 90% of SOFAZ’s total expenditures.4 Along with contributing to the 
Aliyev family’s near-complete control over Azerbaijan, this oil wealth allowed the state to spend 
billions of dollars a year on its military. The advanced weaponry Azerbaijan purchased proved to 
be a decisive factor in enabling its military success during the 2020 war. 
 For Armenia, the most notable domestic change came in the form of the 2018 Velvet 
Revolution, which fundamentally altered the country’s political environment. Serzh Sargsyan, 
who had led Armenia since his election to the presidency in 2008, was poised to continue his rule 
after being appointed to fill the newly empowered office of the prime minister. Sargsyan’s 
Republican Party of Armenia, or Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutyun (HHK), had been in 
power since 1998 and was “a typical post-Soviet ‘party of power’ mainly comprising senior 
government officials, civil servants, and wealthy business people.”5 Under the HHK’s rule, 
Armenia had experienced widespread corruption and allegations of voter fraud and even violence 
had marred elections. However, shortly after Sargsyan was named Prime Minister on April 17, 
2018, massive street protests erupted demanding his resignation. Led by Nikol Pashinyan, the 
mass demonstrations forced Sargsyan to resign, a move that was widely seen as ushering 
                                                 
3 Ibadoghlu, Gubad. “State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan: huge spending and overwhelming poverty.” Crude 
Accountibility. February 27, 2019. https://crudeaccountability.org/state-oil-fund-of-azerbaijan-huge-spending-and-
overwhelming-poverty/  
4 Aslanli, Kenan. “Fiscal sustainability and the State Oil Fund in Azerbaijan.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 6, no. 2, 
(2015): 114-121. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366515000056  




Armenia into a new era. 
 While the Velvet Revolution was greeted with jubilation by most Armenians and Western 
observers, the issue of Artsakh never disappeared from view. Even as they named Armenia their 
‘country of the year’ for 2018, the staff of The Economist noted that “Armenia’s nasty territorial 
dispute with Azerbaijan has not been resolved and could ignite again.”6 While the Velvet 
Revolution had the support of the vast majority of Armenia, some Armenians—especially in 
Artsakh—feared that Pashinyan’s inexperience and his lack of ties to Russia, would prove 
dangerous. Compounding these fears was the fact that, unlike Armenia’s previous two leaders, 
Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, Pashinyan had neither served during the Nagorno-Karabakh 
War nor hailed from Artsakh. However, until 2020, it appeared that Pashinyan’s domestic 
policies and pivot toward Europe had little impact on the security of Armenia or Artsakh. 
Then, on July 12, skirmishes along the border between Armenia’s Tavush Province and 
Azerbaijan’s Tovuz District—far away from Artsakh—escalated into minor border war that 
resulted in the deaths of 17 soldiers: 5 Armenians and 12 Azeris.7 While the conflict quickly 
dissipated without any territorial changes, it had a profound effect on Azeri society. During the 
four days of fighting, Azeri Major General Polad Hashimov was killed by an Armenian strike. 
The death of General Hashimov, a popular figure in Azerbaijan, sparked a pro-war protest in 
Azerbaijan’s capital of Baku. Yelling slogans like “Karabakh or death,” an estimated 30,000 
Azeris took to the streets and even stormed the parliament building, in what became a protest 
against the government.8 Having long claimed that Azerbaijan’s army could easily overrun 
                                                 
6 “The Economist’s country of the year 2018.” The Economist. December 22, 2018. 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/12/22/the-economists-country-of-the-year-2018  
7 Hauer, Neil. “Armenia and Azerbaijan Are at War Again—and Not in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Foreign Policy. 
August 24, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/24/armenia-and-azerbaijan-are-at-war-again-and-not-in-
nagorno-karabakh/  




Armenia, Aliyev now faced the possibility of significant domestic unrest if he did not or could 
not deliver.9 
While the July clashes ended without further incident, they prompted a flurry of activity 
in Azerbaijan. In what now can be identified as preparation for war, Azerbaijan and Turkey held 
a thirteen day long joint military exercise involving a reported 11,000 Turkish troops in early 
August.10 At the same time, Azerbaijan dramatically increased its weapons purchases from 
Turkey, spending $36 million in July and $77 million in August, compared to just $10 million in 
the first seven months of the year.11 Finally, in the wake of the July fighting, reports began to 
emerge that Turkey was recruiting Syrian mercenaries to fight in Azerbaijan, a tactic Turkey had 
already used in Libya.12 While both Turkey and Azerbaijan denied the claim—and continue to 
do so—it has since become readily apparent that Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries fought for 
Azerbaijan in Artsakh. While it is unclear the extent to which the Armenian government was 
aware of these preparations prior to the September 27 attack, Armenian officials declared martial 
law within hours of the attack, indicating that they believed this renewal of hostilities was much 
                                                 
9 European Friends of Armenia. “Collection of war threat statements by the President Ilham Aliyev and other 
Azerbaijani officials.” July 31, 2018. https://eufoa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/AliyevWarThreats_update_31.07.2018.pdf  
10 Huseynov, Vasif. “Azerbaijan, Turkey Hold Large-Scale Military Drills Amidst Escalation of Tensions With 
Armenia.” Jamestown Foundation. August 14, 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-turkey-hold-large-
scale-military-drills-amidst-escalation-of-tensions-with-
armenia/#:~:text=On%20July%2029%2C%20Azerbaijan%20and,air%20forces%20from%20both%20countries.  
11 Toksabay, Ece. “Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan surged before Nagorno-Karabakh fighting.” Reuters. October 
14, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-armenia-azerbaijan-turkey-arms/turkish-arms-sales-to-azerbaijan-
surged-before-nagorno-karabakh-fighting-idUSKBN26Z237 
12  “Private sources … Starting transfer of 1st batch of Syrian mercenaries to Azerbaijan.” Syrian Observatory for 
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more severe than previous ceasefire violations.13  
While it had long been apparent that the conflict over Artsakh could erupt and that 
Azerbaijan’s military capabilities had surpassed Armenia, Armenia had relied upon Russia to 
keep the situation relatively stable. This strategy had worked in the past, with a Russian 
orchestrated ceasefire bringing a quick end to the April 2016 Four Day War, although it has also 
been suggested that Russia initially greenlit Azerbaijan’s 2016 attack to strengthen its position in 
the Caucasus.14 Of the three countries of the South Caucasus, Armenia is by far the closest to 
Russia. Not only does it host Russia’s last remaining military base in the region, it also the only 
CSTO member state in the region. Especially after the Four Day War demonstrated Azerbaijan’s 
improved military might, Russia was understood to be a necessary guarantor of the security of 
Armenia and, by extension, Artsakh. Under Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty, Russia and the other 
member states were obliged to treat an attack upon Armenia as an attack upon themselves. While 
such an obligation is ultimately voluntary and only ambiguously applied to Artsakh, Russia 
seemed to encourage such uncertainty. As Laurence Broers of the UK-based Chatham House 
think tank wrote in 2016, although Russia “both tolerates and encourages low-intensity warfare, 
it does appear to hold against an all-out war.”15 
However, faced with a full-scale war in the fall of 2020, Russia appeared unwilling or 
unable to prevent it. Beyond the fact that Turkey’s greatly increased support for Azerbaijan made 
it more difficult for Russia to unilaterally impose peace, Russia’s attempts to mediate the conflict 
were half-hearted. After being largely inactive for the first two weeks of fighting, Russia 
                                                 
13 Dallison, Paul. “Armenia declares martial law after clashes with Azerbaijan.” Politico. September 27, 2020. 
https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-declares-martial-law-azerbaijan-military/  
14 Jarosiewicz, Aleksandra and Falkowski, Maciej. “The four-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Centre for Eastern 
Studies. April 6, 2020. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/four-day-war-nagorno-karabakh  




mediated a temporary humanitarian ceasefire on October 10 in a marathon 10-hour long 
negotiating session in Moscow. However, just minutes after this ceasefire was slated to go into 
effect, Azeri forces launched fresh attacks on Armenian positions—ignoring the Moscow 
agreement, and drawing no meaningful response from Russia. Furthermore, while there were 
rumors that Russia was covertly providing more aid to Armenia than it publicly announced, 
President Putin explicitly stated that he did not consider Russia’s security agreements with 
Armenia to extend to Artsakh, giving Aliyev a green light to continue the war.16  
Russia’s relatively relaxed approach toward mediating the war likely had origins in a 
desire to punish Armenia for taking a less Russo-centric approach to foreign policy under 
Pashinyan. While maintaining a pro-Russia line on official matters, Pashinyan made several 
moves that alienated Russia and Putin personally. First, despite emphasizing that Russia would 
remain Armenia’s key strategic ally, Pashinyan made a decided push to bring Armenia closer to 
the West. As the European Policy Centre noted in May 2020, there had been an “increased 
intensity in EU-Armenian relations since Pashinyan became prime minister… The European 
Union (EU) has played a crucial role in supporting Pashinyan’s ambitious reform agenda.”17 
Second, Pashinyan’s crackdown on corruption—intentionally or not—implicated many 
prominent Armenians with close ties to Russia, including Yuri Khachaturov, the head of the 
CSTO military alliance, and Robert Kocharyan, Armenia’s former president and a personal 
friend of Putin.18 Finally, while downplayed by many observers of the Velvet Revolution in 
                                                 
16 “Russia’s Security Guarantees for Armenia Don’t Extend to Karabakh, Putin Says.” Moscow Times. October 7, 
2020. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/07/russias-security-guarantees-for-armenia-dont-extend-to-
karabakh-putin-says-a71687  
17 Sammut, Dennis. “Two years after the Velvet Revolution, Armenia needs the EU more than ever.” European 
Policy Centre. June 2, 2020. https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Two-years-after-the-Velvet-Revolution-Armenia-
needs-the-EU-more-than~33e910  
18 Baumgartner, Pete. “Moscow Watches Anxiously As Pashinian Realigns Armenia’s Foreign Policy.” RFE/RL. 




2018, there is a strong anti-democratic and especially anti-revolutionary trend among Russia’s 
elite; reports indicate that Putin himself “tends to take this issue personally, still feeling the old 
profound shock from watching helplessly as angry crowds marched by the Dresden KGB 
headquarters.”19 The combination of these factors created an incentive for Russia to allow a 
military defeat that would weaken Pashinyan’s support and potentially result in his removal and 
the return of the pro-Russian old guard. 
While Pashinyan likely knew that he risked alienating Russia by taking a more pro-
Western stance, he seems to have been counting on greater support from Europe and the United 
States. However, Azerbaijan’s attack was perfectly timed to be ignored by the West. With the 
world facing the coronavirus pandemic and focused on a historically bitter election in the United 
States, Western nations made little effort to intervene. Overshadowed by these other news 
stories, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan received only minimal attention. While both 
France and the United States—the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group along with Russia—held 
negotiations that resulted in a ceasefire announcement, these agreements were as ineffective as 
the one brokered by Russia. Despite efforts from Armenia and the Armenian diaspora to invite 
greater involvement from Western countries—pointing to instances of atrocities committed by 
Azeri forces and the likelihood of ethnic cleansing if Azerbaijan captured areas populated by 
Armenians—there was little appetite to engage. 
For Armenians who had assumed that their progress toward becoming a liberal 
democracy would result in greater aid from Western democracies, the lack of engagement came 
as a rude awakening. While Armenia certainly garnered more international sympathy than 
Azerbaijan, the sympathy did not translate to meaningful assistance. This attitude was perhaps 





best encapsulated by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement that the United States was 
“hopeful that the Armenians will be able to defend against what the Azeris are doing,” but would 
not be taking any substantial steps to bring about an end to the fighting.20 As Aris Roussinos 
wrote after the final agreement had been made, “The human rights NGOs who applauded 
Pashinyan’s reforms were silent once the war began. EU officials who’d encouraged Pashinyan’s 
westward path limited themselves to empty expressions of concern as the fighting raged.”21 
Disillusioned with the West and more dependent than ever on Russia’s military protection, 
Armenia is likely to now be pushed even further into Russia’s sphere of influence.  
Azeri officials reportedly expected to easily overpower Armenian defenders, taking 
control of significant amounts of territory in three to five days before negotiating a new ceasefire 
to legitimize its gains.22 However, aided by 30 years of defensive preparations and Artsakh’s 
mountainous terrain, the Armenians’ defense proved to be much tougher than Azerbaijan 
expected. After the first week of fighting, Azeri forces had only taken control of two small 
pockets of land. In the weeks that followed, however, Azerbaijan succeeded in capturing much 
of the low-lying land along the Iranian border and had made incursions into more mountainous 
areas near the town of Hadrut. As the fighting dragged on, Azerbaijan’s greater resources and 
technological advantage proved decisive. By the end of October, Azeri forces had taken an 
estimated 17.5% of the territory previously controlled by Armenians and was advancing toward 
the strategic Lachin Corridor that connects Artsakh to Armenia.23 A little over a week later, at 
                                                 
20 Baev, Pavel. “What explains Russia’s uncharacteristic indifference to the revolution in Armenia?” Barrons. May 
7, 2018. https://www.barrons.com/news/pompeo-hopes-armenia-to-defend-itself-against-azerbaijan-01602780605  
21 Roussinos, Aris. “Armenia: another country abandoned to its fate.” Unherd. November 13, 2020. 
https://unherd.com/thepost/armenia-another-country-abandoned-to-its-fate/  
22 Giragosian, Richard. “Azerbaijan’s ‘five day’ war turns uphill battle.” Asia Times. October 30, 2020. 
https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/azerbaijans-five-day-war-turns-uphill-battle/ 
23 O’Farrell, Ryan. @ryanmofarrell. “Footage from last night (can tell from the sunset) confirms that the Azerbaijani 
advance was *much* further up the Hakari river valley, within 10km of the Lachin highway, which is Stepanakert's 
last road to Armenia.” October 22, 2020. https://twitter.com/ryanmofarrell/status/1319312471048552450 
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around 2:00 AM on November 10, Pashinyan took to Facebook to announce that he had made 
the “extremely heavy” decision to sign a Russian-brokered agreement to end the war.24 
The agreement not only locked in Azerbaijan’s territorial gains—including the culturally 
and strategically important city of Shushi—but also forced Armenia and Artsakh to agree to 
return the surrounding regions to Azerbaijan. While a corridor connecting Artsakh to Armenia 
would be left open, Armenia was forced to agree to grant Azerbaijan passage through Armenian 
territory to the exclave of Nakhichevan. To enforce the agreement, Russian peacekeepers were 
sent to Artsakh, arriving within hours of Pashinyan’s announcement. To many in Armenia, the 
agreement amounted to an unacceptable capitulation. Now it was Armenian protestors who 
stormed the parliament, demanding Pashinyan’s resignation and alleging that he had ‘sold out’ 
by agreeing to hand over territory to Azerbaijan. Once one of the most popular leaders in modern 
Armenian history, Pashinyan is now a deeply divisive figure and even some of his former 
supporters have begun referring to him as a davajan—a traitor. In April, Pashinyan acceded to 
the opposition’s demands that he resign, but did so as a formality to trigger snap elections.25 
Now, Pashinyan is facing off against a slate of opposition candidates—including Armenia’s 
former strongman president, Robert Kocharyan—in an election that will have a profound effect 
on the country’s future. 
The future of the Artsakh conflict is just as uncertain. While the introduction of Russian 
peacekeepers has injected a degree of stability, the underlying conflict is perhaps even more 
dangerous than ever. The forty-four days of bloody fighting re-awoke tensions between 
Armenians and Azeris that are unlikely to soon heal. New sources of conflict have arisen as 
                                                 
24 Pashinyan, Nikol. Facebook. “Սիրելի հայրենակիցներ, քույրեր եւ եղբայրնե” [Dear compatriots, sisters and 
brothers]. November 9, 2020. https://www.facebook.com/nikol.pashinyan/posts/2807204759599901 




Armenia and Azerbaijan negotiate the process of delineating the border between the two 
countries—which, due to Armenia’s erstwhile control over the territories between it and Artsakh, 
had never before been a truly international divide. Finally, and most importantly, the 
fundamental question of whether Armenians or Azeris will control Artsakh has yet to be 
answered. While Azerbaijan has taken control of significant portions of Artsakh, tens of 
thousands of Armenians remain in the pocket of territory that remains under Armenian control 
and Russian protection.26 Without a negotiated solution—something that will almost certainly 
not happen without a concerted international effort—the question is not if there will be another 
war, but when. 
                                                 
26 “More than 93,000 Artsakh Residents Took Refuge in Armenia, Official Says.” Armenian Mirror-Spectator. 






Chapter One: The Mountain Fortress 
Artsakh Through the Ages 
 The history of the Armenian people has long been shaped by the geography of the region 
that has come to bear their name. Stretching from central Anatolia in the west to the Kura-Aras 
plains in the east, and from the Caucasus Mountains in the north to the low-lying lands of Syria 
and Iran in the south, the terrain of Armenian Highlands exerted a significant influence over the 
course of Armenian history.27 As the historian Robert Hewsen writes that, “there have been few 
countries in the world where geography has played a more important role than it has in Armenia. 
This role, in fact, has been decisive to the point where the destiny of the Armenian people may 
be said to have been largely predetermined by the location of the Armenian homeland and the 
nature of its terrain.”28 Located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the 
Armenian Highlands were a valuable prize for the many empires that surrounded it throughout 
history and, for much of that history, Armenia was subjected to foreign domination. Armenia 
frequently existed as a “precarious buffer spatiality, appearing ephemerally at moments of 
political vacuum in the rivalries between” empires.29 The conquest of Armenia by these foreign 
powers was made easier by its internal political divisions. While Armenia was traditionally seen 
as being composed of fifteen provinces, in reality “Armenia consisted not of large provinces but 
of nearly 200 districts large and small.”30 This lack of centralized rule, partially resulting from 
the difficulty of uniting such rugged terrain, made it easier for neighboring empires to conquer 
                                                 
27 Hovannisian, Richard, ed. The Armenian People From Ancient to Modern Times. Volume I. The Dynastic Periods: 
From Antiquity to the Fourteenth Century. New York: St Martin's Press, 1997, 2. 
28 Ibid. 
29  Broers, Laurence. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019, 
64. 
30 Hovannisian. The Armenian People: Volume I, 15. 
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Armenia. At the same time, however, Armenia’s geography enabled it to resist assimilation into 
the empires that ruled over it. While the mountainous terrain made it difficult for a single ruler to 
unite Armenia against foreign invaders, the same “lack of political unity meant the survival of its 
culture even when its kings were deposed and its capital cities destroyed.”31  
Perhaps nowhere in historical Armenia has the influence of geography been more 
decisive than in Artsakh—known more commonly in English as Nagorno-Karabakh. Located at 
the far eastern edge of the Armenian Highlands, Artsakh has long been “a quintessential 
borderlands.”32 Although geographically on the periphery of the Armenian world and exposed to 
a multitude of outside influences, Artsakh was also a stronghold of Armenian culture during 
periods that saw the rest of the Armenian Highlands fall under the control of foreign empires. As 
Laurence Broers writes, “The list of suzerains who have ruled today’s Karabakh from afar is 
long, encompassing Sasanid Iran, Arab Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates, Bagratid Georgia, 
Ilkhanid and Timurid Mongols, the Qara-Qoyunlu and Aq-Qoyunlu Turkmen tribal 
confederations, Safavid Iran, Nadir Shah, and finally the Russian Empire.”33 However, Artsakh 
also has a long history of resisting external domination. The particularly rugged topography of 
the region made it difficult for outsiders to exert local control and Artsakh has been “a 
stronghold of Armenian national identity from at least the ninth century.”34 
While it is unclear when Armenians first arrived in Artsakh, Hewsen places it within the 
lands controlled by the Orontid Kingdom—the first Armenian monarchy—between the fourth 
and second centuries B.C.35 He later muddles the issue to a certain degree, writing that the 
                                                 
31 Bournoutian, George. A Concise History of the Armenian People. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 
2002. 8. 
32 Broers. Anatomy of a Rivalry, 85. 
33 Ibid., 86-87. 
34 Hewsen, Robert. Armenia: A Historical Atlas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, 58. 
35 Ibid., 33 
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eastern frontier of Armenia was “acquired by the Armenians during the early second century 
B.C, when Strabo tells us that they conquered Phauēnē [Syunik], Otēnē [northwestern 
Azerbaijan and northeastern Armenia], and Kaspianē [northern Iran] under Artaxias I, and 
possibly the unnamed land of Arc’ax [Artsakh] which lay between the other three.”36 Other 
historians contest Hewsen’s conclusion, arguing that Strabo “says nothing of Artsakh and Utik, 
since these provinces were certainly already a part of Armenia” having been so since the Orontid 
period.37 Historian Levon Avdoyan takes a somewhat more conservative stance, arguing that 
“Armenians have been in the area now called Nagorno Karabakh since c. 370 A.D., if not 
before.”38 However, given the fact that Artsakh was counted as one of the traditional provinces 
of Armenia since the second century B.C, the earlier date given by Hewsen and Donabedian is 
likely correct. While it is possible, as Hewsen recognizes, that Artsakh, “may also have been 
originally more varied in ethnic character,” it can safely be said that Armenians have inhabited 
Artsakh in significant numbers for “well over a thousand years.”39  
The advent of genetic sequencing has allowed for further research into the history of 
Armenians in Artsakh, but unfortunately has failed to provide a definitive answer. On one hand, 
a team of researchers studying the mitochondrial DNA of 52 ancient skeletons from present-day 
Armenia and Artsakh found that “during the last eight millennia, there were no major genetic 
turnovers in the female gene pool in the South Caucasus.”40 While this would suggest that 
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today’s Armenians are the descendants of the region’s original inhabitants, the oldest samples 
taken specifically from Artsakh date back to the late first millennium B.C. rather than the 8000 
years of some of the other sites the researchers examined.41 Other research into the genetic 
history of Armenians supports the more conventional view that Armenians migrated into the 
Armenian Highlands between four and five thousand years ago. As the authors of this second 
study write, “Armenians show signatures of an origin from a mixture of diverse populations 
occurring from 3000 to 2000 BCE.”42 While this study did not examine the origin of the 
Armenians of Artsakh specifically, their findings would be consistent with Hewsen’s 
documentation of an Armenian conquest of Artsakh at or before 200 B.C. Regardless of whether 
Armenians are indeed indigenous to the Armenian Highlands or migrated into the region during 
the third millennium B.C, it is once again safe to say that genetic evidence demonstrates that 
Armenians have lived in Artsakh for thousands of years. While Artsakh has falled under the 
political authority of a dizzying list of empires over the past two millennia, protected by their 
mountains, Armenians remained the overwhelming majority of the region’s population 
throughout the political turmoil. 
As was also the case for much of historic Armenia, control over Artsakh vacillated 
between independent nakharars—Armenian noble houses—and foreign rulers. Indeed, the first 
recorded mention of the territory that comprises modern-day Artsakh comes from an eighth 
century B.C. inscription of the Urartian king Sarduri II that documents his conquest of what was 
then known as Urtekhini.43 After the Urartian Kingdom collapsed, Armenian kings took control 
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of Artsakh and would continue to rule over it with a few minor interruptions until 428 A.D. One 
of those interruptions came in 363 when the Persians defeated Rome and took control of 
Armenia, which had previously been a Roman vassal state.44 “Intent on teaching the Armenians 
a lesson they would not soon forget,” the Persians ravaged the country and stripped Armenia of 
several border regions, including Artsakh, which was handed over to the Caucasian Albanians, a 
confederation of tribes from present-day Azerbaijan.45 However, the tide quickly reversed and in 
the 370s the combined forces of Armenia and Rome “returned these territories to Armenia…and 
restored the Armenian-Albanian frontier at the Kura River.”46  
Although the Romans enjoyed a temporary superiority over the Persians in Armenia 
following their victory, their dominance did not last. Following conflict between pro-Persian and 
pro-Roman nakharars, Armenia was formally partitioned between the Persian Empire and 
Eastern Rome in 387, leaving Artsakh under the control of Persia but still part of a distinct 
Armenian state.47 The status of Artsakh changed once again in 428 when the Sassanids dissolved 
the Armenian Kingdom and divided their Caucasian possessions into three administrative 
districts, beginning “a new period in which Artsakh (the future Karabagh) and Utik were 
politically cut off from Armenia.”48 Following a Persian attempt to forcibly convert Armenia to 
Zoroastrianism, Armenians, led by Vartan Mamikonian, revolted against the Sassanids in a bid to 
reassert their independence.49 While the Armenian forces were defeated at the Battle of Avarayr 
in 451, the military defeat turned into a political victory as the Sassanids adopted a more tolerant 
religious policy toward Armenia in the face of unexpectedly fierce resistance.50 
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Although the uprising failed to liberate the majority of Persian Armenia, Artsakh, which 
had been one of the centers of Armenian opposition to the Sassanids, was annexed by Caucasian 
Albania during the rebellion along with the Armenian province of Utik to its east.51 Albania, 
which had formerly referred to the territory to the east of the Kura River, now shifted to the 
southwest as the tribes along the shores of the Caspian Sea broke off and became separate 
entities.52 Representing approximately half of Albania’s territory and forming more homogenous 
group than tribes that made up the rest of the kingdom, “the Armenian element was progressively 
able to impose its language and its culture” on the rest of Albania.53 Indeed, “some sources 
(mainly Armenian ones) suggest that the early kings of Albania were of Armenian origin, and 
descendants of an ancient noble family called the Arranshahik.”54 While still culturally and 
politically distinct from Armenia, Caucasian Albania came to have much in common with 
Armenians. The Caucasian Albanian church, having been largely established by Armenian 
missionaries in the fourth century, fell under the authority of the Armenian Church.55 Albanian 
architecture, particularly ecclesiastical architecture, was influenced by Armenian designs.56 
Armenian tradition holds that Mesrob Mashtots—the creator of the Armenian alphabet—also 
developed the Albanian alphabet, although this claim is disputed.57 
The Albanians would continue to control Artsakh until the early seventh century, when it 
was captured by the Persian Mihranid dynasty.58 The Mihranids would control Artsakh for close 
to 200 years, and “became related by marriage to the Aranshahiks, adopted Christianity, and 
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rapidly assimilated into the Armenian majority.”59 Then, in the late eight century, an Arab 
invasion under the Umayyad dynasty forced the Mihranids to submit to the authority of the 
caliph, reuniting Artsakh with the rest of Armenia—albeit under a foreign power—for the first 
time in 350 years. The Arab conquest “had a twofold effect on Armenia. No counterbalancing 
power was left in the area to support and protect the Armenians against the new conquerors… 
Once this domination was established, however, Armenia found itself for the first time in almost 
a millennium outside the theater of international warfare.”60 United for the first time in centuries, 
Armenia was able to attain greater unity than had been possible while divided between the 
Persians and Romans. While still definitively subject to Arab rule, “Armenia through almost the 
whole of the seventh century had the status of an autonomous, if tributary, state.”61  
The decline of the Umayyad dynasty and rise of the Abbasids in 750 gave the Armenians, 
who had grown discontent with increasing taxation and decreasing religious tolerance, an 
opportunity to rebel against their Arab rulers.62 The uprising was led by the Mamikonians, the 
descendants of Vartan Mamikonian and the preeminent family among the nakharars, who were 
dissatisfied by the Umayyad’s preference for the rival Bagratuni family.63 While the 
Mamikonians and Bagratunis temporarily joined together against the Abbasids, infighting 
between the two houses and a lack of hoped-for Byzantine support resulted in the uprising 
failing.64 While another failed uprising in 775 would spell the end of the Mamikonian house, the 
Bagratunis succeeded in regaining and even strengthening their position, replacing the 
Mamikonians as the dominant force in Armenia’s domestic politics.65 The Bagratunis continued 
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to consolidate power while remaining under the authority of the Abbasids, with their patriarch 
Ashot Msaker eventually being named Prince of Armenia by the caliph in 804.66 While this put 
Artsakh at least nominally under the control of Armenians once again, the Iranian revolutionary 
leader Babak Khorramdin soon gained possession of it through a marriage to the daughter of the 
Armenian prince Vasak in 824.67 However, only twelve years later, a military campaign led by 
the Abbasids captured Artsakh and other territories held by Babak, rejoining them to Abbasid 
Armenia.68 This arrangement was also short lived, coming to an end in 850 when the nakharars 
united behind the Bagratunis mounted a second rebellion against Arab rule.69 The Abbasids 
successfully put down the first rebellion, killing or capturing the leading nakharars and forcing 
Armenia into submission.70 However, internal dissent among the Abbasids a generation later 
allowed the Bagratunis to finally seize power, taking control of much of Armenia between 855 
and 862.71  The Bagratuni dynasty would be the last independent Armenian state until the 
modern era. Forming an alliance with the Bagratids of Georgia—a possibly related noble family 
whose name they adopted—the Bagratunis, now Bagratids, were able to establish “a new 
autonomous state based on the northwest portion of the plateau, such as Armenia had not known 
for centuries.”72 
Despite their success in creating the first independent Armenian state in almost half a 
millennium, the Bagratids were not able to unite the entirety of Armenia under their rule. Not 
only did they face external obstacles in the form of a resurgent Byzantine Empire and Arab 
emirates that had split off from the declining Abbasid Caliphate, “the five hundred years of 
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partitions and decentralization had resulted in political fragmentation and the loss of a 
framework for a single state” and the Bagratids were often challenged by rival nakharars who 
resisted their authority.73 While the Bagratids succeeded in securing the loyalty of the nakharars 
from Artsakh, their control over the region—and most of Armenia—was tenuous, resting 
“ultimately on the personal authority of the ruler rather than on any traditional or legal 
foundation.”74  
This internal dissent proved nearly fatal to the Bagratid Kingdom, when, in 909, the Emir 
of Azerbaijan—a term that then applied to northern Iran rather than the Azerbaijan of today—
Yusuf ibn Abi'l-Saj attacked the Bagratids with the assistance of rival Armenian factions.75 
Yusuf and his Armenian allies succeeded in routing the Bagratids, capturing and executing the 
Bagratid king Smbat and forcing the remaining loyal forces to retreat to more defensible 
positions, including Artsakh.76 However, “the cruelty of Yusuf toward Smbat and other 
nakharars costs him the support of Gagik Artsruni and other Armenian leaders who now joined 
Smbat’s son Ashot II…and drove the Muslims out of most of Greater Armenia.”77 The Bagratid 
dynasty would continue to rule Armenia for over another century, until a crisis of succession in 
1020 exposed the fundamental instability of Bagratid rule. Aided by the threat of Turkic tribes 
from the east and the partitioning of the kingdom between rival heirs, the Byzantine Empire 
succeeded in annexing—through both invitation and force—the majority of Bagratid territory by 
1064.78 However, rather than joining the Byzantine Empire, Artsakh, together with the 
Kingdoms of Syunik and Lori, assumed an autonomous status that it would retain until 1450.79 
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The Arrival of the Turks 
While Turkic tribes had been present in the Caucasus since the middle of the fourth 
century, settling in present-day Azerbaijan between the fifth and seventh centuries, they were 
relatively few in number and did not significantly alter the region’s demographics or politics.80 
Based on the writings of the tenth century historian Tabari’s, it appears that the Khazars—a 
partly Turkic confederation—first began settling in Albania along the western bank of the Kura 
river in the mid-sixth century.81 However, while they would eventually come to occupy the 
lowlands of the Kura-Arax plain, the mountains of Artsakh remained almost exclusively 
populated by Armenians and Albanians.82 The arrival of the Turks combined with Arab rule 
beginning in the seventh century spelled the end of the Caucasian Albanians as a distinct people, 
with many converting to Islam and “the remaining Albanian people were driven into Armenia by 
the Khazars.”83 However, the full impact of the Turkic tribes would not be realized until the 
appearance of the Seljuks several hundred years later. As Audrey Altstadt writes in her history of 
the Azeri people, “Complete Turkization of eastern Caucasia” did not occur until “the arrival of 
the Seljuks in the 11th century and [was] more fully consolidated with Turkish migration during 
the 13th-century Mongol eruption.”84 
The first to unite the various Turkic tribes that had come to inhabit the South Caucasus, 
the Seljuks, a tribe of Oghuz Turks, “managed to impose their authority over all the existing 
Turkic tribes north of the Kura river and even gain the loyalty of a majority of the local feudal 
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princes.”85 With the strength of this combined force, Seljuk commander Togrul-Bey conquered 
first Iran in the 1020’s and then most of the Middle East by 1055.86 The Seljuks then turned their 
attention to the Byzantine Empire, which had taken control of much of the Armenian Highlands 
after the collapse of the Bagratid Kingdom. After defeating the Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV 
Diogenes in 1071, the Seljuks took control of most of Armenia.87 However, just as they had 
resisted the Byzantines a few decades prior, “the nakharars of Artsakh (Karabagh), Siunik 
(Zangezur), Gugark (Lori), Sasun, and other mountainous regions…maintained viable military 
forces and remained autonomous.”88  
In Artsakh, the Kingdom of Khachen, which had been a vassal of the Bagratids since it 
first emerged in 885, assumed independence.89 As one of the few kingdoms that successfully 
resisted the Seljuk invasion, Khachen served as a “refuge and bastion” for Armenians fleeing 
from nearby territories that had been conquered.90 By 1000, Khachen had become “a formal 
kingdom,” and comprised a small pocket of independent Armenia surrounded by the Seljuks.91 
While the Seljuks were unable to bring Artsakh under their rule and appeared content to allow it 
to remain independent, the decline of the Seljuks in the late eleventh century began a period of 
“incessant confrontations between generals, emirs, and Seljuk sultans, as well as between 
indigenous princes and Turkish chieftains, which would last until the second half of the twelfth 
century.”92 During this time of instability, Artsakh was administered by the Turkish Emir of 
Gandzak (present-day Ganja) and “the Armenian lords…lost a great deal in Artsakh as well, but 
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were not completely eliminated there.”93 Artsakh would be reconquered by a Georgian-
Armenian military alliance in 1199, and for a few decades, Artsakh fell under the authority of the 
short-lived Zakarid Principality.94 
The Mongol invasion of the southern Caucasus in the middle of the thirteenth century 
conquered much of Armenia, driving the Zakarids out of Artsakh. However, Armenians led by 
“Hasan Jalal, the governor of Khachen-Artsakh managed to preserve the semi-independent status 
of the territory.”95 While pledging loyalty to the Mongols, Hasan Jalal retained independence in 
domestic affairs.96 Not only was Khachen’s autonomy a political achievement, it also helped 
foster a flourishing culture, and it was “during this period [that] valuable architectural ensembles 
such as the church and vestibule of Hovhannes Mkrtich in Gandzasar Monastery, the Dadi 
Monastary Cathedral Church, and Gtchavank Cathedral Church were built.”97 Despite recurring 
Mongol invasions throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the subjugation and 
decimation of vast swaths of Armenia, the Armenian princes of Artsakh and a few other small 
mountainous regions managed to maintain a semiautonomous status, though even they too were 
periodically invaded by Mongol forces.98 During the fifteenth century, the eastern portion of 
Armenia around Artsakh was ruled first by the Kara Koyunlu and then by the Ak Koyunlu 
Dynasties, both of which were comprised of Oghuz Turkic tribes.99 However, as Dickran 
Kouymjian writes, “there were still autonomous and semiautonomous Armenian nakharars units 
of varying size, especially in Siunik and Karabagh, but they affected only a small portion of the 
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population.”100 Indeed, “by the sixteenth century Armenian nobility (except in the remote areas 
of Karabagh) had all but vanished.”101 
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman and Safavid empires 
battled for control over the Armenian Highlands. When the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab divided 
Armenia between the Safavid Empire in the east and the Ottoman Empire in the west, Artsakh 
fell under the lands ceded to Safavids.102 However, the Safavids encountered “a number of small 
principalities in Karabagh which were ruled by local Armenian mountain chieftains called 
meliks. Recognizing the impregnability of these mountain fortresses, the Safavids, like the 
Turkic and Mongol rulers before them, granted the meliks an autonomous status.”103 Despite 
accepting the authority of the Safavids, the meliks retained “total independence in matters of 
internal government and the right to maintain an army.”104 While they were able to maintain 
their individual independence, “rivalries among the meliks prevented them from becoming a 
formidable force against the Muslims.”105 Although infighting may have prevented a larger 
Armenian state from forming, preserving some form of independence was no small feat. As 
Kouymjian writes, “it was in Mountainous Karabagh that autonomous rule seems to have 
survived best during the dark days of the sixteenth century.”106 
The collapse of the Safavid Empire in the 1720s brought both Russian and Ottoman 
armies into Transcaucasia.107 While Russian assurances of support had inspired an Armenian 
resistance, the help failed to materialize and the Ottomans captured the vast majority of 
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Armenia.108 For almost a decade, between 1724 and 1232, “the only unconquered land left for 
the Ottoman armies were Artsakh and Syunik, regions that had essentially achieved 
independence at the time.”109 Although Ottoman forces attempted to conquer Artsakh in 
February 1725, their attack was quickly rebuffed by the meliks. In both Artsakh and Syunik, 
Armenian forces under the command of Davit Bek “managed to keep much of the highlands in 
Armenian hands until the revival of Persia” in 1735 forced the Ottomans to withdraw to the 
border established in 1639.110 
The new Persian shah, Nader Khan Afshar, rewarded the meliks of Artsakh for their 
assistance against the Ottomans by “recognizing Karabagh and Zangezur as semiautonomous 
enclaves.”111 However, the assassination of Nader in 1747 threw the Persians into disarray, 
allowing Turkic tribes to take control of Eastern Armenia, including Artsakh.112 Taking 
advantage of the divisions between the meliks, the Turkic ruler Panah Ali Khan conquered 
Artsakh and declared himself the Khan of Karabakh.113 While Persian forces quickly 
reestablished their suzerainty over the region, the Karabakh Khanate under the Javanshir tribe 
remained semi-independent, just as earlier Armenian meliks had.114 In 1750, under the direction 
of Panah Ali, a new fortification was created on the site of Davit Bek’s former capital.115 
Panakhabad—today known as Shushi to Armenians and Shusha to Azeris—would become the 
cultural center of Artsakh for both Armenians and Azeris. Politically, the Karabakh Khanate 
experienced a significant degree of turmoil. In 1796, Persia, now ruled by Afghan lords, 
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occupied Shushi and began “plundering the former khanate while local land-owners fought petty 
wars over property—in all, a general state of anarchy.”116  
 
Artsakh Under the Russian Empire 
This period of anarchy was brought to an end by the conclusion of the 1804 - 1813 
Russo-Persian War, when Russian forces invaded Artsakh and forced the Karabakh Khanate to 
become a Russian vassal.117 Following a period of military rule, the Russians reorganized the 
Caucasus’ administrative districts in 1840, creating the Georgian-Imeretian guberniia and the 
Caspian oblast with Artsakh in the latter and the majority of Armenia in the former.118 Only five 
years later, the Russians once again reorganized the Caucasus, this time placing Artsakh and 
most of present-day Azerbaijan in the Shemakhi—later Baku—guberniia.119 Finally, in 1868, the 
administrative status of the region was finalized with the creation of the Elizavetpol guberniia, 
which combined Artsakh and Syunik with the plains of present-day Azerbaijan to the north and 
east.120 The Russians largely succeeded where the Persians and Ottomans had failed, directly 
governing Artsakh without the intermediary of a semiautonomous Armenian state. The Russians 
were able to achieve this accomplishment thanks to the cooperation of the local Armenians, who 
welcomed Russian rule, even forming volunteer brigades during the Russo-Persian War to 
support the Russians.121 To many Armenians, “Russia symbolized an advanced civilization and 
society, a champion of Christendom against Islam, and the hope for emancipation.”122 The 
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attraction of Russian rule was sufficiently powerful to induce large numbers of Armenian 
immigrants from the Ottoman Empire and Persia, creating “a compact Armenian majority on a 
small part of their historic homeland.”123 While the majority of these arrivals from Western 
Armenia settled in present-day Armenia or Nakhichevan, some chose to settle in Artsakh.124  
 The inclusion of Artsakh within the Elizavetpol guberniia, though not particularly 
contentious at the time, proved to be perhaps the most fateful decision made by the Russians in 
the Caucasus. During the following fifty years of Tsarist rule, Artsakh would become 
economically linked with the lowlands to its east rather than mountains of Armenia to its west.125 
While the Russians constructed roads and railroads connecting Shushi with Baku and other cities 
in present-day Azerbaijan, no such effort was made to allow for easier travel between Artsakh 
and Armenia.126 As Michael Croissant explains, “By linking the highlands of Karabakh with the 
plains to the east, the Russians brought the economies and transportation networks of both areas 
closer together, with Nagorno-Karabakh becoming integrated gradually but completely into the 
economic system of eastern Transcaucasia.”127 When national borders were drawn in the early 
20th century, these economic ties and the assumption that Artsakh belonged in the same political 
unit as the rest of the Elizavetpol guberniia contributed to Artsakh being placed in Azerbaijan 
rather than Armenia.  
 While communal relations between Armenians and Azeris were generally peaceful 
throughout Russia’s rule of the Caucasus, the seeds of tension were already somewhat apparent. 
Armenians, while concentrated most heavily in the Erivan guberniia, were “scattered throughout 
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every province of Transcaucasia” and comprised a small but significant minority in Azeri cities 
such as Baku.128 The status of Armenians as “a wealthy minority who enjoyed a special 
relationship with the Russians” formed a “basis for both conflict and cooperation.”129 The 
economic success of the Armenians and their close relations with the Russians “caused feelings 
of resentment that gradually coalesced into anti-Armenian feelings” among many Azeris.130 As 
the Azeri and Armenian nationalist movements developed and strengthened during the course of 
the nineteenth century, the two groups increasingly came to define each other—rather than the 
Russians—as the enemy. As Croissant writes, “Azeri national consciousness developed not so 
much against the Russian colonizer as against the Armenians…[and] the budding Armenian 
nationalist movement in Russia in the late nineteenth century tended to foment further anti-
Turkish, and therefore anti-Azerbaijani, sentiment.”131 The fact that both Armenian and Azeri 
nationalism tended to concentrate on the other group rather than the Russians was not accidental. 
As Hovannisian concludes, the idea that Russian authorities in the South Caucasus encouraged 
“Ameno-Tatar conflicts so that both peoples would be distracted from the current of 
revolution…is not without validity.”132 
Revolution, War, and Genocide 
 As revolution and unrest spread across the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, 
“Violence erupted in and around Erevan in February 1905, in Nakhjivan in May, in Shusha in 
June, and in Ganje and Tiflis in November.”133 Violence was also visited upon the Armenians of 
Baku and “For more than a month, mobs of Azeris rampaged through the Armenian quarter of 
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the city…By the time the violence was brought to an end by the pleas of local religious leaders, 
600 Azerbaijanis and 900 Armenians had been killed.”134 Fighting was particularly intense in 
Artsakh. Armenian historian Mikayel Varandyan found that, “in none of Transcaucasia’s towns 
were the Armenian-Turkish clashes as furious and bloody as in Karabakh and its capital city of 
Shushi.”135 During the fighting, Azeris captured and desecrated the Aguletsots church and 
launched attacks on the Armenian quarter but were pushed back while Armenians burned Azeri 
homes.136 According to Italian diplomat and historian Luigi Villari, “the number of killed and 
wounded [in Shushi] amounted to about 300, of whom two-thirds were Tatars, since the 
Armenians were better shots and also enjoyed the advantage of position.”137 Although violence 
in the major cities was relatively short-lived, intermittent fighting would continue for the 
following two years, resulting in “Thousands of casualties and property losses amounting to over 
forty million rubles.”138  
The violence spurred on the burgeoning nationalist movements in both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, with Artsakh becoming “a hotbed for the growth of Armenian nationalism following 
the violence of 1905.”139 While the 1905 clashes are often cited as the first outbreak of violence 
between Azeris and Armenians, suggesting a relatively recent origin for the Armenian-Azeri 
conflict, this is only partially true.140 Armenians and the Turkic tribes from which Azeris are 
descended had been intermittently fighting for control of Artsakh since the arrival of the Seljuks. 
Even in 1905 there was already discussion of the “longstanding antagonism” between Armenians 
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and Azeris.141 The nationalistic conception of the conflict that rose to prominence in the early 
20th century, however, was a new development, one that would have significant impacts on the 
next century of the conflict. The re-imposition of firm Russian rule in 1907 brought an end to the 
violence, but did little to address the underlying sources of conflict which would emerge once 
again following the collapse of the Romanov dynasty in 1917. 
 Although fighting along the Caucasus Front during World War I never reached Artsakh, 
the war had an extremely consequential effect on the region. While the Azeris, as Muslims, were 
banned from military service in the Russian Empire and thus were not conscripted, Armenians 
formed several volunteer units that fought alongside the Russian Army.142 Although officially 
subject to the Russian Caucasus Army Command, the “immediate contact and orders emanated 
from the special Armenian committee in charge of volunteer activities.”143 In sharp contrast to 
the Azeris and Georgians, who were largely ambivalent toward—or even supportive of—the 
possibility of an Ottoman victory, “the Armenian populace was struck with horror, for little 
compassion was expected from Enver Pasha.”144 The Hamidian Massacres of 1894-1895 that 
had resulted in the deaths of around 100,000 Armenians and the Adana Massacre of 1909 which 
killed over 19,000 more had shown Armenians that Russian rule was far preferable to the 
Ottomans.145 In January 1915, a decisive Russian victory over the Ottomans at Sarikamish gave 
Armenians hope for an “expected occupation of the entire Plateau by Russian troops,” which 
could reunite Western and Eastern Armenia under the control of a friendly power.146  
 This hope was dashed in cruelest of ways when, instead of being liberated by the 
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Russians, the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were instead subjected to the horrors of the 
Armenian Genocide, beginning with the arrest and execution of prominent Armenians in 
Constantinople on April 24, 1915.147 Blaming the Armenians for their military defeats against 
the Russians, the Young Turks orchestrated a campaign of mass killings and deportations against 
the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire that resulted in the death of well over a million 
Armenians and the removal of hundreds of thousands more from historic Armenia. The exact 
number of victims has become a contentious historical question, with “the most commonly 
accepted figure” of several decades ago and the number normally cited by Armenians today 
being 1.5 million.148 Since then, there have been efforts by pro-Armenian and pro-Turkish 
scholars to respectively raise and lower that number with little conclusive results. In addition to 
the removal—through both killings and deportations—of over three-quarters of the Ottoman 
Empire’s Armenian population, the vast majority of those remaining were forced to adopt Islam 
in order to force assimilation into the Turkish population.149 Just as the Young Turk rulers of the 
Ottoman Empire intended, the Armenian Genocide all but ensured that there would be no 
Armenian majority in the western portion of the Armenian Highlands that could mount a bid for 
statehood. 
 While Artsakh remained under Russian control and was not directly affected by the 
Armenian Genocide, the legacy and memories of the genocide would significantly impact the 
later conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ever since 1915, the Armenian Genocide has 
“constituted a layer of collective memory that rested just below the surface of [Armenian] 
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life.”150 The Armenian Genocide, which “now provides the archetype by which Armenians 
understand grave or threatening events,” would become a powerful reference for the Armenian 
struggle for Artsakh in the 1980s and 90s.151 As Nora Dudwich—an anthropologist who 
witnessed the Armenian protests in the late 1980s—wrote, “every social and political problem 
took on additional significance as containing a threat to the Armenians’ continued existence as a 
people.”152 The Genocide also “embedded the trope of ‘lost lands’ at the heart of Armenian 
geopolitical culture,” which would later be applied to Artsakh.153 Although Azeris themselves 
were not involved in the Armenian Genocide, their close association with Turkey—and their 
later denial of the Genocide—would further corrode the already hostile relationship between the 
two groups. 
 The overthrow of the Tsar in March 1917 and the Bolsheviks’ subsequent rise to power 
in November “threw Transcaucasia into turmoil.”154 While “the Armenians, Georgians, and 
Muslims of Transcaucasia hailed the revolution that ended the 300-year reign of the Romanov 
dynasty,” they were “nearly unanimous” in their opposition to the Bolshevik’s rise to power.155 
With the exception of the Baku Soviet, where many members had already resigned in protest, the 
Transcaucasian territories rejected the authority of the Bolsheviks’ Sovnarkom.156 Instead, “a 
multinational congress of Transcaucasian representatives met in Tiflis in November 1917 to 
create a provisional regional executive body.”157 The resulting commissariat and the 
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legislature—called the Seim—that was formed in February 1918 continued to maintain that 
“Transcaucasia formed an integral unit of the (nonexistent) Russian democracy.”158 However, 
the mass desertion of Russian soldiers left Armenian and Georgian forces alone “to defend a 
300-mile perimeter formerly secured by up to a half million Russian regulars.”159 The position of 
the Transcaucasian forces was further weakened by the Bolsheviks accession to the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk that “recognized the right of the Ottoman Empire to regain all of Turkish 
Armenian and to occupy the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum.”160  
 As Georgian and Armenian forces fought the advancing Ottomans in the west, 
Azerbaijan was undergoing domestic turmoil. While most Azeris supported the Musavat Party—
which advocated for “nationalism, Türkchülük [“Turk-ness”], halkchilik [populism] and 
modernization,” in Baku the Bolsheviks took control of the City Council and the local 
garrison.161 The Bolsheviks, led by an Armenian named Stepan Shaumian and enjoying the 
cooperation of the Hay Heghapokhagan Dashnaktsutiun—the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation, commonly referred to as the Dashnaks or ARF—were seen by many Azeris as a pro-
Armenian force.162 On March 30, 1918,  the arrival and subsequent disarming of “the so-called 
Savage Division, manned by Azeri volunteers and soldiers of fortune and armed and paid for by 
Turkish agents” sparked an Azeri uprising against the Bolsheviks.163 Overnight, “barricades 
went up in Muslim quarters” and the following morning “Azerbaijani spokesmen demanded that 
their community be armed like the others.”164  
Negotiations quickly turned violent, pitting the Bolsheviks and their Dashnak allies 
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against the Azeri troops.165 The fighting turned into a massacre as the Bolsheviks unleashed 
artillery on residential areas, forcing “immediate capitulation and acceptance of the soviet’s 
ultimatum: unconditional recognition of the soviet’s power and withdrawal of all ‘Muslim’ 
forces from the city.”166 The Dashnaks, who served as the primary ground force for the 
Bolsheviks, began “looting, burning and killing in the Muslim section of the city…for a day and 
a half.”167 Shaumian estimated that the violence resulted in 3,000 deaths, but present-day 
accounts place the number as high as 12,000.168 A parallel episode of violence would be visited 
on the Armenians of Baku five months later when Turkish and Azeri forces captured the city in 
September and “swarmed throughout the city plundering and killing…Conservative estimates of 
Armenian dead are close to ten thousand, while many sources claim that from twenty to thirty 
thousand Christians were slaughtered.”169 The March Days—as the massacre of Azeris would 
come to be known thanks to the use of the Gregorian Calendar—and the September Days 
marked further episodes of violence between Armenians and Azeris that damaged the possibility 
of coexistence between the two groups.  
 In April, facing the possibility of having to fight against the Ottoman army and with 
Bolsheviks in now firmly control of Baku, the Seim’s “Muslim spokesmen made it known that 
they would not take arms against a kindred people,” marking the end of any remaining Azeri 
military support.170 Georgian representatives initially “pledged…a resolute defense of the front,” 
but following the capture of Batumi—the defense of which had been the motivating factor 
behind Georgians willingness to oppose Ottoman forces—on April 14, 1918 they “bowed to the 
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Ottoman conditions for negotiations—a declaration of Transcaucasia’s total separation from 
Russia and the recognition of the territorial rights of Turkey.”171 Forced to choose between 
defending against the Ottomans alone or joining with Georgians and Azeris in declaring 
independence from Russia, the Armenians reluctantly chose the latter, and representatives of all 
three groups declared Transcaucasia independent on April 22, 1918.172 For Armenians, 
independence meant the loss of any remaining hope of Russian intervention and was seen by 
many as “a huge and horrifying stride toward consummation of the pan-Turkic goals of the 
Young Turk dictatorship.”173 However, beset by internal division, the union of the three 
Caucasian states proved to be extremely short lived.  
 While the Azeris pursued “close collaboration with the Ottomans” and hoped “for a 
further Turkish advance,” the Christian Georgians and Armenians feared a loss of independence 
and massacres at the hands of the Young Turks.174 Seeking to protect Georgia from Ottoman 
domination, Georgian leaders appealed to Turkey’s German ally for protection. However, doing 
so required “severing bonds with Armenians, for it was clear that they were doomed and Georgia 
could not afford to perish with them.”175 The Georgians and Germans began a series of secret 
negotiations, adopting an agreement “whereby Germany would extend protection of Georgia in 
return for economic concessions.”176 On May 26, 1918, the Georgian representatives at the Seim 
announced their intention to declare independence and sponsored a motion to dissolve the 
Transcaucasian Republic, proclaiming that “basic differences among the peoples who had 
created the Transcaucasian Republic” made its continued existence impossible.177 The following 
                                                 
171 Ibid., 292-293 
172 Ibid., 293-294 
173 Ibid. 
174 Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 182. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Hovannisian, The Armenian People: Volume II, 296. 
177 Ibid. 297. 
36 
 
day, the Muslim National Council declared independence as Azerbaijan and—again 
reluctantly—Armenians followed, declaring their own independence on May 28.178 
The departure of the Georgians seemed to many to signal “that the end of the Armenian 
people had come. Four Turkish divisions had begun an attack on Kharakilisa (today’s Vanadzor), 
Bash Aparan, and Sardarapat.”179 With Yerevan—the last major Armenian city—only a few 
hours march away, “It seemed that there would be no deliverance for the thousands of natives 
and refuges in the province.”180 However, a last-ditch Armenian defense beginning on May 21 
kicked off “three days of fierce combat [after which] the Armenians remained firm and the 
Turkish regiments were in retreat.”181 The Armenians, saved from complete destruction by this 
victory, were nevertheless forced to sign an agreement with the Ottoman Empire that left 
Armenia with only around half of the Erevan province and to allow for “the unhindered transit of 
Turkish troops and supplies across the republic.”182 Azerbaijan likewise signed a treaty with the 
Ottomans, though their agreement “was more in the nature of an alliance” than a surrender.183  
 The creation of three separate states out of the former Transcaucasian Republic, however, 
posed a significant challenge in regard to the creation of borders. With a significant dispersal of 
ethnic groups throughout the Caucasus, each of the three newly independent countries claimed 
territory that was also claimed by their neighbors.184 While the question of control over these 
territories—including Artsakh—had been put aside during the brief period of cooperation that 
followed the Russian Revolution, the declarations of independence brought the issue to the 
forefront. At the same time that both Armenia and Azerbaijan laid claim to Artsakh, on July 22, 
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1918 the First Congress of the Armenians of Karabakh declared their own independence and set 
about creating their own state.185 The combination of these territorial disputes and the existence 
of armed national units from all three republics, meant that “all Caucasia was set for armed 
conflict.”186 Although Armenia had been turned into “a land of refugees” by the Armenian 
Genocide and forced to sign a humiliating treaty with the same government that had committed 
it, the Armenians were not at a complete disadvantage in their struggle with Azerbaijan over 
these disputed regions.187 In contrast to the Armenian forces which had been hardened by their 
struggle against the Ottomans, “The Azerbaijanis were least prepared” among the three countries 
of Transcaucasia “because of their long exclusion from military service and a lack of equipment, 
training, and arms.”188  
 The weakness of the Azeri situation in Artsakh was compounded by the overwhelming 
numerical superiority of the Armenians. While Azeris formed a majority in the Elizavetpol 
guberniia as a whole, in Artsakh they were outnumbered almost three-to-one by Armenians.189 
After seeking assistance from Baku—which was still in the hands of the Bolsheviks—to little 
avail, the Azeris of Artsakh turned to “the Turkish-Azeri alliance preparing to march on 
Bolshevik Baku. On September 22, shortly after the [Baku] Commune’s downfall, Turkish and 
Azeri troops moved into Karabakh…After three days, Shusha fell.”190 The arrival of these Azeri 
and Ottoman forces in Artsakh, however, did not go unopposed. The Armenian military leader 
Andranik—who had broken with Armenia’s Dashnak leadership over the treaty with the 
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Ottoman Empire and had been fighting the Ottomans in Syunik—“immediately set off to repel 
the Turks from Karabagh.”191 Andranik and his forces “pushed Nuri Pasha’s troops back from 
Mardakert (Agdara) while guerilla units under a young commander named Aslan 
Muradkhanian…forced them to withdraw from Veranda [Fuzuli]. Irritated by Nuri Pasha’s 
failure to place Karabakh under control, the Sublime Porte recalled him and his troops.”192  
With the departure of the Ottoman soldiers, Andranik was poised to consolidate 
Armenian control first in Shushi and then over all of Artsakh. However, “his force was stopped 
short of its objective when Allied officers intercepted him and insisted that he return to Zangezur 
[Syunik] and await the just decision of the Paris Peace Conference.”193 While Andranik 
complied with the request, before a final verdict had been reached in Paris, the situation on the 
ground in both Armenia and Azerbaijan had rendered the conference’s decision redundant. The 
British, who had taken a position of authority in the Caucasus following the end of World War I, 
“motivated by strategic and economic concerns, embarked immediately upon a generally pro-
Azerbaijani policy…In order to induce goodwill, the British set out to provide the Azerbaijanis 
with an important carrot: The attachment of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Republic of 
Azerbaijan”194 Initially, the Armenians of Artsakh “refused to hear of even temporary 
Azerbaijani jurisdiction. But acts of Armenian defiance led to the massacre and razing of four 
Armenian villages in June.”195 With the Republic of Armenia facing its own difficulties and 
unable to offer assistance, the military balance of power began to shift back towards the Azeri 
forces.196 Following announcement that British forces would withdraw from the Caucasus, 
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taking with them “whatever restraint the British may have had on the Azerbaijanis, the Karabagh 
National Assembly agreed in August 1919 to “a 26-point document providing for the provisional 
authority of Baku over a quasi-autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh pending the final determination 
of its status at the Paris Peace Conference.”197 
 Despite this provisional recognition of Azerbaijan’s authority, conflict between 
Armenians and Azeris in Artsakh continued. Dashnak activists continued to train Armenians in 
the countryside, Armenian travelers reported frequent attacks—including several deaths—and 
Azerbaijan deployed additional troops into Artsakh.198 In response to these reports, the Armenian 
National Congress in Artsakh “categorically rejected” Azerbaijan’s request to consider the full 
integration of Artsakh into Azerbaijan, claiming that “Azerbaijan’s government had periodically 
violated the key points of the temporary agreement.”199 On February 22, 1920, the “heightening 
interracial tension culminated in an outbreak of violence at Khankend (now Stepanakert) that left 
as many as 400 Armenians dead.200 A month later, “On the night of March 22, about 100 armed 
[Armenian] men slipped into Shushi to disarm the Azerbaijani garrison in the Armenian quarter. 
But everything went wrong.”201 In response, “Azerbaijani troops, joined by the city’s Muslim 
inhabitants, turned Armenian Shushi into an inferno. From March 23 to 26, some 2,000 
structures were consumed by the flames.”202 Estimates for the death toll range as high as 20,000, 
but Armenian historian Richard Hovannisian reports a much more conservative 500 victims.203 
While Sushi had formerly been a mixed city of both Armenians and Azeris, the Armenian 
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population was forced to flee and Shushi became a heavily Azeri city. As Hovannisian writes, “It 
was the end of Armenian Shushi.”204 
 While Azerbaijan had succeeded in establishing tenuous control over Artsakh following 
the March violence, the country soon faced an existential crisis in the form of the expanding 
Soviet Union. Hoping to take control of Baku’s valuable oil fields, which had produced 90% of 
Russia’s oil as recently as 1914, a Red Army armored train crossed into Azerbaijan in the early 
morning of April 27.205 By midnight, the government in Baku had accepted a Bolshevik 
ultimatum that brought a formal end to the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and declared 
Azerbaijan to be a part of the Soviet Union.206 However, the declaration from Baku did not 
prevent resistance to the Bolsheviks elsewhere in Azerbaijan. While the most fierce opposition 
was centered in Ganja, where the opposition to Soviet rule was crushed in May and June 1920 
resulting in over a thousand deaths, “Armed resistance to communist rule was widespread and 
would continue at least into 1924.”207 
 On August 10, 1920, the Allied powers in Paris signed the Treaty of Sèvres with the 
Ottoman Empire, which forced Turkey to “accept the boundary that President Wilson would lay 
down” for the borders Armenia.208 In November, Wilson unveiled a plan for an expansive 
Armenian state, incorporating the majority of the four Armenian provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire.209 However, even before Wilson had publicized his plans, the emergence of Mustafa 
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Kemal Ataturk as a leading figure in Turkish politics and his renunciation of both the Ottoman 
government and the Treaty of Sèvres made “Wilsonian Armenia” an unachievable goal for 
Armenians.210 Under the leadership of Ataturk, Turkey signed a separate treaty with the Soviet 
Union declaring previous agreements to be void and sent its armies against Armenia once 
again.211 By November, Turkish forces had reconquered the territory they had lost during their 
retreat in 1918 and again threatened to entirely erase the Armenian state and people.212 Facing a 
near certain defeat, a new Armenian government was formed to “conclude peace and preserve 
the physical existence of the Armenian people at almost any price.”213 
 Rather than succumb to a Turkish invasion, the new Armenian government agreed to join 
the Soviet Union. On December 2, 1920, the Republic of Armenia became the Armenian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, and “Soviet Russia acknowledged as indisputable part of that state all lands 
that had been under the jurisdiction of the Armenian government prior to the Turkish 
invasion.”214 However, on the same day that Armenia joined the Soviet Union, “Turkey 
demanded that Armenia immediately sign a treaty renouncing Sèvres and all claims to western 
Armenia.”215 Alexander Khatisian, the prime minister of Armenia, signed the Turkish treaty 
shortly after midnight on December 3, having “calculated that the Bolsheviks would denounce 
the treaty as null and void” as he no longer technically had any legal authority.216 However, 
Khatisian’s gambit failed and the Soviets, while offering mild diplomatic objections, recognized 
the agreement, creating the borders of modern Armenia.217 As was also the case in Azerbaijan, 
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the Soviets faced opposition even after the official agreement. In January 1921, Dashnak 
forces—disappointed with the Soviet’s failure to press the border issue and opposed to their 
harsh economic policies—staged a rebellion in Syunik and Artsakh.218 By February 18, the 
Dashnaks had driven the Soviets out of Yerevan and established a new government.219 However, 
in April “the Red Army returned to Armenia, overcoming the resistance of Dashnak forces” and 
re-establishing Bolshevik rule.220 
A Frozen Conflict 
 In annexing both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Soviet Union inherited the complex issue 
of delineating the national borders between the two newly created republics. In 1920, the Soviet 
authorities announced their decision to award Artsakh, along with Nakhichevan and Syunik, to 
Armenia “apparently as a reward for its conversion to Bolshevism.”221 The Soviets secured a 
concession from Nariman Narimanov, Soviet Azerbaijan’s first minister of foreign affairs, 
declaring all three disputed regions to be part of Armenia.222 However, following the anti-
Bolshevik uprising in Armenia in the spring of 1921, these early agreements were nullified.223 
While in Syunik and Nakhichevan, control had “been decided by force of arms” with Armenians 
and Azeris respectively driving out the civilian populations of the opposite ethnicity in order to 
secure their claims, control over Artsakh was seen as more of an open question.224 On July 4, 
1921 the Kavburo—the Soviet authority in the Caucasus—awarded Artsakh to Armenia, over the 
objections of Azeris. However, the following day, the committee reversed course, announcing 
that “the necessity for national peace between Muslims and Armenians and the economic ties 
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between upper and lower Karabakh” meant it should be incorporated into Azerbaijan despite the 
fact that its population was 94% Armenian.225 However, in recognition of the Armenian 
majority, the Soviets created the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and awarded 
it “wide regional autonomy.”226 As Thomas de Waal writes, “gallons of ink have been expended 
in discussing why Nagorny Karabakh was made part of Azerbaijan…[but] the longer-term 
considerations behind the Kavburo’s decision were probably as much economic as colonial.”227 
The Soviet authorities placed an emphasis on creating “economically viable” territories and— 
thanks to the previous Russian decision to place Artsakh in the Elizavetpol guberniia—Artsakh 
had been economically linked to Azerbaijan rather than Armenia.228 
 The Soviet Union’s annexation of Azerbaijan also brought about significant changes in 
the Azeri national identity. As Broers explains, “the inchoate category of ‘Azerbaijani 
Turk’…was still ill-defined by World War I.”229 Before the creation of the Azerbaijan 
Democratic Republic in 1918, “Azerbaijan” had historically referred to the northwest province of 
Iran and the people who lived in what would become Azerbaijan were referred to by a variety of 
names most frequently “Tatars,” “Muslims,” or “Azerbaijani Turks.”230 Entering the Soviet era, 
the Azeri people “continued to be known in Russian by the term tyurki and their language as 
tyurkskiy,” terms distinct from the Russian words for Turk and Turkish but clearly heavily 
related.231 It was not until 1937 that tyurki and tyurkskiy were replaced by azerbaydzhantsy 
(Azerbaijanis) and azerbaydzhanskiy (the Azerbaijani language) respectively.232 
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 The malleable nature of the Azeri identity was not limited to demonyms. Under the 
control of Soviet authorities, “The raw materials of nationhood – ethnonyms, scripts and theories 
of origin – could change with regional and international winds.”233 Before 1937, the Soviet 
Union had encouraged an emphasis on Azerbaijan’s Turkic heritage and identity in an attempt to 
influence the Turkic people of Turkey and Iran.234 However, this strategy also exposed the 
Soviet Union to the possibility of the process working in reverse. As developments in both 
Turkey and Iran threatened to undermine the Turkic-Azeri identity the Soviet Union was 
promoting, the Soviets reversed course and began a “quest for pre-Turkic ancestors in antiquity, 
with the emphasis on the homeland of the AzSSR rather than theories admitting migration.”235 
This quest culminated with the claim, made in the 1960s, that the Caucasian Albanians were “the 
progenitors of most of the population of Azerbaijan.”236 While it certainly is true that some 
Albanians assimilated into the Azeri population, the main origins of today’s Azeris “are to be 
found, according to most sources, in the waves of Turkic immigrations” with “Mongol and 
particularly Indoeuropean foundations that made substantial contributions to the Azeri language, 
culture, and other traditions.”237 
 During the 75 years between the sovietization of the Caucasus and the beginning of the 
Karabakh Movement, the issue of Artsakh’s status would largely be obscured by the fact that 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan were in the Soviet Union and by the extreme difficulty of 
expressing political opinions in the Soviet Union. Despite this, there were periodic attempts by 
Armenians to bring attention to the issue and urge Soviet authorities to join Artsakh with Soviet 
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Armenia.238 However, these efforts failed to achieve meaningful results, and “the cause of 
Mountainous Karabagh’s Armenians was generally forgotten outside the oblast.”239 Instead, 
during the Soviet era, “an odd slow-motion war [took] place between Armenians of the oblast 
and officials in Baku. The casualties were tallied in terms of demographic statistics and 
economic development, and the Armenians saw themselves as losing a conflict of attrition.”240 
Not only did poor economic conditions, caused in part by a lack of investment from the 
government in Baku, result in many Armenians “leaving the oblast to seek their fortunes 
elsewhere,” the Azeri government deliberately attempted to alter the region’s demographic 
balance.241 As Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev said in 2002, “I was trying to change the 
demography… I tried to have more Azerbaijanis in NK and for the number of Armenians to 
decrease.”242 While Armenians still constituted the significant majority of the population, 
between 1926 and 1979 these efforts resulted in the Armenian proportion falling from 89% to 
76% while the Azeri population rose from 10% to 22%.243 
 Along with economic stagnation and concerns over the changing demographics of 
Artsakh, the Armenian population was also subjected to cultural repression.  In 1957 the Azeri 
authorities declared Azerbaijani to be the republic’s official language and “whittled away the 
oblast’s education budget and closed twenty-eight Armenian schools.”244 During the Soviet 
period, a total of “167 churches, 17 monasteries, and 120 cemeteries in Mountainous Karabagh 
were destroyed either through negligence or state planning.”245 Azeri authorities also took aim at 
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the regions history, banning textbooks teaching Armenian history and “quietly [removing] 
references to Armenians.”246 Not only did Azeri authorities attempt to erase the Armenian 
history of Artsakh, following the lead of Azeri historian Zia Buniatov, many Azeris began to 
claim that the historical rulers of Artsakh “were not really Armenians but Armenianized 
Albanians,” a claim that has been rejected by most academics outside of Azerbaijan.247 Although 
Soviet authority stifled any overt expressions of conflict, these issues of demographics, 
economics, cultural rights, and historical claims would come to a head in the late 1980s when the 
gradual loosening of political restrictions gave rise to one of the most powerful grassroots 
movements the Soviet Union had ever seen. 
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Chapter Two: Three Paths to Independence 
Protests and Pogroms 
While the roots of the modern struggle between Armenians and Azeris over Artsakh 
stretch back over a century, the most recent conflict emerged in the late 1980s when the Soviet 
Union, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, began instituting the policies of glasnost. 
Emboldened by the loosening of political restrictions, the Armenians of Artsakh saw an 
opportunity to advance their longstanding goal of unification with Armenia. As they had done 
during previous attempts, the movement initially took the form of a letter writing campaign. In 
February 1986, the Artsakh Armenians sent “thousands of individual letters…along with more 
petitions from scientists, intellectuals, and senior military officers” to Moscow urging the Soviet 
Central Committee to unite Artsakh with Armenia.248 The following year, a petition written by 
Armenian writers and other intellectuals received 80,000 signatures, including 31,000 from 
Artsakh itself.249 While these early efforts to change the status of Artsakh were bold steps for the 
time, it was not until February 1988 that the movement exploded into a major campaign for 
change.  
On February 13, 1988 the first large-scale protest took place in Stepanakert where—
coinciding with the return of a delegation of Artsakhi writers and artists from a visit to 
Gorbachev—7,000 Armenians staged “an unprecedented event in Lenin Square: an unsanctioned 
political rally.”250 As would be the case throughout many of the subsequent protests, in order to 
make the movement more tolerable to the authorities, the rally’s organizers “devised slogans that 
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proclaimed that they were Soviet loyal citizens acting within the spirit of glasnost. Banners 
carried the slogan “Lenin, Party, Gorbachev!”251 The success of the first protest—defined mostly 
as the lack of a severe crackdown from the local Communist authorities—inspired the 
Armenians of Artsakh and “For the next week, the square would be the site of an around-the-
clock demonstration…The total number of protestors never dipped below 1,000, even with 
nighttime temperatures falling well below freezing.”252 Unable to reassert control through the 
normal methods, Boris Kevorkov—the ethnically Armenian, but extremely loyal to Baku, 
Communist Party Secretary for the NKAO—dispatched party bureaucrats to the towns of 
villages of Artsakh but found that many of them “were besieged by local residents and forced to 
turn back.”253  
While to outside observers these initial protests “occurred as if out of the blue and 
quickly acquired their own momentum… the initial phase of the Armenian campaign had been 
carefully planned well in advance.”254 Prior to the protest on February 13, “Ten thousand leaflets 
were printed and flown into Nagorny Karabakh” to be distributed to the residents of 
Stepanakert.255 Along with local leaders in Artsakh itself, the early stages of the Karabakh 
Movement received support from a loose alliance of prominent Armenians, many of whom had 
come from Artsakh but now lived scattered across the Soviet Union.256 Figures such as Abel 
Aganbegyan, Gorbachev’s economic advisor, Zhanna Galstyan, an actor from Artsakh, and Zori 
Balayan, a prominent writer and journalist, were instrumental in supporting to the movement that 
would later bring hundreds of thousands of Armenians to the streets in support of unification.257 
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At the center of this loose network was Igor Muradyan, a politician who had moved from 
Artsakh to Baku at an early age, and became one of the driving forces behind the formation of 
the Karabakh Organizing Committee later in February.258 However, once the movement took 
hold in the mind of the Armenian public, it acquired its own momentum that even the initial 
organizers found themselves unable to control.  
 On February 20, a week after the first protest in Stepanakert, the regional soviet for the 
NKAO convened an extraordinary session to consider unification with Armenia. While officials 
loyal to the Azeri government in Baku had mounted a twin-pronged attempt to prevent the 
session by alternately attempting to soothe tensions and intimidate the Armenians into silence, 
the Armenian representatives would not be dissuaded.259 Shortly before midnight on the night of 
February 20, the soviet passed a motion by a vote of 110 to 7—including 13 abstentions and 
without the participation of 30 Azeri representatives who had boycotted the meeting—
petitioning Armenia, Azerbaijan and “the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for an affirmative 
decision regarding the transferal of the NKAO from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian 
SSR.”260 While the Politburo of the Soviet Union met the following day, rejecting the demand 
for unification and “blackening the disloyal Karabakhis as ‘extremists,’” the push for unification 
would only continue to gather steam, especially as it crossed the border into Armenia proper.261 
After making this transition to Armenia proper in the last weeks of February 1988, “The 
movement that had been nurtured so patiently in Mountainous Karabagh spread to Yerevan like 
wildfire.”262 
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 On February 18, a few days before the soviet in Artsakh met to pass their resolution, the 
workers of an chemical plant near Yerevan had held a rally raising concerns about environmental 
issues and asking for the plant to be closed.263 However, these environmental concerns were 
largely a cover designed to test the response of Soviet authorities and lay groundwork for future 
demonstrations about the fate of Artsakh. As Balayan, who helped organize the protest, later 
reported in an interview, “We gathered on Theater Square with purely ecological slogans…But 
among them was, let’s say, one slogan saying, ‘Karabakh is the historic territory of Armenia.’ 
No one paid any attention to it. At the next rally there were a few of these slogans… In this way 
people got used to the idea that they could talk about the national question as well.”264 After this 
initial gathering, increasingly large protests in Theater Square continued throughout the week. 
On February 20, “30,000 demonstrators rallied there. Every day, the number redoubled. On 22 
February, it was above 100,000 people—a phenomenal number in any country, but especially in 
the Soviet Union of 1988. The next day an estimated 300,000 gathered.”265 A few days later the 
protests reached their peak when, “On Thursday, 25 February, there were perhaps close to a 
million people in the streets of Yerevan, or more than a quarter of the population of Armenia.”266  
As the sheer scale of the protests demonstrated, “the Nagorny Karabakh issue had the 
capacity to touch a deep nerve inside Armenians…Even those who knew almost nothing about 
the sociopolitical situation in Karabakh itself felt that they could identity with the cause of 
Armenians encircled by ‘Turks’ (a word that in the Armenian vernacular applies equally to Turks 
and Azerbaijanis).”267 Despite the introduction of almost 5,000 Soviet troops and imposition of a 
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curfew, Yerevan’s “Theater Square had by now become a world unto itself…Even the most 
apathetic Armenians found themselves drawn into the square.”268 For many Armenians, 
“Attending these rallies became almost an end in itself, a collective ritual of self-assertion…The 
Yerevan rallies were peaceful, but they also had a terrifying momentum.”269 However, on 
February 26, Gorbachev found a way to—at least temporarily—halt the demonstrations, giving 
an address broadcasted on both the radio and television calling on Armenians to return to work 
and promising that the Central Committee would examine the situation in Artsakh.270 The same 
day, Gorbachev met with Balayan and the Silva Kaputikyan, a poet and another leading figure in 
the Karabakh movement, who returned to Armenia sufficiently optimistic to echo Gorbachev’s 
call for a suspension of the demonstrations, proposing a halt to protests until March 26 that was 
accepted by the demonstrators in Theater Square.271   
While a feeling of optimism gripped the protesters in Yerevan, the situation across the 
border would soon take a drastic turn for the worse. A few days prior to Gorbachev’s address, on 
February 22, several hundred Azeris from the town of Aghdam had marched toward Stepanakert 
“burning everything along the way.”272 While Azeris claim that the crowd was reacting to the 
rape of two Azeri women in Stepanakert, Armenian sources counter by arguing that “it was only 
in the beginning of the 1990s that the ‘rape of two Azerbaijani girls’ was put into circulation” to 
explain the motivation of the crowd.273 Whatever their motivation, the crowd was “met by a 
cordon of policemen and a group of Armenian villagers, some of whom carried hunting 
rifles.”274 In the ensuing fighting, two Azeris were killed, one by an Azeri policeman and the 
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other by a hunting rifle likely fired by an Armenian.275 News of the incident quickly traveled 
across Azerbaijan, with Armenians blamed for the death of both men, stoking anger against the 
Armenian population of Azerbaijan that would soon explode into violence.276 
That explosion occurred on the evening of February 27, when a rally in the coastal Azeri 
city of Sumgait “attracted thousands of participants, most of them young Azerbaijani men. The 
theme of the gathering was Mountainous Karabagh’s campaign for unification with Armenia. 
The mood was angry.”277 The crowd was whipped into further fury by an anonymous man who 
“said that he had escaped from Kapan with his Azerbaijani compatriots and that Armenians there 
had killed his and his wife’s relatives.”278 Despite attempts by officials to calm the crowd, the 
demonstration quickly turned violent and transformed into a vicious pogrom against the 
Armenians residents of Sumgait. For three days, the rioters “roamed around, smashing windows, 
burning cars, but above all looking for Armenians to attack” while the police force stood idly 
by.279 These “roving gangs committed acts of horrific savagery. Several victims were so badly 
mutilated by axes that their bodies could not be identified. Women were stripped naked and set 
on fire. Several were raped repeatedly.”280 By the time order was re-imposed on February 29, at 
least 29 Armenians and 6 Azeris had been killed and the Armenian population of Sumgait—
between 14,000 and 19,000 people—had become refugees.281 Although most sources cite the 
official number of 35 deaths, Armenians argue that the Soviet officials underreported the true 
extent of the violence and contend the real death toll reached into the hundreds.282 
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The Sumgait Pogrom had a significant psychological effect on Armenians in both 
Armenian and Azerbaijan, prompting them to see the struggle with Azerbaijan over Artsakh 
through the lens of a potential genocide.283 These worries were further exacerbated by the fact 
that the violence against the Armenians of Sumgait appears to have been at least partially 
planned in advance. The presence of “improvised weapons—sharpened pieces of metal casing 
and pipes from the factories—which would have taken time to prepare” and the fact that the 
attackers had the addresses of Armenians suggest some level of planning on the part of the 
attackers.284 Furthermore, the complete failure of both the government in Baku and Sumgait’s 
police force—composed almost entirely of Azeris—to put an end to the violence amplified fears 
that Armenians would not be safe living under Azeri rule.285 It took two days for the Soviet 
authorities to send reinforcements to Sumgait and when they did arrive, “the troops came 
unarmed and without orders to confront the mob.”286 In this regard, Sumgait marked a significant 
turning point that would alter the direction of the entire Karabakh Movement. As Mark 
Malkasian writes, “What had begun as a campaign for political change and human rights was 
recast overnight in the context of an ethnic feud.”287 To many Armenians, “the massacre had 
demonstrated that Azerbaijan could not responsibly govern Mountainous Karabagh.”288 
While most sources recognize the Sumgait Pogrom as the first instance of widespread 
violence, the idea that Armenians in Kapan had previously committed acts of violence against 
the Azeri residents of the district has become a common refrain among Azeris. This claim has 
been made most prominently by Thomas de Waal, a British journalist and author of Black 
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Garden, who writes that “In November 1987, two freight cars arrived at the Baku trains station 
containing Azerbaijanis who had just fled Kafan as a result of interethnic violence.”289 De Waal 
also cites Arif Yunusov, the same Azeri historian who reported the rape of the two girls in 
Stepanakert, who says that in January 1988 four buses arrived in Baku full of Azeris fleeing 
violence in Kapan.290 However, as even de Waal acknowledges, there is no contemporary 
reporting of violence in Kapan and the claim rests on accounts given years after the violence 
allegedly occurred.291 Armenian sources reject the idea that Azeris were violently expelled from 
Kapan before February 1988, instead claiming that “four busloads of young Azerbaijani men 
were recruited from [Kapan] and then crossed into Azerbaijan…The young men arrived at the 
[Sumgait] bus depot on 26 February, setting off the first round of anti-Armenian 
demonstrations.”292 While exactly what, if anything, occurred in Kapan prior to February 1988 
will likely never be known, the complete absence of any contemporary reporting suggests that 
any violence that may have taken place was on a very limited scale. 
Back in Yerevan, Armenians were still observing the temporary halt to demonstrations 
agreed upon before the Sumgait Pogrom, and turned their attention to fundraising to help support 
refugees from Sumgait and elsewhere in Azerbaijan.293 A few days before demonstrations were 
scheduled to resume, Moscow unveiled its proposal intended to pacify Armenians. On March 24, 
Soviet officials announced a “400-million ruble package of economic and cultural reforms for 
Mountainous Karabagh.”294 However, many Armenians doubted the ability of the already 
weakening Soviet government to fulfill its promises and objected to the fact that Baku had been 
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placed in charge of administering the seven-year long plan.295 Anticipating this discontent, the 
Soviets had deployed military forces to Yerevan on March 22, blocking off Theater Square and 
taking control of the city’s major streets.296 In response, the movement’s organizers “called on 
Yerevan residents to stay home Saturday, 26 March, to transform the republic capital into a 
‘dead city.’ And 26 March was indeed quieter than most Saturdays, but government officials 
made sure that at least party members appeared on the sidewalks.”297 In Artsakh, strikes and 
demonstrations had “resumed with full force in late March, only a few days after 40,000 
Armenians in Stepanakert had celebrated the decision of the central committee of the oblast’s 
Communist Party to support unification.”298 However, Soviet “Troops blocked off Stepanakert’s 
Lenin Square. As Karabakh Committee member Ashot Manucharyan put it, the events of March 
were like a punch in the stomach. They knocked the wind out of the Armenian people for a 
month, but the blow was not deadly.”299 
 After a month of dormancy, the Karabakh Movement returned to center stage in May 
1988, when, in an effort to regain popularity he had lost by failing to more actively support the 
unification movement, the head of Armenia’s Communist Party, Karen Demirchyan, struck a 
deal with Igor Muradyan to allow further protests despite an official ban on public 
demonstrations.300 While the crowds numbered in the tens of thousands rather than the hundreds 
of thousands, “Unlike February…curiosity had not brought the people out. Rather the crowd of 
17 May consisted of the newly politicized. They came with a sense of purpose.”301 A subsequent 
demonstration on May 19 would prove to be the end of Muradyan’s de facto leadership of the 
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Karabakh Movement, when he gave a speech on May 19 arguing for cooperation with 
Demirchyan, rejecting efforts to achieve greater democratization as a distraction from the issue 
of Artsakh, and suggesting “that atrocities against Armenians in Shushi be countered with eye-
for-an-eye revenge.”302 While Muradyan’s more militant message attracted some support, the 
majority of the crowd “answered with boos and whistles.”303 Following the demonstration, 
activists who opposed Muradyan’s vision formed the Karabakh Committee while Muradyan 
formed his own group called Miatsum (unification). For the following weeks “The split between 
Muradyan and the Karabagh Committee was to remain an irritant for the Karabagh 
movement.”304 Miatsum “attracted a small, committed following, but Muradyan did not regain 
his former stature” and the eleven-member Karabakh Committee came to dominate not only the 
unification movement but Armenian politics in general.305 The May demonstrations also failed to 
rescue Demirchyan’s political career, as widespread disproval among the Armenian people 
prompted Moscow to remove him from office and replace him on May 21 with Suren 
Harutyunyan, an Armenian from Georgia who had spent most of his career outside of 
Armenia.306  
 
A Union Collapses 
 Largely directed by the Karabakh Committee, by the end of May, “Armenia, formerly 
one of the most loyal of republics, turned into the leading rebel in the Soviet Union.”307 Strikes 
and demonstrations continued to be held throughout the late spring and early summer of 1988, 
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with numbers once again reaching a hundred thousand.308 On June 15, the Supreme Soviet of 
Armenia voted in favor of unification with Artsakh, firing “the opening shot in what came to be 
called ‘the war of laws.’ Regional Party organs, ditching the old Soviet principle of ‘democratic 
centralism,’ passed legislation that openly antagonized one another.”309 Two days later, the 
Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan responded with a resolution of its own, rejecting the idea of 
unification and restating its claim to Artsakh.310 The first stage of this war of laws reached its 
peak on July 12 when the Stepanakert Soviet “voted to secede unilaterally from Azerbaijan and 
rename Nagorny Karabakh ‘the Artsakh Armenians Autonomous Region.’”311 However, less 
than a week later, at a session on July 18 focused on the question of Artsakh, the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR “ruled out any change in borders,” a decision that would be reaffirmed on 
November 12.312 While a special committee with the power to overrule Baku was formed to 
oversee Artsakh, the decision was a clear loss for the Armenians. The committee would be 
dissolved the following year, prompting the Armenian and Artsakhi parliaments to pass a joint 
resolution on December 1, 1989 unilaterally declaring that “The Supreme Soviet of the 
Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorny Karabakh announce the reunification of the 
Armenian SSR and Nagorny Karabakh.”313 However, this bold pronouncement was ignored by 
both Baku and Moscow and had little effect on the situation on the ground in Artsakh. 
 Although Azerbaijan had come out the victor in the war of laws, Azeris—perceiving that 
the struggle for control of Artsakh was not over—began to organize their own counter-
movement. Along with arguing that “the Russian intelligentsia, the Soviet and Western media, 
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and the central government” were biased in favor of Armenia, Azeris began collect “social-
economic data,” such as the availability of housing and hospital beds, that they argued disproved 
Armenian claims of discrimination.314 Rather, “Azerbaijani Turks said that within the NKAO, it 
was the Armenians who discriminated against them.”315 On November 17, “a series of mass 
demonstrations began in front of the government buildings on Lenin Square” in Baku that would 
attract tens of thousands of people.316 Just as the issue of Artsakh has served to rekindle a 
national consciousness in Armenia, it sparked a similar movement in Azerbaijan. While not as 
focused on Artsakh as its counterpart in Armenia, “A broad-based, multi-issue mass movement 
had begun in Azerbaijan. The people had come in part because of anxiety over the Karabagh 
dispute and the flood of refugees.”317 
 By the fall of 1988 the flow of refugees between Azerbaijan and Armenia was becoming 
a serious concern for both countries. While Armenians had been fleeing Azerbaijan since the 
Sumgait Pogrom in February, the “Autumn of 1988 saw the Armenians turn against their 
Azerbaijani minority and expel them from Armenia…Armenian gangs raided Azerbaijani 
villages; many of their residents were beaten, shot, had their homes burned, or were forced to 
flee on foot. By the end of the year, the Armenian countryside had dozens of deserted villages 
that had been depopulated of most of Armenia’s more than 200,000 Azerbaijanis and Muslim 
Kurds.”318 Likewise, in Azerbaijan violence and intimidation against Armenians continued, 
pushing more and more Armenians to flee to Armenia. In November, “General Viktor 
Omelchenko, the military commander of Kirovabad [now Ganja], recorded ‘more than seventy 
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attempts to organize pogroms against the city’s Armenian community. Roving gangs remained 
on the offensive for several nights, seeking to set fire to Armenian neighborhoods. Soviet sources 
reported that sixty Armenian houses were burned down during the riots.”319 In response to this 
and other instances of violence, “by the end of the year the great majority of the approximately 
300,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan outside of Mountainous Karabagh had either left or were 
planning to leave as quickly as possible.”320  
The same process of ethnic segregation took place in Artsakh, escalating after a violent 
clash between Armenians and Azeris in the town of Khojaly. On September 18, 1988, a convey 
of Armenian students entering the region in to deliver aid and help with the grape harvest was 
met by Azeris, who “stoned the trucks and then opened fire with hunting rifles and shotguns, 
wounding eighteen of the students.”321 When news of the incident reached Stepanakert, 
“hundreds of Armenians boarded buses and trucks, and headed for Khojalu. Others set off on 
foot. Many were stopped by MVD troops before reaching the village, but others broke through 
and traded gunfire with the Azerbaijanis well into the night.”322 The clashes served as the spark 
for the onset of broader violence, in which “all the Armenians were driven from Shushi and the 
Azerbaijanis were expelled from Stepanakert.”323 By early 1990, in Artsakh as well as Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, the “Separation of Armenians and Azerbaijanis—a dynamic that had gathered 
momentum throughout the twentieth century” had been all but completed.324  
 Armenia, already dealing with substantial inflows of refugees, was soon hit by another 
humanitarian crisis, when, on December 7, 1988, a magnitude 6.9 earthquake struck northern 
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Armenia.325 While not especially powerful on an absolute level, “geology, poor construction, and 
unfortunate timing magnified the impact of the earthquake.”326 Due to widespread theft of 
building materials which were replaced with lower quality substitutes, “Every single multistory 
building built in Gorbachev’s, Chernenko’s, Andropov’s, Brezhnev’s, and Khrushchev’s time 
was totally destroyed.”327 The scale of the destruction was staggering: “More than 25,000 people 
died as a result of the earthquake; 530,000 people were left homeless, The disaster idled one-
quarter of Armenian’s industry. Total damage was estimated at 13 billion rubles ($20 
billion).”328 However, “The catastrophe did not, as many had hoped, curtail the Armenian-
Azerbaijani dispute.”329 Gorbachev, who had returned from a trip to the United States to visit the 
impacted area, “stumbled into a shouting match with earthquake survivors” who, rather than 
focusing on the earthquake as he had expected, demanded “that he address the Karabagh 
issue.”330 After returning to Yerevan, “Gorbachev gave an interview to Armenian television in 
which he said that the Karabakh issue was being exploited by ‘unscrupulous people, 
demagogues, adventurers, corrupt people, black shirts’ who were ‘hungry for power.’ This was 
his signal for the arrest of the Karabakh Committee.”331 Nine of the committee’s members were 
arrested at the Union of Writers building where they had established a headquarters for 
coordinating relief efforts, and the remaining two were arrested within a few days.332 
 Throughout 1988 and 1989, as both Armenians and Azeris became increasingly aware of 
the Soviet Union’s instability they began to explore the possibility of seeking independence. In 
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Armenia, the push for independence was largely directed by the members of the Karabakh 
Committee. While careful to maintain enough of an appearance of loyalty toward the Soviet 
Union to not overly-alienate Soviet authorities, members of the Karabakh Committee had been 
considering the possibility of independence almost since its foundation. As Armenian journalist 
Tatul Hakobyan writes, “In May [1988], Karabakh Committee member Hambartsum Galstyan, 
assured historian Gerard Libaridian that the outcome of the events taking place would be the 
independence of Armenia. It becomes clear from various statements made by the committee 
members over time, [that] the agenda of the movement was expanding day by day and included 
not only Karabakh, but other issues such as the independence of Armenia.”333 After being 
released from prison in May 1989, the Karabakh Committee returned to Armenia as heroes and 
“resumed their opposition activities with vastly increased authority” among the Armenian 
people.334 Upon returning to Armenia, the members of the Karabakh Committee created the Pan-
Armenian National Movement (ANM), “which spearheaded Armenia’s efforts to break away 
from the Soviet Union.”335 As the Soviet Union showed further signs of weakening in 1989, the 
members of the Karabakh Committee became increasingly convinced of the need to pursue 
independence. In the words of Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a member of the committee and Armenia’s 
first president, “I myself came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was ending and we would 
achieve independence only after the miner’s strikes in Russia in the summer of 1989…After that 
I said, ‘That’s it, we have to fight for independence.’ Because it would have been very dangerous 
if the Soviet Union had collapsed and we had not been ready.”336  
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 In Azerbaijan too, the idea of independence began to take hold—especially among 
members of the intelligentsia—as the Soviet Union began to show signs of weakening. While a 
number of political movements emerged in Azerbaijan in the waning years of the Soviet Union, 
the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, formed in July of 1988, proved itself to be the most 
influential.337 Led by linguist Abulfaz Elchibey, the success of the Popular Front meant that for 
“the first time Azerbaijan had an alternative political banner around which activists could 
gather.”338 Formed as “a colourful coalition of over a dozen different political tendencies,” the 
Popular Front soon became embroiled in the conflict over Artsakh, with Popular Front-linked 
militia groups carrying out “a string of attacks on lines of transport between Karabakh and the 
rest of Azerbaijan” and attempting to “block the Lachin ‘corridor’ between Nagorno-Karabakh 
and Armenia.”339 As the conflict with Armenia escalated, Azerbaijan would impose a formal rail 
blockade, affecting 85% of Armenia’s rail traffic and causing shortages of fuel and food.340  
Across Azerbaijan, the Popular Front organized strikes, held meetings, and drafted public 
statements intended to “mobilise the people in defense of the nation.”341 As the Popular Front 
matured, its agenda began to focus more on independence: “What had started as a round table 
around which everyone who for whatever reason showed hard feelings towards the Soviet 
regime and its Baku puppets was welcome, now all of a sudden had turned from a blurred 
coalition into a spearhead of clear-cut nationalism with a serene vision of independent 
Azerbaijan’s future.”342 However, unlike in Armenia where “large sections of the Party hierarchy 
proved willing to work with the new nationalist movement…in Azerbaijan, there was no basis 
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for the authorities and opposition to strike a deal.”343 This lack of internal unity would continue 
to plague Azerbaijan throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, undermining Azeri efforts to 
secure control of Artsakh. 
 While 1989 largely saw the continuation of processes that had begun in 1988, both the 
Armenian and Azeri communities in Baku experienced tragedies in January 1990. The month 
began “with all the disturbing portents of mass violence already visible: a defenseless Armenian 
population, whom none of the security structures seemed ready to defend; a Popular Front, where 
radical elements had squeezed out the moderates; a local Party leadership losing power and 
looking for ways to hang on to it; and the Soviet leadership in Moscow, which was prepared to 
take any steps it thought necessary to prevent Azerbaijan’s breaking away from the Union.”344 
While most Armenians had already fled other areas of Azerbaijan, “thousands of Armenians still 
remained in Baku. During the previous two years, they could have exchanged their apartments or 
simply saved their lives, but till the end, they believed in Baku’s internationalism.”345 However, 
on January 13, the hope that Azerbaijan’s capital could remain insulated from the anti-Armenian 
sentiment that had taken hold over the rest of Azerbaijan was brutally crushed when “murderous 
anti-Armenian violence overwhelmed Baku. A vast crowd filled Lenin Square for a rally, and by 
early evening men had broken away from it to attack Armenians. As in Sumgait, the savagery 
was appalling and the center of the city around the Armenian quarter became a killing 
ground.”346 As was also the case in Sumgait, the violence “was not entirely (or perhaps not at all) 
spontaneous, as the attackers had lists of Armenians and their addresses.”347 While the chaos that 
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descended on Baku makes it almost impossible to determine the exact number of victims, 
“Armenians talk about 150 – including those who were injured and died several days later in 
Turkmenistan and other places. Azerbaijani researcher Arif Yumusov mentions 86.”348 
 Once again, violence against Armenians raged for days without Soviet or Azeri officials 
intervening. Despite the presence of Soviet soldiers, who had been deployed before the pogrom 
began, “neither the local authorities nor the 12,000 Soviet Interior Ministry troops stationed in 
Baku did anything to stop” the killings.349 Even more troublingly, Azeri human rights activist 
Arzu Abdullayeva “remembers appealing to a policeman to go to the aid of a desperate 
Armenian being set upon by a mob and being told, ‘We have orders not to intervene.”350 On 
January 15, the Supreme Council of the USSR declared a state of emergency in the NKAO and 
the surrounding regions, but “Inexplicably, Baku was not mentioned.”351 It was not until January 
19, “when, in reality, the massacre of the Armenians had ended and there were no Armenians left 
in Baku,” that Moscow declared a state of emergency in Baku.352 While the reasons behind the 
Soviet authorities’ lack of action remain unknown, “Retired KGB men from both Baku and 
Moscow later agreed there had been instigation in Baku to provide Moscow with a pretext for 
using force,” although that does little to explain why Soviet authorities waited nearly a week to 
declare a state of emergency.353 While the potential involvement of Soviet authorities will likely 
remain a mystery, the Baku Pogrom marked with a “terrible flourish” the effective end of 
Azerbaijan’s Armenian population, with survivors being evacuated across the Caspian Sea to 
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Turkmenistan and then flown to Armenia.354 
 During the pogrom, “Nationalist activists ruled the streets of Baku. They put up 
barricades of trucks and concrete blocks on the roads leading to the barracks on the edge of the 
city.”355 In doing so, they mounted a not-insignificant challenge to Moscow’s authority, one that 
Soviet officials could little tolerate. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov reportedly 
warned the activists that Azerbaijan “was one step away from independence,” an implicit threat 
that Moscow would use force if necessary.356 Following the declaration of a state of emergency 
in Baku, Soviet authorities made good on that threat, deploying an additional 11,000 soldiers 
who “smashed through barricades erected by Popular Front supporters and entered Baku during 
the night of 19-20 January.”357 Troops coming from the south “were from local garrisons and did 
not fight their way into the city, but the troops who approached from the north entered Baku as if 
it were a city under enemy occupation.”358 Over the course of a five-hour long battle, “Some one 
hundred thirty citizens of Baku were killed and several hundred were wounded” along with 
twenty-one soldiers.359  
While the soldiers were successful in asserting the Soviet Union’s military control of 
Baku, their violent methods ensured that “Moscow essentially lost Azerbaijan. Almost the whole 
population of Baku turned out for mass funerals of the victims.”360 In an all-night session, the 
Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet passed “a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet 
troops and threatening secession from the USSR if the demand was not met.”361 Nakhichevan—
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which was classified as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Azerbaijan—even 
“became the first part of the Soviet Union ever to declare unilateral independence,” after doing 
so on January 20.362 However, Moscow ignored both resolutions, arresting several leaders of the 
Popular Front and imposing martial law in Baku.363 While the Soviet authorities had reasserted 
their control of Azerbaijan, the events of “Black January” turned the Azeri population against the 
Soviet Union, marking the beginning of the end of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Just a few weeks later, on February 8, 1990, the Communist Party made the momentous 
decision “to surrender its historic monopoly of power,” opening the door for elections to be held 
in the Soviet Union’s fifteen constituent republics.364 In Armenia, where elections were held on 
May 20, “the ANM and its sympathizers won half the parliamentary seats,” placing the 
government in the hands of a non-communist party for the first time since 1920.365 By August, 
the ANM had ascended to power, electing Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Vazgen Manukyan—both 
members of the Karabakh Committee—speaker of Armenia’s Supreme Soviet and prime 
minister respectively.366 The new leaders of Armenia soon made their intentions clear, when, on 
August 23, they declared independence, proclaiming that “Armenia is a self-governing state, 
endowed with supremacy of state authority, independence, sovereignty, and plenipotentiary 
power. Only the constitution and laws of the Republic of Armenia are valid for the whole 
territory of Armenia.”367 However, Armenia’s independence would not be recognized until after 
the final collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. As Armenia was advancing toward 
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independence, Azerbaijan—still under a state of emergency and occupied by Soviet troops—held 
its own election on September 30, 1990.368 Unsurprisingly given the circumstances, the 
Communist Party won the majority of seats amidst claims of widespread fraud, including the 
murder of two opposition candidates.369 
As the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union became apparent in the early months of 
1990, violence between Armenians and Azeris within Artsakh became increasingly common. On 
January 11, “Azeri mobs attacked three Armenian villages on the border of the oblast…Gunfire 
and hostage-taking took place on both sides.”370 Distrustful of Soviet forces after the events of 
January 1990, Armenians began to form armed militia forces, “the largest and most active of 
which was the 5,000-strong so-called Armenian National Army (ANA)…Beginning in late 
March, armed groups on patrol in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the border with the Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) came into conflict with Azeri villagers, resulting 
in numerous deaths.”371 The Armenian militias also “began to focus more and more on acquiring 
arms from local Soviet forces. Attacks on Soviet military conveys, weapons depots, and border 
checkpoints came to be a regular occurrence.”372 Often, these attacks were carried out with the 
cooperation of the Russian forces themselves, who had been bribed in advance by militia 
members. As Ashot Manucharyan put it, “An attack was simulated and weapons were taken; in 
essence those weapons were bought.”373 This practice of bribing Russian soldiers to turn over 
their weapons would later be employed extensively by both sides during the war. 
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Despite a decree signed by Gorbachev on July 25 declaring militia groups illegal and 
giving them 15 days to turn their weapons over to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the ANA and 
other such groups refused to comply.374 Shortly after declaring independence, however, “the 
Armenian Supreme Soviet declared a state of emergency throughout the republic on 29 August 
and instructed all unauthorized armed formations to hand over their weapons and dissolve 
themselves immediately. Backed by the substantial force of Armenian Interior Ministry troops, 
officials were finally able to disband the ANA.”375 Even this measure could not stop the fighting 
and “sporadic raids on both Soviet forces and Azerbaijani settlements continued throughout late 
1990.”376 The Armenian militias clashed with Azerbaijan’s OMON, Azerbaijan’s legalized 
paramilitary force, which was “deployed almost exclusively in and around Nagorny Karabakh. 
The ten thousand or so militiamen manned checkpoints, went on patrol, and made searches for 
weapons. They took over Karabakh’s airport at Khojaly, where they gained a fearsome 
reputation for shaking down passengers to whom they took a dislike and sexually harassing 
women.”377 The result was a bizarre scene as both countries’ governments “stood by and 
watched as both side’s armies which officially were not supposed to exist were waging full-scale 
battle, while the official Soviet-armed troops remained powerless for sheer lack of orders.”378 
In March 1991, signs of a shift in the balance of power began to appear following a 
referendum organized by Gorbachev “to pass judgement on a new draft Union treaty that 
promised autonomy to the republics.”379 In another assertion of independence, Armenia's 
parliament had voted to boycott the referendum and declared that it would not recognize the 
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results.380 In contrast, “dependent largely on Moscow for its continued grip on power, the 
Azerbaijani government headed by Ayaz Mutalibov became an early supporter of Gorbachev’s 
efforts to revive the Soviet Union.”381 Despite the Azeri people’s distrust of Soviet authority, 
under Mutalibov’s leadership, Azerbaijan and Moscow grew strategically closer. According to 
Mutalibov, in exchange for securing Azerbaijan’s approval of the referendum, Gorbachev agreed 
to “give the orders to disarm the paramilitary units in Karabakh and conduct a passport checking 
operation.”382 Under the guise of this ‘passport checking operation’ requested by Mutalibov, 
Soviet and Azeri forces conducted a military operation, codenamed Operation Ring, against the 
Armenians of Artsakh that marked a drastic escalation in the conflict for control of the region. 
According to Azeri officials, the goal of Operation Ring was to “check the internal 
passports of residents in a series of Armenian-inhabited villages on the borders of Karabakh that 
were sheltering Armenian fedayin,” the word Armenian militia groups used to describe 
themselves.383 However, the operation actually took the form of “a systematic deportation of 
Armenians” from the Shahumyan district between the NKAO and Armenia.384 As de Waal 
writes,  
What followed was a small Soviet civil war, fought on very unequal terms. On one side 
were units of the Soviet 4th Army, based in Ganje, whose entire 23rd Division, complete 
with tanks and artillery, was made available for the operation. They were joined by units 
of the Azerbaijani OMON and groups of Azerbaijani villagers, who engaged in looting 
and intimidation. On the other were the Armenian fedayin. There were far fewer of them, 
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perhaps a few hundred in all.385 
The first target of Operation Ring were the villages of Getashen and Martunashen, whose “three 
thousand villagers were gradually sealed off from the outside world” in late April.386 On April 
30, Soviet soldiers and OMON forces entered the villages, killing a “dozen or so” residents many 
of whom were “in their eighties and nineties.”387 After putting up sporadic resistance and taking 
hostages who would later be exchanged for villagers taken hostage by the Azeri and Soviet 
forces, “The outnumbered fedayin slipped away.”388 Shortly after clearing the village of armed 
resistance, “the occupants of Getashen and Martunashen were deported forcibly to Stepanakert 
and replaced by Azeri refugees.”389 
 Over the next two weeks, “the activities of Operation ‘Ring’ expanded in scope and 
brutality. On 7 May Soviet and Azerbaijani forces backed by tanks and helicopters entered three 
towns in Armenia proper…More than 20 people were rounded up and arrested in the action, and 
numerous atrocities were carried out reportedly against the civilian populace.”390 Subsequent 
operations followed the pattern established at Getashen and Martunashen, “Armenian villages 
were ringed by tanks and armored personnel carriers, after which Soviet and Azerbaijani forces 
entered the area and began harassing the populace. Homes, and in some cases entire villages, 
were burned to the ground.”391 Characterized by extremely high morale, the Armenian fedayin 
put up a fierce resistance, and “it took several weeks for the numerically superior Soviet and 
Azerbaijani forces, even using the tanks and heavy artillery of the 4th Army, to force out 
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Armenian irregulars.”392 However, the fedayin ultimately could not prevent the Soviets and 
Azeris from achieving their goal. In total, Operation Ring “emptied twenty-three villages in and 
around the Shahumyan district, expelling 17,000 Armenians from their homes.”393  
From the Azeri perspective, Operation Ring was successful insofar as it was intended “to 
block the Armenian fedayin, cut off their supply route, and create a new ‘ring’ of Azerbaijani 
villages around Karabakh.”394 However, it also redoubled Armenians’ resolve to resist Azeri 
rule, “virtually precluding the possibility of further coexistence between the two peoples within 
the border of Azerbaijan.”395 Furthermore, “In Armenia, the operation spurred a big recruiting 
drive for the fedayi movement, thereby undermining one of its main objectives.”396 Operation 
Ring was a much more abject failure from the Soviet perspective, who had intended to secure 
Azerbaijan’s support and force Armenia to turn back toward Moscow.397 While there were some 
signs of success, such as Ter-Petrosyan agreeing to attend talks on Gorbachev’s Union Treaty for 
the first and only time, Armenians predictably took an unfavorable view of Moscow’s 
involvement in the operation, “making it less—rather than more—likely for Armenia to return to 
the Soviet fold.”398 The Soviet authorities did succeed in strengthen their ties with Azerbaijan, 
but this victory would soon be overshadowed by events in Moscow. 
 
War Comes to Artsakh 
On August 19, 1991, Soviet hard-liners mounted a coup d’état against Gorbachev.399 
                                                 
392 de Waal, Black Garden, 121. 
393 Melkonian, Markar. My Brother's Road: An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia. London: I.B. Taurus, 2005, 
186. 
394 de Waal, Black Garden, 121 
395 Croissant, 42. 
396 de Waal, Black Garden, 122. 
397 Ibid., 121. 
398 Ibid.; Croissant, 42. 
399 de Waal, Black Garden, 172. 
72 
 
While the expectation that the new leaders of the Soviet Union would take a tougher line against 
Artsakh initially “looked like a vindication of [Azerbaijan’s] loyalty to the Soviet system… 
within three days everything was turned on its head as the coup attempted collapsed.”400 While 
the Soviet Union would continue to exist on paper for another few months, the coup attempt 
marked the effective end of Soviet authority in the Caucasus. On August 30, Azerbaijan declared 
its independence, joining Armenia and a growing list of Soviet republics to do so.401 In 
Azerbaijan, Mutalibov was elected president, “but it was a mechanical victory: his was the only 
name on the ballot.”402 Following a referendum on September 21, in which 95% of Armenians 
voted in favor of independence, Ter-Petrosyan was elected president and “Ten of the original 
eleven members of the Karabakh Committee were given senior state posts.”403 With the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Artsakh was transformed from a violent 
intrastate struggle into a full blown war. 
Three days after Azerbaijan’s declaration of independence, on September 2, “The 
regional Soviet in Stepanakert declared the independence of the new ‘Nagorny Karabakh 
Republic.’404 In a referendum held on December 10, the Armenians of Artsakh, the Azeri 
minority having boycotted, approved the Soviet’s declaration, voting almost unanimously—
108,615 to 24—for independence.405 However, Artsakh’s attempts to secure independence 
would go unrecognized by any state, including Armenia itself which “sought to deny Baku its 
strongest argument for justifying suppression of Karabakh separatism, that Armenia was trying 
to annex Azerbaijani land” by refusing to be the first country to recognize Artsakh.406 In doing 
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so, Armenia also attempted to distance itself from the political fallout of the conflict, officially 
maintaining that Armenia’s armed forces were not involved in the fighting despite ample 
evidence to the contrary.407 Instead advancing the idea that the conflict was a struggle for 
Artsakh’s self-determination, the Armenian government insisted that “Karabakh Armenians 
should be allowed represent themselves in any negotiations on the future administrative status of 
the former NKAO.”408 
Having declared independence, Armenia, Artsakh, and Azerbaijan almost immediately 
entered into a state of war. While Boris Yeltsin and Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev succeeded in getting both sides to commit to a peaceful solution in September at the 
Russian resort town of Zheleznovodsk, the effort to mediate the conflict soon collapsed.409 On 
November 20, a helicopter carrying Azeri officials as well as Russian and Kazakh negotiators 
“crashed over the Martuni region in southern Karabakh, apparently after being shot down by 
Armenian fighters.”410 Six days later, “Azerbaijan’s new National Council voted to revoke 
Nagorny Karabakh’s autonomous status,” followed soon after by Artsakh’s independence 
referendum.411 These developments precluded any remaining possibility of a negotiated solution, 
and ushered in the onset of a full scale war between Armenian and Azeri forces. However, 
having gained their independence from the Soviet Union only a little more than a month prior, 
neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan began the war with an army or the state capacity wage a formal 
war.412 As a result, the fighting was mostly carried out by volunteer regiments on both sides 
which were only loosely under the control of their respective governments. 
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Examining the strength of the two sides on a purely material level, Azerbaijan possessed 
a massive advantage over the Armenian forces. With a population of almost 7.3 million people in 
1991, Azerbaijan was just under double the size of Armenia’s 3.5 million after accounting for the 
roughly 150,000 Armenians living in Artsakh who were included in Azerbaijan’s official 
population.413 Azerbaijan also enjoyed better access to abandoned Soviet military equipment. 
Whereas Soviet planners had envisioned Armenia “as a combat zone in the event of war and 
therefore only had three divisions and no airfields on its soil. Azerbaijan was a rear zone and the 
base for a much greater concentration of forces, with five divisions and five military airfields.”414 
Although a May 1992 agreement between the newly independent states of the Soviet Union 
formally limited the amount of military equipment Azerbaijan and Armenia could inherit, both 
countries completely ignored the agreement, giving Azerbaijan the upper-hand in terms of 
equipment.415 
Armenia also was at a distinct economic disadvantage relative to Azerbaijan. While both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan had suffered a severe economic disruption from the collapse of Soviet 
supply chains and trading networks, Armenia faced a more challenging economic situation. Not 
only had the country just suffered an earthquake that left over half a million people homeless and 
destroyed a significant portion of Armenia’s economic infrastructure, but Azerbaijan—with the 
assistance of Turkey—was able to impose a punishing blockade on rail traffic entering Armenia. 
As a result, “During 1992, Armenia’s GDP dropped by more than 40 percent, about half of 
which was conditioned by the blockade.”416 During the winters of 1991-1992 and 1992-1993, 
“Armenian citizens were forced back into pre-modern living conditions. City dwellers collected 
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their water from wells, cut down trees to feed wood-burning stoves, and lived by candlelight.”417 
In Stepanakert and the other cities of Artsakh, cut off from the rest of Armenia and surrounded 
by Azerbaijan, the situation was even worse.418  
However, while “In economic, military and human terms, Baku’s advantage over 
Yerevan and Stepanakert was obvious,” the Armenian forces enjoyed qualitative advantages of 
their own.419 While Azerbaijan had relied heavily upon Soviet soldiers during Operation Ring, 
“A core of Soviet army officers had set about creating an Armenian army” in the waning years of 
the Soviet Union.420 More importantly, Armenians had a strong paramilitary force in the form of 
“fedayin fighters, who were already hardened from fighting in the hills. Independence brought a 
new flood of Armenian volunteers.”421 As was also the case during Operation Ring, the morale 
of the Armenian forces was significantly superior to their Azeri opponents. As the celebrated 
Armenian general Monte Melkonian told an interviewer in 1993, “mathematically speaking, we 
should have lost long ago…[but] we’ve had big successes. Mostly due to the fact that our people 
are more motivated. Like I said, they’re defending their homes and their families, while the 
Azeris, they’re coming to a region that they really don’t know about.”422 In contrast to the 
Armenians’ general unity and almost single-minded focus on the issue of Artsakh, in Azerbaijan 
“The fundamental issues of power had not been resolved and there were fears of civil war 
between President Mutalibov and the nationalist opposition. For many politicians, the war effort 
was less important than the domestic power struggle.”423 The comparative lack of prior 
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experience, motivation, and domestic unity significantly weakened Azerbaijan’s military efforts, 
enabling the Armenians to win a victory despite their smaller population and relative lack of 
military equipment. 
With war underway, Armenian forces began the process of taking full control of Artsakh 
during the final months of 1991. While Armenians and Azeris no longer lived side by side 
anywhere in Artsakh, the region “was still a mosaic of Azerbaijani and Armenian villages. As 
Soviet forces pulled out, each side tried to redraw this complex map in its favor.”424 Taking 
advantage of their numerical advantage within Artsakh, Armenian forces “began to intimidate 
Karabakh Azerbaijanis out of their villages” in an attempt to create a more defensible 
perimeter.425 The remaining Azeri controlled towns and villages were surrounded by Armenians, 
isolated outposts largely cut off from Azerbaijan and one another. However, “while the 
Azerbaijanis were in a number of traps,” with Artsakh entirely encircled by Azeri-controlled 
territories “the Armenians found themselves in one large trap.”426 With helicopter flights through 
the mountains serving as the only connection to Armenia, delivering food and fuel to Artsakh 
proved extremely difficult.427  
Beginning in January 1992, Azeri forces also began indiscriminately shelling Armenian 
towns and cities.428 Located in a valley overlooked by the Azeri-controlled cities of Shushi and 
Khojaly, Stepanakert was particularly vulnerable to these attacks, and was subjected to intense 
bombardment. As de Waal writes,  
“hundreds of rockets rained down from Shusha onto Stepanakert, causing havoc. Over 
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the course of the spring of 1992, the accumulated casualty figure from the bombardment 
probably ran into the hundreds… Residents spent every night in their basements; first, 
they lit gas pipes, then, when the gas ran out, they lived by candlelight. In the morning, 
they emerged to fetch water from springs several kilometers outside the town. Food and 
medicine supplies ran low.”429 
According to a Human Rights Watch report compiled in July 1993, “Azerbaijani shelling and 
bombing were reckless and indiscriminate, and aimed at terrorizing and forcing out Armenian 
civilians…the death toll among Armenian civilians from October 1991 through April 1992 was 
estimated at 169.”430 Nor were the Azeris alone in using indiscriminant shelling. As Human 
Rights Watch reported, “Both Azerbaijani and Armenian forces actively shelled and engaged in 
sniper attacks on each other’s towns and villages.”431 However, as the report continues, 
“Although both sides are guilty of these practices, Azerbaijani forces (while they still held 
Shushi) engaged in them with extraordinary ferocity and cruelty.”432 
 While the civilians of Artsakh faced both shortages and shelling, the Armenian forces 
were winning victories over the disorganized Azeris. In January 1992, three successive Azeri 
attempts to capture the Armenian village of Karintak to the immediate south of Shushi were met 
with fierce resistance, forcing the Azeris to retreat each time.433 These engagements were “the 
first time since the outbreak of the conflict that military had directly confronted military,” and 
the Armenian victory provided a boost to their morale.434 On the Azeri side, internal divisions 
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and disorganization were severely hampering the effort to defend Shushi—Azerbaijan’s last 
major foothold within the borders of the NKAO: “Promised reinforcements failed to 
materialize…other units were simply abandoning the town.”435 However, while the Armenians 
in Karintak were only around half a mile away, “With cliffs on two sides, Shusha 
had been built as a fortress and was easily defensible.”436 Unable to pierce Shushi’s natural 
defenses, the Armenian forces instead turned their attention to Khojaly, an Azeri controlled town 
to the north of Stepanakert and home to Artsakh’s only airport. 
 Khojaly was also the site of “four Grad [rocket launchers] stationed inside the village 
which were systematically firing upon Stepanakert,” making its capture a priority for the 
besieged Artsakh Armenians.437 Overnight between February 25 and 26, Armenians, 
accompanied by armored vehicles from the Soviet 366th Regiment which had remained in 
Stepanakert even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, surrounded the village on three sides 
and attacked the outnumbered Azeris.438 What followed is widely regarded as the worst single 
massacre of civilians during the war. While the Armenian forces had left a corridor leading out 
of the village open to allow for the evacuation of civilians, when “the crowd of Khojali civilians, 
interspersed with a few militiamen, emerged onto open ground…they were hit by a wall of 
gunfire.”439 Both sides blame the other for firing the first shot, but the result was a massacre of 
the Azeri civilians.440 Other residents of Khojaly suffered—or even died—from severe frostbite 
as they had fled without adequate clothes for the cold weather.441 While the total death toll is 
hotly contested, with estimates ranging from 200 to 600, “Probably the most reliable figure is 
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that of the official Azerbaijani parliamentary investigation, which put the death toll at 485.”442 
 The Armenian fighters—joined by some residents of Khojaly—claim that Armenians had 
warned of an impending attack and urged the Azeris to evacuate civilians. However, Azeri 
officials failed to respond to these warnings. As the mayor of Khojaly, Elman Mamedov, told the 
Moscow-based Memorial Civil Rights Center, “We knew that the corridor had been provided for 
the civilian population to leave.” There are also questions surrounding the mutilation of several 
of the victims’ bodies. While the natural conclusion is that the same forces that committed the 
massacre were responsible, photos and videos taken by Azeri journalist Chingiz Mustafiev in the 
immediate aftermath do not show any signs of mutilation, raising “the grisly implication that 
someone interfered with the corpses afterwards.”443 As the location of the bodies was quickly 
recaptured by Azeri forces, some Armenians contend that the bodies were subsequently 
mutilated by Azeri forces in an effort to discredit the Armenians, although the truth of the matter 
will likely remain forever uncertain. 
Along with the loss of life, the Khojaly Massacre had wide reaching political 
ramifications. Shocked by the massacre and furious that Mutalibov’s government had failed to 
take steps to prevent it, “Tens of thousands of protesters gathered in front of the Azerbaijani 
Parliament building to demand Ayaz Mutalibov's resignation.”444 On March 6, Mutabilov 
submitted to the protestors’ demands and resigned, leaving Yaqub Mamedov the speaker of 
parliament and rector of Baku’s Medical University acting president until new elections could be 
held in June.445 As was widely expected, the leader of the Popular Front, Abulfaz Alchibey, won, 
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temporarily bringing an end to Azerbaijan’s domestic turmoil.446 Khojaly also resulted in a surge 
of motivation among Azeris, and “Hundreds of men for whom Karabakh had hitherto been a 
distant dispute volunteered to fight.”447  
As is the case for many of the controversial events surrounding Artsakh, the Khojaly 
Massacre has spawned a number of conspiracy theories on both sides. Some Armenians, inspired 
in part by Mutalibov who once claimed that the massacre was organized by the Azeri opposition 
“to create grounds for [his] resignation,” argue that Azeris and not Armenians were responsible 
for the massacre.448 However, most observers, and indeed most Armenians, accept that the 
massacre was committed by the Armenian forces. On the other side, Azeris, relying primarily 
upon an interview with Serzh Sargsyan, the chair of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic Self-
Defense Forces Committee and later the president of Armenia, claim that the massacre was 
premeditated and planned by high-level Armenian officials. In the interview, Sargsyan told 
journalist Thomas de Waal that “Before Khojalu the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking 
with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the 
civilian population. We needed to put a stop to all that.”449 However, as de Waal and most other 
observers conclude, Sargsyan was not referring to a premeditated plan to massacre civilians and 
Khojaly was almost certainly not a “deliberate action approved from above… it was a war, it was 
a very chaotic situation.”450 
The Khojaly Massacre was closely followed by the worst single massacre of Armenian 
civilians when, on April 10, Azeri forces captured the village of Maraga. While Armenian 
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officials had attempted to evacuate the village ahead of the advancing Azeri forces, they were not 
aware that “several families had stayed behind in their basements.”451 Armenian troops 
recaptured the village the following day, but in the five to six hours that Azeri forces controlled 
the town “around 50 people, mostly women and children, were killed and 45 more taken 
prisoner.”452 After receiving permission to exhume the bodies, a fact-finding mission by 
Christian Solidarity International found “decapitated and charred bodies.”453 In addition, of the 
45 villagers who were taken prisoner, 19 were never returned, bringing the total number of 
victims to 62.454  
 After capturing Khojaly, the Armenian commanders had turned their attention back to 
Azerbaijan’s other stronghold in Artsakh: Shushi. Under the command of Arkady “Komandos” 
Ter-Tadevosyan, Armenian forces began to “encircle Shusha, capture the villages around it an 
draw some of the Azerbaijani garrison away from the defense of the town.”455 The Armenian 
offensive was aided by continued disorganization among the Azeri ranks. According to Chechen 
commander Shamil Basaev, who participated in the Azeri defense of Shushi, by the time 
Armenian forces began their final assault on May 7, “There were four mujahedeen and there 
were 11 Azerbaijani along with them. Almost everyone left, but 15 people held out in defence on 
their own for one and half days – 15 men. And a 2,800 strong garrison left everything and ran 
away…Shusha was just abandoned.”456 As Samvel Babayan, one of the commanders who led the 
attack, explained, the Armenians had attempted to encourage the Azeri defenders to leave the 
city without a fight: “Shushi was seized using military tactics and not by brute force…We 
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attacked from the direction from which the enemy was not expecting us and tried to make the 
enemy fear that unless he left his positions as soon as possible, he would be completely cut-
off.”457 The Armenians’ tactics were largely successful and during the operation that captured 
Shushi only “58 people were killed from the Armenian side; none of them in Shushi.”458 
 At the same time that Armenians in Artsakh were mounting their attack on Shushi, Ter-
Petrosyan was meeting with Mamedov in Tehran. On May 9, the very same day that Armenian 
forces took control of the city, Ter-Petrosyan and Mamedov signed a statement declaring that 
“within a week after the arrival of the special representative of the President of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran…ceasefire is established and simultaneously all communication roads 
are open with the purpose of meeting all economic needs.”459 However, the news from Shushi 
cut short any realistic possibility of the agreement taking effect and “proved to be a public 
relations disaster for the Iranians—and this proved to be their first and last attempt at 
mediation.”460 The revelation “was also a grave embarrassment for Ter-Petrosian, who had 
known that an assault was planned on Shusha, but not its specific timing…Some suspected that 
the delay in starting the attack was not due to bad weather but was a deliberate ploy by the local 
leaders in Karabakh to wreck the talks in Iran and humiliate Ter-Petrosyan”461 The loss of 
Shushi plunged Azerbaijan into an even more severe lack of political unity, as “former 
Communist deputies suddenly staged a constitutional coup d’état to restore Ayaz Mutalibov to 
office…The maneuver was effectively a declaration of civil war.”462 Supporters of the Popular 
Front and their Gray Wolf allies responded by storming “the parliament building and the 
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television station. Astonishingly, fewer than a dozen people were killed in the shooting as 
Mutalibov was ousted again, this time for good.”463 
 With Shushi under Armenian control, Azeri forces had been pushed almost entirely out of 
the territory comprising the NKAO, but still controlled the vital Lachin Corridor connecting 
Artsakh and Armenia. For the Armenians, Azerbaijan’s brief civil war proved helpful as “The 
Popular Front ‘Geranboi Battalion’ and many other smaller units had left the front and hastened 
to Baku to help overthrow Mutalibov. More seriously, no one was bothering to reinforce 
Lachin.”464 By May 18, less than two weeks after Armenians took control of Shushi, “Lachin 
was captured and a land corridor was opened between Armenia and NK” for the first time in 
over two years.465 In large part the capture of Lachin was an opportunistic measure taking 
advantage of the chaos on the Azeri side. As had been the case with the capture of Shushi, the 
disorganized Azeri defenders put up little resistance, with many Azeri fighters reportedly not 
even sure of who they were supposed to report to.466 As a result, despite the presence of nearly 
3,000 Azeri soldiers and significant amounts of munitions, almost “no shots were directed at the 
advancing Armenian force.”467 
 
War Comes to Azerbaijan 
 With the capture of Lachin, the war entered a new phase. Whereas earlier fighting had 
almost entirely taken place within the borders of the NKAO, the war had now spread to the 
surrounding regions. While fighting outside of the NKAO was not a new development—indeed, 
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the earliest fighting during Operation Ring occurred in the Kalbajar District—the capture of 
Lachin was the first time that Armenians took control of land outside the borders of the NKAO. 
This change brought about a new attitude from the international community, which had formerly 
largely viewed the Armenians as victims of Azeri aggression, but slowly began to become more 
sympathetic to the Azeri side. However, many in the international community recognized the 
need to connect Artsakh and Armenia in order to lift the blockade of Artsakh and took comfort in 
Ter-Petrosyan’s assurance that “Neither Armenia nor the NK intend[ed] to occupy more land 
than that necessary for a link between the republics.”468 Regardless of the incipient threat to their 
goodwill abroad, the capture of the Lachin Corridor was an important strategic victory for the 
Armenians, enabling reinforcements and supplies to be sent to the embattled region.469 
 However, the Armenians’ string of victories soon came to an end as an Azeri offensive 
beginning on June 12 “quickly overran the whole northern part of Nagorny Karabakh…Over the 
next three weeks, the Martakert region was conquered.”470 Coming only 5 days after Elchibey 
was officially elected president of Azerbaijan, the offensive seemed to signal a new stage in the 
war, with a more internally united Azerbaijan taking advantage of its material advantages to beat 
back the Armenian forces. The success of the Azeri offensive was made possible by “a phalanx 
of armored vehicles and tanks—by some accounts as many as 150 of them—which swept aside 
the poorly armed Armenian defenders.”471 Both the tanks and their drivers were Russian, having 
been recruited by the Azeris from the remnants of the Soviet 4th Army.472 In a rather ironic twist, 
these Russian tanks would later be stopped by Russian attack helicopters in early July, which had 
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been persuaded by Armenians to intervene on their side.473 The Azeris also benefited from the 
“festive mood” among Armenians following the capture of Shushi and Lachin, after which many 
of the fedayi from Armenia proper “believed that they had done their share of fighting” and 
returned to Armenia.474 Finally, while Armenian commanders had expected a counterattack, they 
believed it “would come from the east and had left the northern sector poorly defended.”475 
 The Azeri offensive succeeded in capturing roughly half of the NKAO, putting the Azeri 
army only half an hour east of Stepanakert.476 The offensive created a new humanitarian crisis in 
Artsakh as thousands of Armenians were forced to flee their homes—many of them for the 
second time having returned after being deported during Operation Ring.477 In coordination with 
the ground offensive, Azerbaijan began using bombers to renew their attacks on Armenian towns 
and villages, once again most heavily targeting Stepanakert, where bombardments “destroyed 
dozens of houses that had escaped the artillery battering of the winter and spring.”478 The 
renewed attack proved even more deadly to the Armenian inhabitants of Artsakh, with Human 
Rights Watch reporting that an estimated 1,500 civilians were killed between June 1992 and 
January 1993—almost 10 times the number of civilians that had been killed during the fighting 
through April 1992.479  
While Azerbaijan was enjoying a period of national unity, the collapse of Armenian 
defenses caused political chaos in both Stepanakert and Yerevan. In Armenia, Ter-Petrosyan and 
his Defense Minister Vasgen Sargsyan accused the dashnaks of not using funds raised by the 
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Armenian diaspora to aid in the war effort.480 On June 23, the Armenian opposition—including 
the Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutyun (HHK) or Republican Party of Armenia which would 
later rise to power—formed the National Alliance Unity to challenge Ter-Petrosyan’s 
leadership.481 In Artsakh, “The local parliament was in disarray,” struggling to respond to the 
changing fortunes on the ground. However, both governments soon managed to regain unity. In 
Armenia, Ter-Petrosyan appointed opposition leader Vazgen Manukyan Defense Minister and in 
Artsakh, a new State Defense Committee, led by Robert Kocharyan, was formed on August 
15.482 The new Artsakhi leadership undertook sweeping measures to ensure Artsakh’s defense, 
drafting the entire male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five and putting all 
businesses in service of the military.483 
Although the Azeri offensive achieved significant territorial gains in the first two months, 
“The fall of 1992 was the high-water mark of Azerbaijan’s military success in the war… The 
Ministry of Defense in Baku was making plans to bring in buses to ship the Armenian civilian 
population out of the territory Azerbaijan planned to conquer. By October 1992, however, the 
advance had halted and the offensive had run out of steam.”484 Two factors help explain the 
Armenians’ success in turning aside the Azeri offensive. First, the Armenian leadership took a 
more localized approach to their defenses. Beginning in 1993, “defensive battles were allocated 
to the territorial units. To put it roughly, each village was protected by the battalion unit of that 
village…The men fought with the realization that two hundred meters behind them there was 
their village, their children, wives and mothers.”485 At the same time, the Armenians’ “irregular 
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fighting force became more organized” and centralized under the new Defense Committee.486 
What had formerly been a loose network of fighting groups was shaped into an army under the 
direction of Manukyan and Samvel Babayan, the newly appointed commander of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Defense Army.487 
 With these innovations, the Armenians were able to halt the Azeri attack and then 
undertake an offensive of their own. On March 27, 1993, Armenian forces launched an attack on 
Kelbajar, “a sliver of land running between the Northwest of Nagorny Karabakh and 
Armenia.”488 As had been the case a year earlier when the Armenians captured Lachin, the 
offensive faced little resistance as “Kelbajar had only a small group of defenders protecting it 
and no reinforcements came to assist them.”489 By April 5, the Armenians had taken control of 
the region, forcing Kelbajar’s 60,000 residents to flee to across the mountains to the north.490 
Commenting on the exodus, Human Rights Watch reported that the “Refugees claimed that 
hundreds of people froze to death attempting to flee.”491 The loss of Kelbajar prompted another 
political crisis in Azerbaijan, as “the old communist nomenclature gathered around [Heydar] 
Aliyev, [and] removed Elchibey from power by exploiting the loss of Kelbajar and the failures in 
Martakert.”492 
 Aliyev had long been a fixture of Azeri politics under the Soviet Union, serving first as 
the head of Azerbaijan’s Communist Party and then as a member of the Politburo, but was forced 
to resign in 1987 after a falling out with Gorbachev.493 Returning to his home of Nakhichevan, 
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Aliyev began rebuilding his base of power, becoming elected Nakhichevan’s speaker of 
parliament in Azerbaijan’s first elections after independence in September 1991.494 Despite not 
holding any national office, Aliyev “continued his subtle campaign to be a ‘third force’ in 
Azerbaijan” between Mutabilov and Elchibey.495 In the spring of 1993, Aliyev’s planning came 
to fruition when General Suret Husseinov capitalized on the Popular Front’s weakness in the 
wake of the Armenian capture of Kelbajar to mount a coup against Elichibey, marching his army 
from Ganja to Baku.496 In response, a “desperate Popular Front government then invited Heidar 
Aliev to come from Nakhichevan to Baku to its aid.”497 However, with Husseinov still marching 
on Baku, Elchibey fled to Nakhichevan—where he also was from—and Aliyev was granted 
extraordinary presidential powers by the parliament on June 24.498 Aliyev acted quickly, 
securing Husseinov’s support by appointing him prime minister on June 30 and holding a 
nationwide referendum on August 28 in which Elchibey was officially removed from office.499 
By October 3, Aliyev had been elected Azerbaijan’s new president, completing his takeover and 
marking Azerbaijan’s final transition of power until 2003 when Aliyev was replaced by his 
son.500 
 The Armenians were also facing internal divisions, albeit on a much milder scale than 
was occurring in Azerbaijan. Ter-Petrosyan, who had not been informed of the full extent of the 
plans to capture Kelbajar by Manukyan and Kocharyan, traveled to Stepanakert on June 14 to 
meet with Kocharyan.501 While Manukyan and the Artsakh Armenians favored pressing forward 
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to capitalize on Armenia’s military advantage, Ter-Petrosyan attempted to convince them to 
accept a peace plan proposed by Russia, the United States, and Turkey that “stipulated the 
Armenians would withdraw from Kelbajar in return for security guarantees for Nagorny 
Karabakh.”502 Aware of the importance of not alienating Russia by outright refusing the deal, but 
unwilling to accept a deal that did not secure their independence, the authorities in Artsakh 
agreed to the deal, but “asked that the implementation of the demands of the document be 
delayed for 30 days,” hoping that Azerbaijan’s chaotic political scene would give them the 
opportunity to secure a better deal. 503  
 The Artsakhis hopes were soon fulfilled, as Husseinov’s attempted coup “left the 
Karabakh front almost undefended.”504 On June 26 and 27, the Armenian forces “attacked and 
liberated Martakert” with relative ease.505 On July 23, “facing almost no resistance, they took the 
strategically vital city of Aghdam. A month later, they advanced south and captured Fizuli and 
Jebrail.”506 With the Azeris preoccupied with their domestic power struggle, the Armenian forces 
easily captured vast tracts of land. In the entire operation to capture Aghdam—a city of 28,000 
people—only 11 Armenians were killed, four of whom were killed by a land mine rather than 
enemy combatants.507 Indeed, according to a western diplomat in Baku, the Armenian offensive 
more closely resembled a “military stroll” than an invasion.508 Between July and October, “the 
Azerbaijanis lost a staggering five regions of their country as well as the North of Nagorny 
Karabakh itself…an area of almost five thousand square kilometers, or nineteen hundred square 
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miles.”509 The offensive was largely undertaken by the Artsakh Armenians, and Ter-Petrosyan, 
who took a more conservative line regarding advancing into areas outside the NKAO, was often 
informed of new operations only after they had already taken place.510 
 Aliyev, like Elchibey before him, began his presidency by launching a concerted effort 
intended to recapture territory lost to Armenian forces.511 This October offensive contrasted with 
the apparent willingness to make peace that Aliyev had shown while serving as acting president 
from July through the end of September. In September, Aliyev had approved a meeting between 
Azeri officials and Artsakhi officials, “thereby conceding for the first time that the Karabakh 
Armenians were ‘a party to the conflict.’”512 On September 13, Armenian and Azeri officials 
“agreed to prolong a cease-fire, which later did not hold” but was significant insofar as it 
signaled a willingness to end the conflict.513 Aliyev had even agreed to personally meet with 
Kocharyan on September 25 in Moscow.514 However, three weeks after his election, 
“Azerbaijani forces launched a sudden attack in the Jebrail region on 21 October. Spearheading 
the raid was a group of about three hundred Afghan mujaheddin fighters, part of a 1,000-to 
1,500-strong force hired by the Azerbaijani government in a last-ditch effort to reverse the tide of 
battle.”515 However, “the Afghan fighters made little difference on the battlefield and local 
Armenian forces went on the counter-offensive after repulsing the assault.”516 The counterattack 
proved successful, and “During the last week of October, the NK forces occupied Horadiz, 
Minjevan and the entire region of Zangelan.”517 By the end of October, Armenian forces were 
                                                 
509 de Waal, Black Garden, 227. 
510 Hakobyan, Green and Black, 202. 
511 Croissant, 94. 
512 de Waal, Black Garden, 238. 
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Croissant, 94. 
516 Ibid. 
517 Hakobyan, Green and Black, 214. 
91 
 
almost fully in control of five districts of Azerbaijan—Lachin, Kelbajar, Qubadli, Zangilan, and 
Jebrayil to the west and south of Artsakh—as well as parts of Aghdam and Fizuli to the east. 
While extraordinarily successful from a military perspective, the capture of the surrounding 
regions brought international condemnation on the Armenians. The Armenian offensive also 
created a refugee crisis in Azerbaijan, forcing 350,000 people to flee in advance of the Armenian 
forces.518 
The occupation of the surrounding territories prompted the United Nations’ Security 
Council to pass four resolutions calling on Armenian forces to withdraw back to the NKAO and 
urging both sides to come to a diplomatic solution. On April 30, 1993, UN Security Council 
Resolution 822 demanded the “immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar 
district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan.”519 This was followed by Resolution 
853 on July 29 condemning the seizure of Aghdam, Resolution 874 on October 14 calling for 
more negotiations in the wake of a high level meeting between the sides in Moscow, and 
Resolution 884 on November 12 condemning the occupation of Zangilan and the city of Horadiz 
in Fizuli.520 In each of the four resolutions, the Security Council reaffirmed “the respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region,” specifically referencing 
Azerbaijan in the latter three resolutions, as well as “the inviolability of international borders and 
the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory.”521 While three of the four 
Security Council Resolutions were passed in direct reaction to Armenian expansion into 
Azerbaijan, the reference to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of “all States in the region” 
rather than Azerbaijan in particular was perhaps calculated to allow enough ambiguity for the 
                                                 
518 de Waal, Black Garden, 228. 
519 Hakobyan, Green and Black, 387. 
520 Ibid., 388-390. 
521 Ibid., 387-390. 
92 
 
possible inclusion of Artsakh.  
By December of 1993, the war had entered a new and bloodier phase. Between December 
1993 and May 1994, when a ceasefire put an end to fighting, an estimated 2,000 Armenian and 
5,000 Azeri soldiers were killed.522 In contrast to earlier fighting that had been waged largely by 
locals and experienced soldiers, beginning in the late fall of 1993, “both sides relied heavily on 
young and inexperienced conscripts, thousands of whom died in pitched battles.”523 As the 
composition of the armies changed, so too did the nature of the fighting: “There were no longer 
local battles, but a massive front line.”524 With the fighting growing more intense, both sides 
struggled to make significant territorial gains. In December, “The Armenians attempted to push 
east of Fizuli but met with unprecedented resistance and fell back.”525 Azerbaijan launched an 
offensive of its own, “moving forward 25 km in the direction of Horadiz and Beylagan” but 
lacked the force necessary to advance further and were compelled to stop when “soldiers and 
officers began abandoning their posts.”526 
In January 1994, Azerbaijan launched its biggest offensive of the war, sending a large 
contingent over the mountains into Kelbajar.527 Initially, the Azeri forces made significant gains 
against the inexperienced Armenian forces stationed in the region, announcing on January 24 
that “they had encircled and destroyed almost an entire Armenian battalion of 240 men.”528 
While the offensive came close to capturing the town of Kelbajar itself, a February 12 
counterattack by more experienced Armenian troops forced the over-extended Azeris to “retreat 
in panic and hundreds of young soldiers were reported missing or frozen to death. By 18 
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February, the Azerbaijanis were in full retreat over the Omar Pass.”529 With the situation 
reversed, “Two Azerbaijani brigades had now been completely cut off and tried to fight their 
way back north through the narrow pass” but were hit with an Armenian Grad missile barrage 
that killed up to 1,500 Azeri soldiers.530 After repelling the Azeri attack, the Armenians launched 
one of their own in the east, “liberating several Armenian villages that had been occupied 
earlier… Opposing calls from Yerevan to cease the advance, the NK side initiated operations to 
take Mir Bashir [Terter] and its adjacent territories. At the end of April about 50 thousand 
Azerbaijanis abandoned the villages and found shelter in Barda and Yevlakh.”531 
While attempts by foreign officials to negotiate a ceasefire between the Armenians and 
Azeris had begun almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, none of these 
efforts had yielded practical success. Both the Armenians and the Azeris had agreed to ceasefires 
at various points, but “neither side thought seriously about cease-fires; they were tactical ruses. 
There was no trust.”532 In addition, the sheer number of potential interlocutors meant that both 
Armenians and Azeris were “encouraged to ‘shop around’ for whichever mediation effort suited 
them best,” further damaging the possibility of the two sides coming to an agreement.533 
Numerous attempts to mediate the conflict—most notably under the auspices of the OSCE’s 
Minsk Group—had failed to bring the two sides to an agreement that could put an end to the war. 
However, with Azerbaijan suffering defeats on the battlefield and Armenia facing a shortage of 
food and fuel resulting from the Azeri blockade, by May of 1994 both sides were ready to 
discuss terms for peace.534  
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On May 4, the leaders from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Artsakh, along with officials from 
Russia and other CIS countries, met in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to agree to a peace deal.535 The 
resulting “Bishkek Protocols,” signed the following day, “called on all conflicting sides [in 
Nagorny Karabakh] to heed again the voice of reason: to cease fire at midnight on 8 to 9 
May.”536 However, Aliyev had not attended the meeting in Bishkek and the Azeri 
representative—deputy speaker of parliament Afiyettin Jalilov—refused to sign the document 
without his approval.537 Back in Baku, on May 8, Aliyev and other top Azeri officials met and 
agreed to the deal “if they could make two minor alterations to the document and add the 
signature of the Karabakh Azerbaijani leader.”538 The new agreement was faxed to the Armenian 
leaders and signed by Serzh Sargsyan, who had become Armenia’s defense minister, and Samvel 
Babayan, Sargsyan’s successor as the defense minister for Artsakh.539 By midnight of May 11-
12, both sides declared a ceasefire, that—although extremely fragile and frequently violated—
would prevent the return of sustained war for the next twenty-six years.540 
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Chapter Three: An Irreconcilable Divide 
A Ceasefire Takes Hold 
While both the Armenians and the Azeris were exhausted from over six years of fighting, 
the ceasefire had opponents on both sides. In Azerbaijan, the announcement of the Bishkek 
Protocol was met with “a storm of protest from the opposition.”541 Aliyev, apparently giving 
himself time to gauge the public’s reaction, “waited for a few days for the storm to pass” before 
publically supporting the agreement.542 Aliyev himself had earlier been resistant to Russian 
efforts to negotiate a peace, not yielding to a concerted Russian campaign to pressure Azerbaijan 
into accepting a ceasefire that had begun in February 1994.543 However, by May, Azerbaijan, 
facing the possibility of Armenia capturing more territory as well as increasing Russian 
diplomatic pressure—and persuaded in part by Russia reframing negotiations as occurring under 
the aegis of the CIS—was ready to accept a ceasefire.544 However, by acquiescing to a deal that 
consolidated Armenian control over approximately 13.6% of Azerbaijan’s de jure territory, 
Aliyev had undermined his legitimacy in the eyes of many Azeris. 
Aliyev soon faced challenges to his authority, first from pro-Russian elements in the 
Azeri government who objected not so much to the ceasefire as they did to Aliyev’s ‘contract of 
the century’ that gave a consortium of Western companies the right to develop Azerbaijan’s 
Caspian oil fields.545 In October 1994, Azerbaijan’s deputy speaker of parliament, Afiyettin 
Jalilov, was assassinated and “elements of the paramilitary police force, the OPON (successor to 
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the OMON)” mounted a revolt against Aliyev’s rule.546 Aliyev, who was in New York for a 
meeting of the United Nations, “hurried back to Baku, where, with theatrical suddenness, he 
turned on Prime Minister Suret Husseinov and accused him of plotting to seize power.”547 
Husseinov, who had been instrumental in bringing Aliyev to power a year earlier, had since 
become his domestic opponent, leading the pro-Russian faction in the government that sought to 
“station Russian troops in Azerbaijan…reintegrate the country’s oil output into the Russian one, 
and install a regime that would dance to Moscow’s tune.”548 However, faced with Aliyev’s 
accusation, Husseinov fled to Russia and Aliyev “Having dealt with the pro-Russian 
opposition…turned on a different set of enemies.”549  
In March 1995, with Aliyev once again out of the country for a United Nation’s 
conference—this time in Copenhagen—a pro-Turkish opposition mounted its own attempted 
coup.550 Following Aliyev’s announcement that he intended to disband OPON, its “leader, 
Rovshan Javadov, who had been cleared of involvement in the previous coup attempt, seized a 
barracks in Baku and refused calls to disarm.”551 While never confirmed, Javadov is suspected to 
have had the support of “rogue elements of the Turkish security establishment and members of 
the ‘Gray Wolves’” Turkish nationalist movement.552 However, Turkish officials had reportedly 
warned Aliyev of the impending coup attempt, giving him the opportunity to surprise Javadov by 
returning to Baku rather than traveling to Pakistan as he had planned.553 Forces loyal to Aliyev 
attacked the barracks Javadov had made his headquarters, and “An armed confrontation took 
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place which lasted two days…in which 43 people died, including Rovshan Javadov. This time 
there was to be no mercy: anyone related to the revolt was pursued [and] hundreds were 
arrested.”554 In parliamentary elections held in November 1995, Aliyev’s Yeni Azərbaycan 
Partiyası (YAP), the New Azerbaijan Party, won a “commanding majority” amidst widespread 
allegations of fraud.555 Observers from the OSCE reported that the elections “did not meet 
international standards for free and fair elections…And this was the OSCE/ODIHR finding for 
every election in Azerbaijan observed since 1995.”556  
Opposition to the ceasefire was perhaps to be expected from Azerbaijan, but there were 
also Armenians—particularly from Artsakh—who were reluctant to accept the agreement.557 
Among those who, at least later, expressed disapproval of the ceasefire was Artsakhi Defense 
Minister Samvel Babayan, himself a signatory of the Bishkek Protocol, who maintained that the 
Armenians could have secured a more favorable agreement by continuing the war. Interviewed 
in 2006, Babayan claimed that “If we had advanced the 5-6 km remaining to Mir Bashir [Terter], 
today we would have NK's territory set down on paper.”558 The idea that Armenian forces were 
on the verge of advancing further into Azerbaijan was relatively widespread at the time, with 
another Armenian commander later arguing that, “If military actions had not been halted we 
were going to enter Mir Bashir, within a maximum of three days if not in one.”559 Nor was the 
opinion limited to the Armenian side, Azerbaijan’s then-speaker of parliament Rasul Guliev says 
that before signing the ceasefire, “he had just returned from the front line near Terter, where he 
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had seen that Azerbaijani positions were at a breaking point.”560 Likewise, Boris Kazimirov, the 
Russian diplomat who was the architect of the Bishkek Protocol, concurred, arguing that 
diplomatic “efforts would have yielded no results if Aliyev’s situation hadn’t been critical. 
Essentially, Aliyev faced losing not only other territories but his power as well.”561 
However, President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and other Armenian leaders who favored a 
quick end to the war won out over those who believed Armenia should leverage its military 
advantages to capture more territory. While their view was partially motivated by the toll the war 
was taking on Armenia and Artsakh, particularly the economic effects of Azerbaijan’s and 
Turkey’s blockade, Armenians were also largely willing to accept peace because they had little 
to gain from further territorial gains. The capture of the regions surrounding the NKAO had been 
driven in part by the desire to gain leverage that could be used to force political concessions from 
Azerbaijan as Babayan suggested, but the Armenian advances were primarily concerned with 
securing a defensible perimeter around Artsakh. As Robert Kocharyan explained in 2000, the 
Armenian leadership “seriously began to think about [a cease-fire], when we came to borders, 
where we could seriously organize the defense of Karabakh.”562 By May of 1994, the Armenian 
forces had created the defensible perimeter they desired. Not only had the Armenians pushed the 
front line away from Artsakh’s population centers and drastically decreased the length of the 
front line they would have to defend, they had also, with the exception of Artsakh’s northern 
border, driven the Azeris out of the mountains, providing their forces with a natural defensive 
advantage. Indeed, there is reason to believe that this had been the Armenians’ goal throughout 
the entire war: “As early as the winter of 1991, the first Karabakh Armenian leader, Artur 
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Mkrtchian, had sketched out a map of what he thought of as ‘defensible frontiers,’ which was 
remarkably similar to the one eventually drawn on the battlefield.”563  
With the Armenians victorious and Azerbaijan forced to accept what amounted to a 
surrender, the conflict over Artsakh moved from the battlefield to the negotiating table. 
Understandably, the earliest post-war diplomatic efforts were more focused on the more urgent 
issue of “eliminating the consequences of the conflict” rather than resolving the underlying 
political dispute.564 However, even without addressing the more contentious issues, negotiations 
between Armenians and Azeris almost immediately became bogged down. On May 16, four days 
after the ceasefire became official, delegates from Armenia, Artsakh, and Azerbaijan met in 
Moscow to begin negotiations.565 While Russia proposed deploying 1,800 peacekeepers to 
enforce the ceasefire, Mammadrafi Mamedov, the Azeri representative, rejected the idea of a 
Russian military deployment.566 At a subsequent meeting in August, “all three parties endorsed 
the idea of ‘international’ peacekeepers being dispatched,” but disputes over the composition of 
such a force prevented it from ever being realized.567 Only Russia and Turkey were willing to 
deploy peacekeepers, but “The presence of the Turks was unacceptable for Armenia and NK, and 
that of the Russians, for Azerbaijan.”568 The result was an “unusual situation of a cease-fire line, 
which had no neutral troop contingent to patrol it and was, in effect, self-regulated.”569 While the 
OSCE soon established a monitoring mission, it consisted of just six unarmed observers whose 
visits to the frontline had to be announced in advance.570  
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These early negotiations did, however, see the beginning of a framework for peace 
emerge in the form of a Russian proposal for a “six-part process by which a resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute would be achieved.”571 The plan called for the introduction of a 
“primarily Russian” peacekeeping force followed by the staggered withdrawal of Armenian 
forces from the surrounding territories—with the exception of Lachin.572 The most contentious—
and least clear—part of the Russian plan called for “Discussion of the ultimate legal and 
administrative status of Nagorno-Karabakh for an undefined period of time beginning at the time 
of the accord’s signing.”573 Future proposals for peace would follow a similar program, calling 
for security guarantees and the return of the surrounding territories while postponing a final 
decision on the status of Artsakh to an unspecified future date. Predictably, Armenian negotiators 
tended to object to frameworks that required the Armenian side to make concrete concessions 
without securing Artsakh’s status, but the formula nevertheless became the basis for mediation 
efforts. 
 
The Rise of the Minsk Group 
While Russia had been the driving force behind the ceasefire and early efforts at 
resolving the conflict, an international body known as the Minsk Group soon emerged as the 
primary forum for negotiations. The origins of the group dated back to March 1992, when the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—renamed the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in December 1994—inducted the newly independent states of 
the former Soviet Union. Realizing that “the organization had just admitted two members, 
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Armenia and Azerbaijan, who were at war with each other… CSCE foreign ministers resolved to 
hold a peace conference on Nagorny Karabakh—for which another new delegate, from Belarus, 
suddenly volunteered his capital, Minsk, as a venue.”574 While Azerbaijan’s demand that 
Armenian forces leave Shushi and Lachin—which they had captured just before the scheduled 
conference—as a precondition to negotiations prevented the conference from actually taking 
place, it lent its name to the Minsk Group that was subsequently created to mediate the 
conflict.575 Initially chaired by Sweden with representatives from several other countries, 
including Russia and the United States, the Minsk Group brought significant potential 
international pressure to bear on the conflict.576  
However, the multilateral nature of the Minsk Group introduced difficulties of its own.   
After the Russian-brokered ceasefire, the Western members of the Minsk Group scrambled to 
reassert their influence in the region, creating tension among the mediators themselves. In May, 
“Minsk Group chairman Jan Eliasson shuttled back and forth between Yerevan and Baku in an 
effort to convince the sides not to accept hastily the most recent draft Russian peace plan—a plan 
that minimized the CSCE’s role.”577 Continued tension between Russia and the West hindered 
efforts to negotiate peace throughout the rest of 1994, perhaps most acutely symbolized by the 
fact that “the Swedes twice scheduled meetings of the Minsk Group, in Paris and Prague, that 
clashed with CIS meetings in Moscow at which the Russians were intending to hold peace 
talks.”578 As Ter-Petrosyan put it, “the mediating countries and international organizations are 
not interested so much in settling the conflict, as in settling their own accounts.”579  
                                                 
574 de Waal, Black Garden, 241. 
575 Hakobyan, Green and Black, 125. 
576 Croissant, 85. 
577 Ibid., 111. 
578 de Waal, Black Garden, 265. 
579 Ibid., 266. 
102 
 
Azerbaijan, which had long believed Russia to be pro-Armenian, particularly encouraged 
the OSCE to take on a leading role, with Aliyev backing out of Russian-sponsored meetings in 
favor of those held under the auspices of the Minsk Group.580 In addition, improving relations 
between Russia and the West as well as the OSCE acknowledging “Russia’s special role in the 
dispute by promoting it to become one of two co-chairs of the Minsk Group, alongside Sweden” 
convinced Russia to stop pursuing mediation efforts outside of the OSCE.581 By April 1995, 
when Finland replaced Sweden as co-chair, the group’s internal “conflicts were pretty much 
settled between Russia and the West.”582 However, the composition of the Minsk Group meant 
that mediation efforts would permanently remain tied “to the wider issue of the West’s 
engagement with Russia,” becoming a more significant obstacle as that relationship declined.583 
In 1997, the group took on its current form when  the European chair—which had previously 
been rotating—permanently passed to France and the United States joined as a third permanent 
co-chair.584 With the Minsk Group established as the primary forum for negotiations over 
Artsakh, its three co-chairs would come to dominant the international response to issues 
concerning Artsakh. 
The Minsk Group faced a multitude of complex issues in their efforts to resolve the 
conflict. While fighting had stopped, the fundamental question—the status of Artsakh and 
control of the surrounding territories—remained unanswered. While the “Armenians were ready 
in principle to return the six districts they occupied outside Nagorny Karabakh…they said their 
continued possession of Shusha, inside Nagorny Karabakh, and Lachin, giving them a land 
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bridge to Armenia was non-negotiable.”585 Azerbaijan, on the other hand, held that “the loss of 
both regions was unacceptable” and firmly opposed any plan that included Artsakh either 
becoming independent or joining Armenia.586 Not only were the positions of Armenians and 
Azeris, at least regarding Artsakh itself, diametrically opposed, both sides were able to cite the 
norms of international law in support of their position. As de Waal writes, any potential 
“resolution of the issue had to reconcile the competing claims of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity 
and Karabakh’s self-determination.”587 As a result, “little common ground was found during the 
first round of discussions” that took place in the summer of 1994, and there was no international 
body willing and able to force either side to accept a deal it opposed.588 
Along with negotiations over the political status of Artsakh, the war had also raised the 
new issue of refugees. The Armenian capture of territory outside Artsakh had resulted in the 
expulsion of an estimated 530,000 Azeris in addition to the approximately 220,000 that had fled 
Armenia prior to the outbreak of the war.589 These refugees overwhelmed Azerbaijan, giving it 
one of the highest proportions of displaced people per capita in the world.590 With Azerbaijan 
unable to accommodate the immense numbers of refugees, many of the displaced people ended 
up “in a vast archipelago of sanatoria, student hostels, and makeshift accommodations. All 
remained in a terrible limbo while the conflict remained unresolved.”591 With conditions for 
refugees improving only gradually, their plight—perhaps intentionally on the part of the Azeri 
government—served as a lasting reminder of Azerbaijan’s defeat at the hands of their smaller 
neighbor to the west. Even as the Azeri elite grew fabulously wealthy from the country’s oil 
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resources, many of these refugees remained in conditions of poverty. It was not until 2007 that 
the last of the ‘tent camps’ was closed and even after that, many refugees remained isolated from 
broader society.592 
At the same time, Armenia was confronted with 350,000 refugees—including around 
40,000 from areas of the NKAO that remained under Azerbaijan’s control—that had fled 
Azerbaijan before or during the war, a much smaller number on an absolute basis but around the 
same in proportion to its population.593 However, unlike Azerbaijan’s refugees, many of whom 
hoped to return to their former homes if Azerbaijan regained the territories around Artsakh and 
therefore remained somewhat separate from Azeri society, the Armenian refugees had little 
desire to return to Azerbaijan after the pogroms in Sumgait and Baku and instead largely 
attempted to forge new lives in Armenia. Whether or not the refugees on both sides would be 
allowed to return to their former homes—or, especially in the case of those who had previously 
lived in the other country, other arrangements would be made—further complicated negotiation 
efforts. While little progress was made on the issue of refugees, a May 1996 agreement, brokered 
once again by Russia, would provide for the return of 39 Armenian and 71 Azeri prisoners of 
war that had been held for almost exactly a year after the war ended.594 
The return of these POWs was made possible by a new series of talks that had begun 
several months prior. In November 1995, Ter-Petrosyan and Aliyev had met at an OSCE summit 
in Bonn, Germany and agreed to begin direct negotiations between the two countries. The result 
was a series of talks, led by Vafa Guluzade and Gerard Libaridian, held “every month to work on 
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the status question in particular” that “made substantial progress.”595 1996 also saw “several 
stages of the trilateral talks as well as the Minsk Group meetings [that] took place in Moscow, 
Helsinki and Vienna. However, the settlement process continued to bog down on the same 
spot.”596 That central bone of contention—the status of Artsakh—re-emerged in a December 
1996 OSCE summit held in Lisbon, where negotiators attempted to make affirmation of 
Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Artsakh one of three “broad principles for the resolution of the 
dispute.”597 The Armenians refused to agree to a condition that they believed would impose “the 
constant threat of genocide and forced exile” on the Armenians of Artsakh, insisting that the 
people of Artsakh be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination, which would certainly 
result in Azerbaijan losing control of Artsakh.598 The Armenian push for Artsakh to either be 
recognized as independent or be allowed to join Armenia met with predictable opposition from 
Azerbaijan, which had the support of the summit’s OSCE organizers.599 In the end, Armenia 
vetoed the Lisbon Summit’s final communique and the re-exposed rift between the two sides 
“effectively ended the Guluzade-Libaridian negotiating track.”600 
 
An Armenian Power Struggle 
Meanwhile, Armenia was undergoing domestic turmoil of its own as opposition 
politicians mounted a challenge to Ter-Petrosyan, largely as a result of differing opinions on the 
proper approach to negotiations over Artsakh. Aiding the opposition’s quest to unseat Ter-
Petrosyan, his Armenian National Movement no longer possessed the monopoly on political 
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power it had once held: “Ten years in positions of power and leadership had taken their 
toll…The ANM had lost its top leadership to the legislative and executive branches. Particularly 
following the 1995 legislative elections, the governing party had become complacent, arrogant, 
self-confident, and careless.”601 Along with the proliferation of opposition parties—74 parties 
had registered by 1999, although most lacked the size or capability to have any noticeable 
impact—the army had established itself as a significant center of power in Armenia in its own 
right.602 The military officially received between eight and nine percent of Armenia’s GDP, 
though “unofficially, it probably received much more than that.”603 The army also exercised 
political and economic power through a veterans’ organization known as the “Yerkrapahs 
(Homeland Defenders), the group in parliament responsible for Ter-Petrosyan’s loss of 
parliamentary support” that also controlled “large areas of the economy.”604 Vazgen Sargysyan, 
Armenia’s defense minister and founder of the Yerkrapah union, was by all accounts one of the 
most powerful men in Armenia, perhaps even superseding both Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan.605 
However, despite the incipient threat posed by Sargsyan and other members of his own 
administration, Ter-Petrosyan appeared poised to win the September 1996 presidential elections 
with little opposition. The Dashnaktsutyun or ARF, which was popular among the Armenian 
Diaspora and was “the only other party with strong grassroots support,” had been banned in 
December 1994 for refusing to separate itself from its international organization, which was not 
led by Armenian citizens and therefore violated Armenia’s laws regulating political parties.606 In 
addition, prosecutors alleged that the ARF “had instituted a secretive ‘security council’ within its 
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own structure…that seemed to be accountable to no one and was clearly involved in illicit and 
illegal activities.”607 However, even after sidelining the main opposition party, Ter-Petrosyan 
still faced a difficult task: “His popular support had ebbed. Tens of thousands of professionals 
were emigrating, and the country was desperately poor. Disillusionment with the ruling elite was 
strong.”608  
Capitalizing on the opportunity, Vazgen Manukyan—who had previously been both Ter-
Petrosyan’s political opponent and served as his defense minister during the war—returned to the 
opposition to challenge Ter-Petrosyan in the presidential elections.609 Manukyan united the 
opposition forces, mounting a not-insignificant challenge to Ter-Petrosyan’s reelection. Indeed, 
“most international observers concluded that Ter-Petrosian had failed to win the first round of 
the election outright,” but the Central Election Commission nevertheless announced that he had 
won 52% of the vote, voiding the need for a run off.610 Manukyan’s supporters responded by 
storming the parliament building, leading Ter-Petrosyan, who had the crucial support of Vazgen 
Sargsyan and the army, to order tanks into the streets of Yerevan and arrest several members of 
the opposition, effectively securing his victory.611 
Ter-Petrosyan had staved off Manukyan’s challenge, but his popular support had been 
further eroded by the way he had won reelection.612 In January 1997, seeking to shore up his 
legitimacy, Ter-Petrosyan appointed Kocharyan—whose reputation as one of the chief architects 
of Armenia’s victory had made him popular in Armenia as well as Artsakh—Armenia’s prime 
minister.613 Kocharyan had led Artsakh—first as chairman of the defense committee, then as 
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prime minister, and finally as president—since August 1992, and had recently won Artsakh’s 
first elections in November 1996, receiving 89% of the vote.614 However, while Ter-Petrosyan 
sought a quick settlement of the Artsakh issue with Azerbaijan, Kocharyan—together with 
Vazgen Sargsyan and Serzh Sargsyan, an Artsakhi who had served as both Armenia’s Minister 
of National Security and its Minister of Interior—“was included in the ranks of those who towed 
[sic] a ‘hard line’” and were willing to put off a political solution until Armenia was presented 
with a more favorable deal.615 These two factions came to a head in 1997, when the newly 
reconstituted  Minsk Group undertook a concerted push to resolve the question of Artsakh.  
In May 1997, the Minsk Group co-chairs unveiled their proposal, aimed at a 
“simultaneous resolution of the issue of returning the territories (apart from the Lachin region), 
as well as the deployment of peacekeeping forces, the lifting of the blockade, the return of 
refugees and the creation of separating/buffer no-fly zones on the NK-Azerbaijan border.”616 
While both sides generally agreed to these elements, the proposal also envisioned a status for 
Artsakh that “was unequivocally based on the principle of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.”617 
According to Libaridian, from Armenia’s perspective the proposal “was bad; not to say fatal, but 
bad. NK refused. Azerbaijan's response was not clear and we [Armenia] agreed to it in principal 
as a basis for negotiation, while presenting our arguments in detail.”618 The Minsk Group’s 
proposal revealed the fault lines in Armenia’s government. While Ter-Petrosyan, concerned that 
a continued blockade would cripple Armenia’s economic potential and arguing that international 
recognition of Artsakh as either independent or as part of Armenia was impossible, favored 
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compromise, the more conservative elements of Armenian society viewed such compromise—
which would put Artsakh under to Azerbaijan’s control—as a betrayal of the Artsakh 
Armenians.619  
In July, the Minsk Group negotiators visited the region and presented an updated version 
of the plan, split into two stages.620 The first stage called for the complete withdrawal of 
Armenia’s troops and for Artsakh to return to the borders of the NKAO, with Minsk Group 
peacekeepers taking control of the surrounding territories. 621 The strategically vital Lachin 
corridor would be leased to the OSCE, who would guarantee free transport to Artsakh and 
oversee the construction of a road that bypassed the town of Lachin itself.622 However, once 
again the plan foundered on the second stage, the status of Artsakh, attempting to forge a 
compromise that would see Artsakh return to Azerbaijan but have its own constitution that would 
take precedence over laws passed by Baku.623 Perhaps representing the increasing influence of 
the hardliners in Armenia’s government, Libaridian reports that the July proposal was seen by 
Armenia as “even worse than that in May. NK rejected that one too and we opposed it with even 
more serious arguments.”624 The plan also faced opposition from the both Artsakh and 
Azerbaijan, neither of which was willing to accept the compromises that the agreement would 
entail.625 
In September, the Minsk Group presented a third version of their proposal, which “was 
accepted by Azerbaijan and Armenia as the basis of renewed negotiations, but rejected by 
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Karabakh leaders.”626 However, while Ter-Petrosyan had accepted the principles of the step-by-
step plan, the hardliners in his administration did not. Ter-Petrosyan attempted to take his case to 
the Armenian people, arguing that Armenia had to accept a compromise, even if it meant 
Azerbaijan gaining control over Artsakh. On September 26, he “used his first major press 
conference in five years to set out his arguments in favor of compromise.”627 The following 
week, on November 1, Ter-Petrosyan published an article in Yerevan’s daily newspapers entitled 
“War or Peace: The Moment to Become Serious” in which articulated his thoughts on a potential 
settlement of the Artsakh conflict.628 As he wrote, “The refusal to compromise and maximalism 
is the shortest route to NK's complete destruction and the deterioration of Armenia’s situation… 
Today Armenia and NK are stronger than ever, but if the conflict remains unresolved, they will 
incomparably weaken in one to two years.”629 While Ter-Petrosyan’s article is now regarded as 
“one of the weightiest analyses…on the NK settlement to date,” it met with harsh opposition, 
including from officials in Artsakh’s government.630 On November 6, Artsakh’s Foreign 
Ministry “issued an unprecedented statement in which it disputed several of Ter-Petrosian’s 
points.”631 
 Led by Kocharyan, the opposition within Ter-Petrosyan’s administration also began to 
publically advocate on behalf of their positions. On January 14, Kocharyan told journalists that 
he objected to what he referred to as “placing the ideals of freedom and independence on the 
sacrificial altar” and told them that, “It is no longer a secret that there is no unity in Armenia’s 
administration on the issue of approaches for the resolution of NK's conflict.”632 Kocharyan and 
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his allies also argued that Ter-Petrosyan “was exaggerating the impact of the blockades; that the 
main reasons why the economy was not moving to the next phase were administrative 
inefficiency, corruption, Ter-Petrossian’s style of government, as well as his relations with the 
Diaspora.”633 In contrast to Ter-Petrosyan’s more pessimistic views, Kocharyan estimated that 
the Armenian Diaspora could provide $400-500 million a year, equivalent to 25-30% of 
Armenia’s national GDP at the time.634 Kocharyan’s views proved to be more popular among the 
Armenian public, and he won the support of “the opposition, the intelligentsia, Diaspora 
organizations, and the Armenian media.”635 On February 3, 1998, Ter-Petrosyan—facing the 
possibility of a “palace coup”—was forced to resign, announcing to the Armenian people that, 
“A demand for my resignation has been presented to me by certain bodies of the administration 
known to you…I accept those demands and announce my resignation.”636 
 While Kocharyan was seen by many as the natural successor to Ter-Petrosyan, his 
candidacy “presented a problem. The [Armenian] Constitution requires that to be eligible for the 
presidency one would have to have a citizen and permanent resident of Armenia for at least ten 
years. Kocharian was not technically a citizen of Armenia and had been a resident of Karabakh 
during that period.”637 In addition, the constitution mandated that to be eligible for the 
presidency one had to have the right to vote, which had not been true for Artsakh’s Armenians in 
any of Armenia’s elections.638 However, “Despite protests from a variety of groups…the Central 
Election Commission registered Kocharian as a candidate. The Constitutional Court rejected a 
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legal challenge in a short decision that found no grounds to review the case.”639 Having been 
cleared to run, Kocharyan faced Karen Demirchyan, the former leader of Soviet Armenia, whose 
“hastily organized People’s Party of Armenia (PPA) quickly became a force to reckon with.”640 
Kocharyan, on the other hand, had the support of not only Sargsyan and the army, but also the 
ARF and its Armenian organization.641 In the first round, held on March 16, Kocharyan won 
38% of the vote while Demirchyan won 30%, forcing a runoff between the two men.642 While 
the election officials declared Kocharyan the winner of the run-off election, “many local 
observers believed Demirjian had won the elections, as did Demirjian himself, whose candidacy 
was quietly supported by Moscow.”643 However, “Demirjian accepted the verdict, did not take to 
the streets, and bid his time.”644 
 
International Relations and the Artsakh Conflict 
 Across the border, Aliyev, who won an election of his own in October 1998, now “had 
complete political control of the country, managing foreign relations and pursuing negotiations 
with oil companies” and his “YAP had control over the Milli Majlis [Parliament].”645 Aliyev’s 
dominance in Azerbaijan was made possible not only by his political skill, but also by his control 
over Azerbaijan’s growing oil industry.646 The breakup of the Soviet Union had impacted 
Azerbaijan—which had largely produced raw materials to be exported to other Soviet 
republics—particularly hard, wiping out almost 60% of its GDP.647 Without an industrial base to 
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rely on, “Oil was the great hope for Azerbaijan’s future—the resource that would make it 
Switzerland, and not Swaziland.”648 After taking office in 1993, Aliyev had continued to pursue 
negotiations with Western oil companies that his predecessor, Abulfaz Elchibey, had begun.649 
By the fall of the following year, the Azeri government had signed a deal with a consortium of 
Western companies that “was estimated to be worth eight billion dollars and was dubbed the 
‘contract of the century.’”650  
Along with being “a public relations coup for Heydar Aliyev,” the deal and subsequent 
development of Azerbaijan’s oil resources enabled the country to undergo rapid economic 
growth and gave the government a much needed source of funding.651 While British Petroleum 
“came to dominate the oil scene” with a 36% stake, Azerbaijan’s state oil company, SOCAR, 
received 12% of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) that the deal 
created.652 The deal also gave Azerbaijan’s wider economy a significant boost and “oil revenues 
grew from $450 million in 1998 to $2.5 billion in 2004, a fivefold increase. Not surprisingly, 
official data show that 1995 was the first year of an upward trend in Azerbaijan’s state 
income.”653 Over the same period of time, Azerbaijan’s GDP almost doubled, growing from 
$4.46 billion to $8.68 billion, with increasing in oil revenues accounting for nearly half of overall 
economic growth.654  
The involvement of Western countries in developing Azerbaijan’s oil industry—
combined with Azerbaijan’s lingering wariness towards Russia—led Azerbaijan to pursue closer 
                                                 
648 Ibid. 
649 de Waal, Black Garden, 263. 
650 Black Garden, 263. 
651 Altstadt, Frustrated Democracy, 100. 
652 Ibid., 100-101. 
653 Ibid. 




relations with the West. As Audrey Altstadt writes, “Elchibey certainly intended to join the 
West, and Heydar Aliyev stated his intention to bring Azerbaijan into Europe.”655 Continuing to 
the present day, the inclination toward the West has also partially been shaped by the personal 
interests of Azeri elites: “those close to the regime have huge investments in the West…The 
[Ilham] Aliyev family and the oligarchs in his inner circle prefer the alignment with the West 
because they both see and present themselves as Westerners, especially as Europeans.”656 In 
1997, Azerbaijan along with Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova founded GUAM—rechristened 
GUUAM when Uzbekistan joined two years later—an association “initially described as an 
economic cooperation effort but increasingly assigned defense and strategic significance. 
Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, GUUAM is seen by Washington and the member 
states as a factor against Russian influence in the region.”657 
While Azerbaijan began creating ties with the West, Azeri leaders also recognized the 
importance of maintaining friendly relations with Russia—which remained the dominant power 
in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia after independence have been strained 
not only by the memory of Soviet rule, particularly Black January, but also by Russian support 
for Armenia during the war. While Russia supplied—and has continued to supply—weapons to 
both sides, it was seen by Azeris as favoring Armenia and “much of the Armenian success in the 
NK conflict was attributed to Russian assistance.”658 However, despite the sometimes strained 
relationship between the two countries, since Aliyev took power, Azerbaijan has sought to 
“maintain a balance between the West and Russia.”659 While the anti-Russian Elchibey refused 
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to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Aliyev, before even officially taking 
office, “traveled to Moscow to sign the accession documents for Azerbaijan to join the Russian-
led club of post-Soviet nations.”660 Recognizing Russia’s importance, Aliyev—followed by his 
son and successor Ilham—would go on to forge “a ‘friendly’ relationship with Russia replete 
with trade including the sale of oil, gas, and weapons.”661   
Along with Russia and the West, the other major pole of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy 
since independence has been Turkey. Azerbaijan has enjoyed extremely close ties with Turkey, 
drawing on their ethnic ties as Turkic peoples as well as “their nineteenth century national 
identity formation and shared language.”662 Along with this ethnic kinship and shared identity, 
Turkey and Azerbaijan were brought closer by their shared attempt to establish themselves as 
majority-Muslim secular nations, and “both Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar Aliyev supported a 
Turkish presence on the basis of historical ties, as a tool in nation-building, and as a bulwark 
against Iranian Shi’ism.”663 Indeed, Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan’s 
independence in November 1991 and Turkish companies almost immediately began making 
“large-scale deals to revamp the long-neglected infrastructure.”664 During the war, Turkey  had 
“supported Azerbaijan diplomatically, politically, technically, and, in a limited manner, 
militarily” and even after the ceasefire announced that it would delay normalizing relations with 
Armenia until the Artsakh conflict was resolved.665  
While Armenian foreign policy has also attempted to balance between Russia and the 
West, not coincidentally its approach has been the opposite of Azerbaijan’s, heavily favoring the 
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former. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia immediately joined the Russian-led CIS and in September 
1992 even reached an agreement to allow Russian border guards to patrol Armenia’s border with 
Turkey.666 Many Armenians credited Russia and the CIS with helping to ensure that Turkey’s 
participation in the war was limited to assisting Azerbaijan rather than direct involvement, which 
seemed possible in the war’s early years.667 Armenia also became a founding member of the 
1992 Collective Security Treaty—which became the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) in 2002—gaining “the putative guarantee of the CSTO Charter’s Article 4 committing 
member-states to treat an attack on one as an attack on all.”668 In 1995, Armenia again signaled 
its commitment to its alliance with Russia, agreeing to allow the Russian army to continue using 
a Soviet-era military base in Gyumri—a city in northwestern Armenia on the border with 
Turkey—for the next twenty-five years.669 In 2010, Armenia agreed to extend Russia’s lease for 
an additional 24 years, securing a Russian military presence in the country until at least 2044.670 
Two years after the initial lease of the base, the two countries signed the 1997 Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation that served as the culmination of bilateral agreements between 
Russia and Armenia.671 In addition, although “Yerevan opposed any attempt by the CIS to revive 
the logic of an imperial economy,” Russian companies nevertheless came to control significant 
portions of the Armenian economy—particularly the energy industry, giving Russia significant 
economic interests in Armenia.672 
While Armenia’s friendly relations with Russia can be partially explained by a real or 
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imagined connection as fellow Orthodox Christian peoples, it has far more to do with Russia’s 
perceived role as the “guarantor of physical survival of the nation.”673 The idea that Armenia 
depends upon Russia for protection stretches back almost as far as the history of Russian 
involvement in the Caucasus, but became particularly pronounced during the First Republic of 
Armenia in the early 20th century. Emerging from the Armenian Genocide as a “small, poor, 
deprived and isolated country” with Turkic peoples to both the east and west that were seen as an 
existential threat to the very existence of the Armenian people, Armenia’s leaders understood 
that becoming “truly independent and autonomous” was likely an unattainable goal and preferred 
Russian domination to Turkish.674 A similar challenge faced the leaders of Armenia in the 1990s 
who took control of a country on the verge of war with Azerbaijan and facing a still hostile 
Turkey to the west. While Armenia may have been able to fight against a disorganized 
Azerbaijan without Russian assistance, the “Turkish menace exacerbated the sense of 
overwhelming insecurity, and stressed the importance of forming a military partnership with 
Moscow.”675 In exchange for underwriting Armenia’s security, Russia gained its only military 
installation in the South Caucasus apart from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, “projecting Russian 
power into the region and ‘loaning’ it to Armenia.”676 However, Russian assistance to Armenia 
only extends insofar as it is in Russia’s own interests. Russia’s policy toward Armenia and 
Azerbaijan has been “characteristically mixed and directed at keeping parity between the two 
sides,” in order to maximize its influence over both countries.677 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Turkey has continued to be viewed as a significant 
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threat to Armenia, perhaps even rivalling Azerbaijan as Armenia’s greatest perceived enemy. 
While this has much to do with the history of the Armenian Genocide and Turkey’s continued 
campaign of denial, Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan, its refusal to normalize relations, and the 
not-unfounded fear that Turkey itself might invade Armenia all contributed to extremely poor 
relations between the two countries in the years after Armenia’s independence.678 Turkey, on the 
other hand, feared that Armenia intended to challenge the legitimacy of the Turkish state both by 
pressing for recognition of the Genocide and potentially claiming the formerly-Armenian regions 
of eastern Turkey. Debates within Armenia and the Diaspora over the legitimacy of the Treaty of 
Kars, which had set the modern borders between Turkey and Armenia, contributed to Turkish 
suspicions that Armenia intended to lay claim to parts of eastern Turkey, an issue that has 
continued to percolate through Armenian civil society but has never been seriously pushed by the 
government.679 
While Ter-Petrosyan pushed for the “establishment of diplomatic relations and 
normalization of relations at the earliest possible date, without any preconditions…Turkish 
diplomats insisted, in unofficial statements, that the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Armenia would have to be preceded by a promise by Armenia that the Armenian state would not 
raise the issue of the Genocide and Genocide recognition and would take it upon itself to 
convince the Diaspora to also desist” a step that Ter-Petrosyan was unwilling to take.680 While 
Ter-Petrosyan nevertheless came close to establishing relations with Turkey, the war intervened 
and “Turkey set withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan as a precondition for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of its border with Armenia.”681 While 
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Kocharyan also sought to normalize relations with Turkey, he began pushing more actively for 
recognition of the Genocide, both as a tactic to pressure Turkey to withdraw its objections over 
Artsakh and to gain support from the Diaspora which has long pushed for international 
recognition of the Armenian Genocide.682 
While its security interests have led Armenia to definitively align with Russia, like 
Azerbaijan it has also attempted to foster good relations with the West. Although Armenia lacks 
Azerbaijan’s oil, it has another resource that it has leveraged to advance its relations with 
Western countries: the Armenian Diaspora. Largely the result of refugees who survived the 
Genocide, the sizable Diaspora in the United States and Europe, “gave Armenia a comparative 
advantage over its adversaries in the region, both in terms of diplomatic clout and actual policy 
results.”683 Unlike Azerbaijan and other former Soviet states that “had to hire experienced 
lobbying firms to ease them into Washington politics and conduct a PR campaign, the Armenian 
Assembly [one of the leading Armenian-American political organizations] performed these 
crucial functions for the Armenian embassy for free.”684 In 1992, Armenian-American lobbying 
organizations secured the passage of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act which prohibited 
aid to Azerbaijan until it took “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive 
uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”685 At the same time, the Armenian-
American Diaspora pushed for increased foreign aid, making Armenia “the fourth-per-capita 
recipient of U.S. aid in the world.”686  
However, since the onset of the War on Terror in 2001, American foreign policy has 
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shifted in the direction of Azerbaijan. Not only did Azerbaijan present itself as exactly the kind 
of secular majority-Muslim country that the United States wished to create in the Middle East, 
Aliyev also “promptly committed Azerbaijan’s full support to the United States. This support 
translated into landing rights for planes en route to Afghanistan and a small contingent of ground 
troops there, and later in Iraq.”687 Aliyev’s efforts were reward by an amendment to Section 907 
that granted the president the power to “waive restriction on assistance to the Government of 
Azerbaijan if it is in the national interest of the United States of America.”688 That waiver has 
been exercised every year since, with Azerbaijan’s perceived strategic importance outweighing 
efforts by Armenian-Americans to halt the flow of aid.689 In Europe, the Armenian Diaspora has 
been similarly important, “at times [injecting] the Armenian diplomacy with confidence and 
important ‘connecting’ material lacking among Georgians and Azerbaijanis.”690 Of particular 
importance to the question of Artsakh is the large Armenian community in France, giving 
Armenia greater influence over one of the three Minsk Group co-chairs.691 While Armenia, 
largely through its Diaspora, has attempted to cultivate close relations with Western countries, it 
also recognizes that “the ‘West’ is not ready to provide to Armenia with the security guarantees” 
that it can receive from Russia.692 As a result, while it has sought to join European institutions 
like the Council of Europe or to secure aid from the United States, it remains fundamentally 
dependent upon Russia.693 
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 The final regional player that must be considered is Iran, which has tended to favor 
Armenia over the predominantly-Shi’a Azerbaijan. With both Azerbaijan and Turkey blockading 
Armenia and Georgia “in permanent crisis” throughout the early 1990s, Iran “became Armenia’s 
friendliest neighbor…without Iranian trade, Armenia might not have survived the two miserable 
winters of 1991-1992 and 1992-1993.”694 Likewise, the internationally isolated Iran benefits 
from trade with Armenia and “Both countries see each other as one of the paths leading them 
away from regional marginalization and isolation.”695 The two countries also enjoy cultural and 
historical ties, looking past the frequent conflict between Armenia and Persia to “the historically 
benevolent treatment of the Armenian community by the Iranian shahs and the distinguished 
position that the Armenian community enjoys in Iran.”696 The Armenian-Iranian relationship is 
also strengthened by Iran’s fears that ethnic Azeris in northern Iran—the largest minority ethnic 
group in Iran—might attempt to secede and join Azerbaijan.697 The result has been an uneasy 
relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran, neither antagonistic nor friendly that has pushed Iran 
in the direction of Armenia. However, while maintaining friendly relations with Iran, Armenia 
has also been careful not to alienate itself from the United States and “imports from Turkey have 
exceeded those from Iran in many recent years.”698 
 
Renewed Negotiations 
 With the domestic political situations in both Armenia and Azerbaijan stabilized, the two 
sides once again began to engage in diplomacy. At a November 1998 meeting of the Minsk 
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Group, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Yevgeny Primakov proposed a ‘common state’ solution 
under which Artsakh would be recognized as “a state-territorial unit in the form of a Republic 
[that] constitutes a common state with Azerbaijan in the latter’s internationally recognized 
borders.”699 Primakov’s plan also called for troops from Armenia proper to withdraw entirely 
while those from Artsakh would be “withdrawn to the 1988 boundaries of the NKAO, with the 
exception of the Lachin corridor,” the status of which would be determined at a later date.700 
While deal nominally upheld Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Artsakh, “the powers accruing to 
Nagorny Karabakh were significantly wider, including direct foreign relations and participation 
with a vague veto power on some issues in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.”701 Both Armenian and 
Artsakh accepted the proposal as the basis for continued negotiations, but Aliyev firmly rejected 
it, insisting that he would not accept the creation of a what amounted to an essentially 
independent state within the borders of Azerbaijan.702  
While this first round of negotiations under Kocharyan and Aliyev resulted in little 
progress, a promising new format emerged the following year. On April 1, Aliyev and 
Kocharyan met in Moscow for a CIS summit and held a two and half hour long meeting.703 
Three weeks later, both men traveled to Washington D.C. to celebrate NATO’s fiftieth 
anniversary where they “had an informal meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
in her office. Albright left Kocharian and Aliev together to talk one-on-one. Thus, almost by 
accident, a new kind of dialogue began.”704 Surprisingly, the two men formed a rather warm 
relationship, resting on “a common base of understanding between them. Both were hard, lonely 
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leaders who were more comfortable with the format of confidential top-level talks…Over the 
next two years they met fifteen times or so.”705 The resulting negotiations were likely the closest 
that the two sides ever came to achieving a mutually acceptable solution. 
The relative success of the direct negotiations between Aliyev and Kocharyan came 
despite the fact that Kocharyan—at least rhetorically—represented the more hardline elements of 
Armenian society. In contrast to Ter-Petrosyan, who very publically argued that Armenia must 
be willing to accept significant compromises, “The position of the Kocharyan administration was 
that NK has never been and will never be a part of independent Azerbaijan, and that NK's right 
of self-determination must be written down in all of the proposals presented by the 
mediators.”706 While even Ter-Petrosyan held that “Yerevan will never sign any document, 
which does not include Stepanakert's signature,” Kocharyan went further, emphasizing that 
Artsakh’s de facto independence was a non-negotiable issue. Kocharyan argued his 
predecessor’s stance counterproductively shifted blame to Artsakhi officials and instead held that 
“we [Armenia] have our own position and are ready to insist on that.”707 In arguing that Armenia 
would represent its own position rather than deferring to Artsakh, Kocharyan was not implying 
that Yerevan would pressure Stepanakert into accepting a deal, but instead that Armenia should 
be willing to deploy its “entire potential - diplomatic, economic and defense - for the settlement 
of this conflict.”708 
One of the factors that contributed to the relative success of the Kocharyan-Aliyev talks 
was Kocharyan’s status as both an Artsakhi and the president of Armenia. Azerbaijan had long 
refused to directly negotiate with the officials from Artsakh, fearing that allowing their 
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participation in international mediation efforts would lend legitimacy to Artsakh’s statehood. 
While Armenians had succeeded in convincing the OSCE to “clearly and definitely” recognize 
Artsakh as a party to the conflict in March 1995, Azerbaijan still held that the conflict was a 
territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan rather than an issue of Artsakh’s self-
determination.709 Kocharyan’s ability to represent both Armenia and Artsakh helped make 
negotiations possible, but later he “was frequently criticized that during his tenure in office the 
format of the NK settlement was distorted, Stepanakert was left out of the negotiations” allowing 
Azerbaijan to present “the conflict to the international community as a territorial dispute between 
Baku and Yerevan.”710  
After reviewing the various proposals put forward by mediation efforts over the previous 
decade, the negotiations between Kocharyan and Aliyev settled on a plan first put forward in 
1992 by a U.S. State Department Caucasus specialist named Paul Goble.711 Under the ‘Goble 
plan,’ “Azerbaijan would concede Nagorno Karabakh,” as well as the Lachin corridor, “which 
would become an integral part of the Republic [of Armenia] and Armenia would relinquish the 
Meghri district in the south of Armenia. Armenia would have the best possible solution to the 
status problem, but would lose its border with Iran, while Azerbaijan would establish a land 
connection with Nakhichevan as well as allow direct access for its oil pipeline to Turkey.”712 
Establishing this link between Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan had long been a goal of 
Aliyev, himself a native of the exclave, and he seemed personally supportive of the plan.713 
While the proposal entailed significant concessions for both sides, both presidents appeared 
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willing to make the sacrifice and they agreed to the plan “in principle.”714 
However, news of the deal, which has been crafted behind closed doors, “created an 
immediate negative reaction within the small circle of presidential advisers in both countries who 
learned about it.”715 In Azerbaijan, many among the elite viewed “the plan on offer in 1999 as 
meaning a surrender of Karabakh. In October 1999, three of Aliev’s top aides all resigned, 
apparently over this issue.”716 Likewise, Kocharyan met with resistance from his advisors who 
saw Armenia’s southern border with Iran as a vital “not only for the future development of trade, 
but in particular, as a door to the non-Turkish part of the world.”717 As objections mounted, the 
deal “underwent a number of changes, mainly in the exact amount of Meghri territory involved 
and the degree to which Armenia would relinquish sovereignty over said territory. As the simple 
idea evolved into a complex formula, Azerbaijan liked it less and less.”718 In addition, while the 
Goble plan had “the energetic support of Washington and Ankara…for most officials in Moscow 
the formula was unacceptable” and Iran “made its objections clear to Yerevan.”719  
While Aliyev maintained a vice-like grip over Azerbaijan and could withstand opposition 
from his advisors, Kocharyan’s position was not so secure. After winning the 1998 elections with 
the support of Vazgen Sargsyan, relations between the two men “had soured very quickly. 
Vazgen Sargsian reorganized the Yerkrapahs by integrating them in the small Republican Party 
of Armenia…which then joined hands with Karen Demirjian’s PPA to present a united front 
against Kocharian for the parliamentary elections” of May 1999.720 While the details of the 
potential adoption of the Goble plan were still confidential at the time, many Armenians were 
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“suspicious of Kocharian’s tactics, personality, and ultimate concerns. In the parliamentary 
elections of mid 1999 the Sargsian-Demirjian coalition won a comfortable majority… 
Kocharian’s powers were severely curtailed” and relations between Kocharyan and Sargysan, 
now Prime Minister, and Demirchyan, the President of the National Assembly, continued to 
deteriorate.721 
Then, October 27, 1999, Armenia’s political landscape was thrust into chaos when five 
gunmen stormed the National Assembly building, killing Sargysan, Demirchyan, and six other 
high-level Armenian officials.722 The leader of the assailants, “a former journalist named Nairi 
Hunanian, announced he was taking power from the ‘blood-suckers’ who were ruling Armenia” 
and they barricaded themselves in the parliamentary chambers.723 Following the personal 
intervention of Kocharyan, who offered the attackers the chance to speak on television and 
assured them they would receive a fair trial, the five men agreed to be taken into police custody 
on the morning of October 28.724 The attack left Armenia reeling, “half the top leadership of the 
country had been decimated, leaving major gaps in the constitutional succession order.”725 
Speaking in 2007, Ter-Petrosyan compared the attack to the killing of the Armenian elite that 
marked the beginning of the Armenian Genocide and Stalin’s purges of the 1930s, except this 
time it “was carried out not by foreigners, but by Armenians themselves.”726 
The motivation of the assassins and the potential that some other figure or group had 
been behind the attack quickly became the subject of intense speculation and remains one of the 
greatest unanswered questions of modern Armenian political history. Some theorized that the 
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gunmen intended to derail the Artsakh peace process, a possibility that seems unlikely as 
“Sarkisian was not the obvious first target; it was not yet manifest that he had actually signed on 
to a peace agreement; [and] finally, Sarkisian was a close ally of the Russian security 
establishment, the most likely suspect for wanting to sabotage a United States-led peace deal.”727 
Others pointed the finger at Kocharyan himself. While no evidence emerged to connect him to 
the gunmen, the attack did seem to play in his favor politically; “Demirjian and Sargsian did not 
only hold two of the highest offices in the Republic but they also were the leaders of two parties 
that opposed the president, parties that had become strong by the sheer strength of the 
personalities of their leaders.”728 The investigation into the attack had “an aggressive start,” but 
the prosecutor “brought charges against the five in a manner that placed full responsibility of the 
killings on them…the course of the judicial proceedings have left most Armenians with the 
impression that there has been a cover up.”729 
While the attack did remove Kocharyan’s two most powerful opponents, in the short term 
it also undermined his authority. “Already widely considered as an outsider, Kocharyan lost [the] 
majority of his popular support after the assassinations. He remained alone, facing a very 
skeptical public [and] tensions with the army and Erkrapah.”730 He also “faced a parliament now 
determined to oppose him. Some members of the National Assembly initiated impeachment 
proceedings against the president” and he was compelled to appoint Sargsyan’s younger brother, 
Aram Sargsyan, the prime minister.731 However, Aram, the director of a cement factory, lacked 
his brother’s political skill and by May 2000 Kocharyan “was able to dismiss Aram Sargsian 
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without any serious reaction.”732  
While a planned summit between Armenian and Azeri officials, including both 
Kocharyan and Aliyev, still took place in November 1999, Armenia’s domestic turmoil had 
temporarily displaced the issue of Artsakh from the forefront of its politics.733 However, by 
2001, Kocharyan had reasserted his control over Armenian politics and “for the first time, the 
three countries in the Minsk Group, France, Russia, and the United States, appeared to be 
working in close harmony. The peace process moved up a gear.”734 After two meetings between 
Aliyev and Kocharyan, “In what looked like a coordinated move, newspapers in both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan printed leaked copies of the three Minsk Group peace plans of 1997 and 1998. 
The leaks were intended to test public opinion on Karabakh and pave the way for a fourth, 
entirely different, plan.”735 While Kocharyan and Aliyev both seemed eager to make a deal, “the 
reaction to the three old plans, especially in Azerbaijan, was overwhelmingly hostile. Almost no 
one in Baku spoke up in public in support of compromise.”736 
Despite the lack of support from their publics and advisors, the two presidents continued 
to press forward. The mediation efforts reached their culmination in April 2001, “when the U.S. 
State Department organized five days…of the most high-profile and intensive negotiations ever 
on the dispute.”737 At talks held in Key West, Florida, a “new format combined the confidential 
dialogue of the two presidents with the specialist advice of the Minsk Group negotiators. After 
the meeting, one of the mediators said they had reached agreement on ‘80 or 90 percent’ of 
issues.”738 For the most part, the Key West talks picked up where the previous negotiations had 
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left off, focusing on the status of Artsakh, the creation of corridors between Armenia and 
Artsakh and Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, and Azerbaijan’s access to Shushi and the right of 
return for refugees, particularly those from Shushi.739 Alleviating Armenian concerns about the 
loss of its border with Iran, negotiators proposed building a 40-kilometer long elevated highway 
across Meghri that would be owned by Azerbaijan, an idea that seemingly achieved the 
objectives of both countries.740 Such an elaborate proposal was made possible by the willingness 
of the three co-chairs to provide funding, a condition that was partially dependent upon the 
absence of other international crises at the time.741 
 At the conclusion of the Key West summit, a peaceful conclusion to the Artsakh conflict 
seemed within sight; “A follow-up meeting was planned for Switzerland in June and there was 
even talk of a peace agreement’s being signed by the end of 2001.”742 Achieving peace was 
largely contingent on Azerbaijan’s willingness to renounce its claim to Artsakh, a dramatic 
concession but not an unthinkable one. For Aliyev, Azerbaijan reasserting control over Artsakh 
represented a potential threat to his domination of Azeri politics, “a serpent in the Azerbaijani 
garden he had spent years tending; better not to have it at all and win concessions from the 
Armenians on other issues.”743 However, to the rest of Azerbaijan, “Aliev’s attempt to cut the 
knot was too bold and too cynical…The gap between what Aliev was saying in private and 
saying in public was too wide, and even his limitless guile could not bridge it.”744 After returning 
to Azerbaijan, Aliyev withdrew the concessions that had been discussed at Key West and the 
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subsequent meeting that “was expected to produce results…instead produced a crashing 
disappointment.”745 
 The talks at Key West represented the last realistic effort to solve the conflict through 
diplomatic means. The failure of the talks frustrated the American officials who had organized 
the summit and the world’s attention soon shifted away from the conflict following the 
September 11 attacks and the onset of the War on Terror.746 In addition, both Armenians and 
Azeris were largely content to continue with the status quo. For some in Armenia and Artsakh, 
the existence of a functionally independent Artsakh seemed to demonstrate that the conflict had 
already been decided in their favor. Supporters of Kocharyan began to adopt the view that “If 
Karabakh is a problem…it is a problem for Azerbaijan, not Armenia or Karabakh.”747 Across the 
border in Azerbaijan, the de facto independence of Artsakh was politically unacceptable, but 
Azeri leaders calculated that “the coming power asymmetry with Armenia made concessions on 
status unnecessary.”748 With the international community distracted and neither Armenian nor 
Azeri leaders pressing for renewed talks, the Artsakh conflict entered an uneasy hibernation. 
 Azerbaijan was also dissuaded from undertaking new mediation efforts by the declining 
health of Heydar Aliyev.749 In 2003, with presidential elections set to be held in October and a 
visibly unhealthy Aliyev turning 80, “all thoughts were on the succession.”750 In July, Aliyev 
was taken to Ankara for medical treatment, never to return to Azerbaijan: he died in Cleveland in 
December, although there were rumors that the announcement of his death had been delayed 
until after the election.751 The absence and subsequent death of Aliyev, who had dominated 
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Azerbaijan’s politics since 1993, left an immense vacuum in Azerbaijan’s politics. Aliyev’s 
anointed successor, his son Ilham, had a reputation as “a playboy and a gambler” and “One 
foreign diplomat commented privately that Ilham ‘had the attention of a gnat.’”752 However, 
despite Ilham’s apparent weaknesses, “Ruling elites, all of whom were Heydar Aliyev’s 
appointees, worked hard to secure Ilham’s victory—which was also, of course, their own. 
Knowing of Ilham’s ‘image problem,’ the state-controlled press proclaimed that he had the “right 
genetic code” to be president, a notion that the opposition openly ridiculed.”753 On August 1, 
Ilham registered as a candidate for presidency. Three days later he was appointed prime minister 
and “Soon, Ilham had officially replaced his father as YAP’s candidate.”754 
 The opposition sensed an opportunity to challenge the Aliyevs, but were weakened by 
their inability to unite around a single candidate.755 In addition, officials loyal to the YAP openly 
committed election fraud to secure Ilham’s victory. The OSCE election monitors “recorded all 
the usual violations…Counting violations were even worse, with 55 percent of counting stations 
observed having ‘significant problems,’ larger than any previous election. Unauthorized persons 
were present in more than a third of the counting stations. Some of these unauthorized 
individuals were directing the counting; others had brought additional ballots, sometimes 
hundreds of them.”756 The official tally claimed the junior Aliyev had won a landslide victory 
with 76.8 percent of the vote, but “Musavat supporters believed that it was they who had won the 
election and the mood in Baku turned from jubilant to ugly…At least one opposition 
demonstrator was killed as the security forces cleared the streets. Over the next week, the 
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authorities launched what the OSCE report called ‘a sweeping government crackdown on the 
opposition in which over 600 persons were detained around the country.”757  
 Despite this inauspicious start to Ilham Aliyev’s rule, there were some who hoped that 
Azerbaijan’s new leadership would jumpstart new progress on the issue of Artsakh. In April 
2004, a new flurry of negotiations began between Elmar Mammadyarov, “Azerbaijan’s first truly 
autonomous” foreign minister, and Vartan Oskanian, a Syrian-Armenian who served as 
Kocharyan’s foreign minister for the entirety of his presidency.758 The ‘Prague Process’ had 
started two years earlier but had been limited to the two countries deputy foreign ministers and 
had not seemed promising.759 While the involvement of Mammadyarov and Oskanian raised the 
profile of the talks, the two sides were still extremely “polarized on the fundamental question of 
the status of Nagorny Karabakh itself.”760 Inspired by the impending referendum on secession in 
Montenegro, the U.S. mediator proposed a similar solution for Artsakh, although “the actual 
details of the referendum would be shrouded in ‘constructive ambiguity’…This would enable the 
Armenian side to state that the principle of allowing Karabakh to separate from Azerbaijan was 
established… For its part, the Azerbaijani side would be able to argue that the modalities of the 
vote ruled out full secession.”761  
 As might be expected of a deal designed to allow both sides to announce mutually 
exclusive victories to their populations, the Prague Process resulted in little actual progress. 
While the prospect seemed promising enough for Kocharyan and Ilham Aliyev to begin 
personally negotiating and a seemingly warm relationship developed between the two presidents, 
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“there was suspicion that they trusted each other enough only to collude in saying no to a final 
agreement. As one official involved in talks put it, ‘there is a school of thought that when the co-
chairs close the door and leave the two presidents together, the two of them agree not to make a 
deal.”762 This round of negotiations culminated in 2007, when the Minsk Group co-chairs 
presented the Basic Principles, more commonly referred to as the Madrid Principles, which 
consist of six key elements: the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the surrounding territories, 
an ‘interim status’ for Artsakh, the creation of a corridor between Artsakh and Armenia, the right 
of return for all refugees, an international peacekeeping force, and—most crucially—the “future 
designation of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of 
will.”763 However, while the Madrid Principles have served as the basis of negotiations for all 
subsequent talks, the two sides have not agreed to accept the principles, with particular 
disagreement over the final point.764 Azeri officials objected to the fact that the agreement would 
stipulate “the boundaries, electorate and unlimited nature of status options to be offered in the 
future plebiscite” making a vote for independence a “foregone conclusion.”765 Addressing these 
concerns, second draft of the Madrid Principles was circulated in 2009, that instead proposed a 
“mutually agreed and legally binding expression of will” to determine Artsakh’s status.766 This 
time, it was the Armenians who objected to the wording, calling for another new draft.767 
 In April 2008, Kocharyan’s second term as president had come to an end and Armenia’s 
constitutional term limit prevented him from seeking reelection. Facing his departure from 
office, “Kocharian began preparing the ground for his old friend, colleague, and fellow 
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Karabakhi, Serzh Sarkisian, to succeed him…Sarkisian had served twice as Armenia’s defense 
minister and more recently as prime minister, and arguably was already as powerful as 
Kocharian himself.”768 As Kocharyan’s handpicked successor, Sargsyan was widely expected to 
win the February 2008 elections. However, “The election contest came alive with the surprise 
entry into the race of Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosian.”769 Ter-Petrosyan united 
the opposition around himself, accusing Kocharyan and Sargysan corruption and promising to 
“clean out the Augean stables.”770 While Ter-Petrosyan ran a competitive campaign, due in part 
to the fact that he still commanded they loyalty of many among Armenia’s political elite, “After 
the first round of voting on 19 February 2008, Serzh Sarkisian was declared the outright 
winner…There were loud allegations of fraud.”771 
 Rather than accept defeat, Ter-Petrosyan and his supporters took to the streets to contest 
the results of the election. Such post-election protests were common in Armenia, but “in almost 
all cases after 1996, the incumbent government was able to consolidate its resources and wait out 
the protests…The exception to this rule was 2008, when the protest dynamic was apparently so 
strong that it could be stopped only by a major violent crackdown.”772 Following ten days of 
protests that showed little sign of stopping, “The confrontation turned violent in the early 
morning of 1 March, when police began to forcibly remove protestors from Freedom Square.”773 
The protestors regrouped and “Clashes broke out in which ten opposition supporters died and 
hundreds were injured. Opposition supporters said they saw snipers firing directly at the crowd. 
At 10 p.m., President Kocharian declared an official state of emergency…Ter-Petrosian was put 
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under de facto house arrest.”774 While this secured Sargysan’s victory, it meant that he “assumed 
the presidency amidst national turmoil” that would taint his presidency for the rest of his term.775 
 While periodic attempts to renew mediation efforts continued throughout the 2010s, most 
notably a 2011 attempt by Dmitri Medvedev, they achieved little to no progress. The two sides 
were simply too far apart on the question of Artsakh’s status and neither was willing to 
compromise their preferred vision to make an agreement possible. Armenians had grown used to 
Artsakh’s de facto independence and saw little benefit in sacrificing that reality for an agreement 
that did not guarantee Armenian control of the region, a condition that Azerbaijan was unwilling 
to agree to. By the early 2000s, Artsakh was for all intents and purposes fully independent from 
Azerbaijan, with all the structures and functions of any other country. As Laurence Broers 
explained,  
the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] fields a complete state bureaucracy composed of 
executive, legislative and judicial branches, including seven standing parliamentary 
committees, eleven ministries and an ombudsman for a population of fewer than 150,000 
– a generous estimate (see below). The dominant political parties are local parties that do 
not operate in Armenia; only one party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, or 
Dashnaktsutyun), operates in both spaces. The republic has its own Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which has a representative office in Yerevan, as well as representations in 
Moscow, Washington, Paris, Berlin, Beirut and Sydney.776 
 In a move symbolic of its separation from Azerbaijan, the country adopted a new constitution in 
2017 that formally changed its name from the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to the Republic of 
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Artsakh.777 The name change not only placed emphasis on the country’s specifically Armenian 
identity and heritage, it also symbolized a movement away from its Soviet-era history as part of 
Azerbaijan. 
 However, even as Artsakh moved toward greater independence and autonomy, it 
remained heavily dependent on Armenia. While Artsakh formally claimed complete 
independence, it was in some ways akin to a province of Armenia. As Thomas de Waal writes, 
“When it came to army service or foreign passports there was no telling a citizen of Karabakh 
from one of Armenia. By the estimates of its own government, of the 2005 budget of a little 
more than $50 million dollars, less than 30 per cent came from the revenue collected in 
Karabakh itself, the rest coming in transfers from Armenia and donations from the Diaspora. For 
many Armenians the distinction between the two territories began to blur.”778 A similar 
ambiguity appeared in Armenians’ opinions on the what the ultimate status of Artsakh should be. 
As Artak Beglaryan, currently the chief of staff to Artsakh’s president, put it, “Independence is 
the intermediate goal but unification is the vision. But this does not mean that we couldn’t be 
independent … Armenia is not seeking our unification, it seeks only our self-determination, then 
we can decide what we want.”779 
  While concerns for the safety of Armenians under Azeri rule predominated, Armenian 
opposition to Azeri control of Artsakh was also partially attributable to a sense of national pride. 
To many Armenians, Artsakh represented the one part of their historic homeland they had 
successfully defended and their victory in the 1990s was seen as a matter of historical justice.780 
However, over time, this sense of national pride became somewhat of a barrier to a negotiated 
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settlement. While Armenian officials maintained their willingness to return the surrounding 
territories as part of a negotiated settlement, many Armenians began to see the territories around 
Artsakh “not as ‘occupied’ but as ‘liberated.’”781 However, while national pride played a part in 
preventing an agreement, the fundamental cause of Armenians’ ardent opposition to Azeri 
control over Artsakh was a deep-seated fear that such an outcome would mean the end of 
Artsakh’s Armenian population. Fed by memories of pogroms and Azerbaijan’s attacks on 
Armenian civilians during the war, this fear dated back to the Soviet era, when the Armenians of 
Artsakh pointed to Nakhichevan—which had a significant Armenian minority well into the 20th 
century but was subject to a process of “de-Armenianization” under Soviet-Azeri rule—as an 
example of what they feared might also happen in Artsakh.782 
 The Armenians’ fear of ethnic cleansing—whether violent or gradual—only increased in 
the years after the end of the first war as the two sides grew more divided and memories of 
coexistence under Soviet rule faded. The Azeri government did little to assuage these fears, 
rather taking several action that seemed to confirm the belief that life as an Armenian in 
Azerbaijan would be near impossible. Beginning as early as 1997, Azeri authorities in 
Nakhichevan began a campaign of cultural erasure against the existing Armenian monuments in 
the region. Simon Maghakyan, one of the researchers who uncovered and documented the 
destruction of 89 medieval churches, 5,840 khachkars (cross-stones) and 22,000 tombstones, 
called it “the worst cultural genocide of the 21st century.”783 While outside observers tend to see 
the destruction “as a vengeful legacy of the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh war,” Armenians argue it 
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was “an effort to neutralize Armenian “historical rights” or antiquity-derived political legitimacy 
in the region.”784 Similar efforts to erase Armenian cultural heritage or relabel it as “Caucasian 
Albanian” were widespread across the rest of Azerbaijan, and Armenians argued would also be 
visited upon Artsakh if it were to fall under Azerbaijan’s control.785  
 These efforts had a parallel across the border in Artsakh and Armenia, as many Azeri 
sites under the control of Armenians fell into disarray. In particular, lying close to the line of 
contact, the city of Aghdam was completely abandoned after Armenians took control of it in 
1993 and over the following years, Armenians “slowly stripped every street and house” in search 
of building materials, leaving the city’s mosque the only remaining structure.786 However, while 
it is certainly true that Azeri towns and structures across Artsakh and the surrounding regions 
were left to decay or were scavenged for materials by the local Armenian population, there is no 
evidence of an organized campaign of cultural erasure akin to the one that took place in 
Azerbaijan. Indeed, in 2019, the government of Artsakh even repaired one of the mosques in 
Shushi, although this too was mired in controversy over the decision—reminiscent of 
Azerbaijan’s insistence that Armenian churches were actually built by Caucasian Albanians—to 
refer to it as ‘Persian’ rather than ‘Azeri.’787 
 Then, in 2012, the Azeri government took another step that could hardly have been 
designed to more effectively stoke Armenian fears, when it gave a “heroic reception… to a man 
whose only claim to fame was to have killed an Armenian in his sleep,” a move that even non-
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Armenians interpreted as “a pre-meditated act of provocation.”788 The man in question was 
Ramil Safarov, an Azeri army officer who, while participating in a 2004 NATO training program 
in Budapest, had “burst into the bedroom of Armenian lieutenant Gurgen Margarian and brutally 
killed him with an axe, almost severing the head from the body. He then tried to murder a second 
Armenian officer, whose door was fortunately locked.”789 Sentenced to life in prison by 
Hungarian authorities in 2006, Safarov was extradited to Azerbaijan “nominally on the condition 
that he would serve the remainder of his life-sentence.”790 However, upon his return to Baku, 
Safarov was immediately pardoned by Aliyev, “presented with a bouquet of flowers, a free 
apartment in Baku and promoted to the rank of major,” a move that was harshly condemned by 
both Armenian and non-Armenian commentators, including then-President Obama.791 As 
Laurence Broers writes, “The tragic irony of the Safarov case is the convergence it signified with 
a much-quoted and criticised comment by Armenian President Robert Kocharian claiming a 
fundamental ‘ethnic incompatibility’ between the two nations. Since the late 2000s Azerbaijan 
has effectively implemented this axiom as policy through a near-total ban on entry into 
Azerbaijan by any ethnic Armenian – whatever their citizenship.”792 
 
A Four-Day War 
While negotiations had all but ended and the status quo of an unrecognized but 
independent Artsakh increasingly appeared stable, the Artsakh conflict was by no means settled. 
With around 10,000 soldiers positioned on each side, often only a few hundred meters apart, 
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escalation—inadvertent or planned—was an ever-present threat.793 As Thomas de Waal wrote in 
2013, the “conflict over Nagorny Karabakh is often called ‘frozen.’ It is a misleading term, 
verging on the dangerous. The different elements of the conflict zone are in motion even as its 
underlying causes are not.”794 The 200 kilometer-long line of contact—as well as the border 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan—became one of the most militarized borders on earth, 
comparable to those between North and South Korea or India and Pakistan.795 Both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan had “fortified their defenses, turning the so-called Line of Contact into one of the 
most impregnable borders in the world…Several dozen soldiers a year continued to die on both 
sides, although they were as much the victim of mines or accidents as of enemy fire.”796 
However, enemy fire was by no means a trivial threat. Even during periods of relative peace, 
cross-border sniping was a near-daily occurrence, with hundreds or even thousands of ceasefire 
violations recorded every month.797 While Armenians frequently pushed for more security 
measures along the border—which would protect their control over the territory, “Senior 
Azerbaijani policy-makers have repeatedly rejected confidence-building measures along the LoC 
[Line of Contact], such as the withdrawal of snipers or the introduction of an incident 
investigation mechanism, unless such measures are tied to territorial withdrawals by Armenian 
forces.”798 
In April 2016, the tensions along the border boiled over into a serious clash later dubbed 
the ‘Four-Day War.’ Beginning in the early morning of April 2, “large-scale hostilities broke out 
in the northeast, east and southeast sectors…By the end of the day, Azerbaijani forces had 
                                                 
793 de Waal and von Twickel, 214-215 
794 de Waal, Black Garden, 305. 
795 Broers, Anatomy of A Rivalry, 2.  
796 de Waal, Black Garden, 264. 
797 “A festering sore.” The Economist. October 3, 2013. https://www.economist.com/eastern-
approaches/2013/10/03/a-festering-sore  
798 Broers, “Defaulting to War,” 16. 
141 
 
captured numerous Armenian front posts” in the northeast and south.”799 While Azerbaijan 
accused Armenia of instigating the fighting, “The strategic context; the scale, operational 
coherence and geographical coordination of Azerbaijani forces on 2 April; the capture of several 
Armenian front posts on that day; Azerbaijani media reporting that an offensive was under way; 
and the heavy media coverage given to Minister of Defence Zakir Hasanov in the preceding 
week – all suggest a planned Azerbaijani operation.”800 The fighting was by far the most intense 
and widespread since the 1994 ceasefire, with a reported 80 Armenians and 37 Azeris killed—
although unofficial reports suggest that “the Azerbaijani death toll may have reached three times 
the official figure.”801 In one of the most shocking events of the war, “the respected Yerevan-
based investigative journalism centre Hetq, identified three Armenian civilians as having been 
killed and mutilated post-mortem in an outlying house that had not been evacuated.”802 By April 
5, when a new Russian-backed ceasefire brought an end to the brief war, Azerbaijan had 
captured 800 hectares—roughly three square miles, although most of it had little strategic 
importance.803 
While the Four-Day War ultimately had very little impact on territorial control, it did 
have significant political impacts. In Azerbaijan, the fighting uncovered the Azeri population’s 
widespread support for a war that could place Artsakh and the surrounding territories under 
Azeri control: “Thousands were reported to have volunteered to fight, only to be turned away by 
the Ministry of Defence on the grounds that they were not needed…Even critical voices 
expressed surprise at the suddenness and intensity of societal mobilization. Spontaneous 
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demonstrations took place across the country. Youth rallies marched through Ganja and Baku 
and some smaller towns on 5 and 6 April with none of the usual hindering of demonstrators by 
police or security forces.”804 In contrast, the war was met with “a sombre reaction in Armenia 
and NK.”805 The difference in reaction was due not only to the fact that Armenia had nothing to 
gain from renewed fighting—indeed the resumption of the prior status quo was the best outcome 
Armenia could hope for—but also from the fact that the war had demonstrated the extent to 
which Azerbaijan’s military had outstripped that of Armenia and Artsakh. While most of the 
territory lost on April 2 was later recaptured, “a growing sense of public disappointment focused 
on corruption and complacency in the army. Outdated equipment and communication lines along 
front-line positions were held to have been responsible for many Armenian casualties in the first 
few hours of hostilities.”806 However, rather than impelling Armenians to make a more concerted 
push for peace, the war—perhaps by demonstrating the value of a security buffer—actually 
increased their resolve to maintain control over not only Artsakh, but also the surrounding 
territories that now were dotted with Armenian settlements. Writing in April 2017, Tatul 
Hakobyan reported that following the war “The number of Armenians who were in favor of 
achieving peace by returning the territories to Azerbaijan decreased.”807 
This came despite the fact that Armenia’s military situation stood in rather stark contrast 
to Azerbaijan’s, which had been heavily strengthened in the years leading up to 2016. Beginning 
in the mid-2000s, Azerbaijan had undergone a second oil boom that enabled the Azeri military to 
dramatically outspend Armenia’s. In May 2006, Azerbaijan opened the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan 
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(BTC) pipeline followed in September by the South Caucasus gas pipeline.808 Thanks largely to 
its oil resources, “Azerbaijan was the world’s fastest growing economy in the years 2005-2008 
and in 2008 its GDP had risen to $35 billion, having been just $1.3 billion in 1991.”809 
Azerbaijan channeled much of its newfound wealth into its military, with military expenditures 
topping $1 billion for the first time in 2008 and rising to a peak of $2.3 billion in 2012.810 While 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan placed among the top 10 most militarized states—based on 
military spending as a percentage of GDP—since 2011, Armenia simply lacked the resources to 
compete with Azerbaijan’s spending as the latter’s defense spending routinely exceeded 
Armenia’s entire budget.811 However, as a member of the CSTO, Armenia was able to purchase 
weapons from Russia at discounted prices and also periodically received “substantial ad hoc 
deliveries negotiated with Russia.”812 Russia, which stood to gain leverage over both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan from a continued stalemate, provided these transfers in an attempt to “maintain 
strategic balance between the two sides.”813 
While Armenian forces had successfully repelled the Azeri incursions, the fighting had 
revealed the disparity between their military capabilities and hinted at the future of the conflict. 
As Broers writes, “The four-day duration of hostilities permitted wartime experimentation with 
new military and informational technologies. Azerbaijani forces reported the deployment of new 
weapons, including the Israeli-manufactured Harop ‘kamikaze’ or suicide drone.”814 Along with 
displaying new technology, weapons that would feature prominently in the 2020 war, the Four-
Day also cast new light on Russia’s position. While Russia had intervened to craft a ceasefire 
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relatively quickly, the willingness of Russia—and the CSTO more generally—to come to 
Armenia’s aid had been cast into doubt, a development that was seen as “likely to embolden 
Azerbaijan to test that commitment further.”815 
 
Velvet Revolution 
In the spring of 2017, Sargsyan faced the same problem that Kocharyan had ten years 
earlier: his second term as president was coming to an end and he was prohibited from seeking a 
third. However, Sargsyan, foreseeing this problem, had orchestrated a constitutional referendum 
in 2015 that transferred the majority of the president’s powers to the prime minister.816 While 
many in Armenia believed the referendum to merely be an attempt by Sargsyan to secure his 
own continued power, Sargsyan had promised not to seek reelection as either president or prime 
minister, telling the Armenian people, “I believe that one person must not aspire to the reins of 
power in Armenia for more than twice in a lifetime.”817 However, three years later, “On 11 April 
[2018], President Sargsyan finally announced that he would, after all, seek the RPA’s nomination 
as prime minister, reneging on his earlier pledge.”818 While opposition leaders protested the 
move, Sargsyan was formally sworn in as prime minister on April 17 and few expected that 
protests would have any impact.819 
However, a protest march from Gyumri to Yerevan organized by former newspaper 
editor Nikol Pashinyan and the small opposition party he had founded succeeded in gathering 
significant support from the Armenian people.820 Beginning with just a handful of supporters 
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when he first arrived in Yerevan on April 13, the demonstrations “coalesced rapidly with local 
protest movements that had begun on 12 April…By 20 April, the numbers of people mobilizing 
daily were reaching hundreds of thousands, bringing Yerevan and other city centers to a 
standstill.”821 On April 22, Sargsyan met with Pashinyan and “appeared to issue a threat by 
asking Pashinyan if he had not learned the lesson of 1 March 2008” and Pashinyan was arrested 
shortly after the meeting.822 However, rather than dampening the protests, Pashinyan’s arrest and 
the apparent threat of violence only increased opposition to Sargsyan, with “massive, non-violent 
protest on the nation’s streets far exceeding the numbers gathering over the previous 
fortnight.”823 Even more shockingly, “members of the Armenian army’s prestigious 
peacekeeping battalion marched in uniform with the protestors, suggesting that Sargsyan did not 
enjoy the complete loyalty of the army.”824  
By the following evening, perhaps anticipating even larger crowds on April 24, the date 
of the annual Armenian Genocide commemoration, Sargsyan “tendered his resignation, 
including an enigmatic mea culpa – ‘Nikol Pashinyan was right, I was wrong.’”825 While 
Sargsyan’s allies succeeded in blocking Pashinyan from being elected prime minister in the first 
vote held on May 1, renewed protests succeeded in placing enough pressure on members of the 
National Assembly to secure his victory in a second vote a week later.826 In December of 2018, 
when new parliamentary elections were held, Pashinyan’s “’My Step’ alliance won the election, 
deemed free and fair by international observers, with 70.4 per cent of the vote...Neither the RPA 
nor their former coalition partner, the ARF, passed the threshold for representation. Armenia had 
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entered a new era.”827 
Although the Velvet Revolution—as the protest movement came to be known—was 
driven almost entirely by domestic concerns about corruption—including revelations of 
corruption in the army that had emerged following the Four-Day War—and the economic power 
of Armenia’s oligarchs, the transition of power was not without international significance. 
Pashinyan attempted to distance himself from previous ‘color revolutions’ in the former Soviet 
Union, explicitly pledging not to alter Armenia’s foreign policy, a message intended to assure 
Russia that he was not leading a pro-Western revolution. However, the “emphasis on rooting out 
corruption set the Velvet Revolution on a path of inevitable collision with the heavily Russian-
oriented oligarch space.”828 Indeed, within a year of coming to power, Pashinyan’s government 
arrested not only Kocharyan but also Yuri Khachaturov, the then-Secretary-General of the 
CSTO—both of whom were personally friendly with Putin—over allegations of their 
involvement in the March 2008 death of protestors.829 While Armenia and Russia maintained 
close institutional ties through organizations such as the CSTO, CIS, and Eurasian Economic 
Union, analysts noted that Pashinyan “changed the formula of Russian-Armenian relations [at 
their foundation]...because Armenia is now pursuing a sovereign foreign policy.”830 However, it 
appeared that Pashinyan had successfully placed Armenia on a path toward greater 
democratization without angering Russia. 
 Some observers also expressed hopes that Pashinyan—the first Armenian leader not from 
Artsakh in two decades—might present an opportunity for renewed negotiations. Tensions did 
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slightly ease between Armenian and Azerbaijan, as Pashinyan and Aliyev agreed in 2019 to 
create a hotline between commanders on the front lines and de-escalate military activity on the 
border.831 However, on the central issue of Artsakh’s status, Pashinyan was “more 
outspoken…than his predecessors, perhaps because, as an Armenian from Yerevan, he feels the 
need to prove his credentials to the Armenians of Karabakh.”832 Furthermore, unlike Kocharyan 
and Sargsyan, Pashinyan “insisted that as the leader of the Republic of Armenia, he cannot speak 
on behalf of the Karabakh Armenians,” raising the old issue of Artsakh’s representation that 
once again increased tensions.833 After some initial hope that Pashinyan’s election would open 
the door to substantial progress on the diplomatic front, it soon became clear that the two sides 
were as far as part as ever on the issues that have driven the conflict since the 1980s. 
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Chapter Four: Forty-Four Days of War 
Prelude to War 
With little progress in negotiations and ever more powerful Azerbaijan intent of gaining 
control over both Artsakh and the surrounding territories, the risk of renewed war was always a 
distinct possibility. This was a well-known fact to observers of the conflict and the foreign 
diplomats assigned to mediate between the two sides. As Thomas de Waal presciently wrote in 
March 2020, “Armenia and Azerbaijan are always one step from renewed war.”834 Just four 
months later, on July 12, such a fight erupted along the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
proper. The two countries quickly released conflicting statements, with both sides accusing the 
other of initiating the fighting. A little after 4:00 in the afternoon, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of 
Defense released a short statement accusing Armenian forces of “grossly violating the ceasefire 
on the direction of the Tovuz region of the Azerbaijani-Armenian state border.”835 In a Facebook 
post made soon after Azerbaijan’s statement, Shushan Stepanyan, the spokeswoman for 
Armenia’s Minister of Defense, responded, claiming that Azeri soldiers had attempted to cross 
the border into Armenia’s Tavush province.836 According to Stepanyan’s post, the Azeri soldiers 
entered Armenian territory in a UAZ vehicle, but abandoned it and fled after being “warned” by 
Armenian troops, only to return an hour later, at which point they were fired upon and incurred 
casualties. Azeri officials later claimed that these soldiers were on a routine patrol when they 
were ambushed by Armenian forces who then shelled Azeri positions with artillery.837 
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While the lack of external monitoring makes it difficult to say with certainty who or what 
sparked the fighting, there is little reason to believe that it was premeditated on either side. 
Instead, it appears to have been the result of inadvertent escalation and inadequate 
communication. The clashes followed the replacement of regular Azeri military units with 
members of Azerbaijan’s border guard and “a sudden flurry of construction of new housing, 
roads, and other buildings, which caused ‘a lot of confusion on both sides.’”838 Additionally, the 
presence of large civilian populations and crucial infrastructure on both sides of the border meant 
that both Armenia and Azerbaijan had incentives to avoid fighting in the area. When coupled 
with the lack of any readily apparent military objective either side could realistically hope to 
achieve, it appears as though the fighting was the result of confusion in an extremely tense 
situation rather than a deliberate attack. As Olesya Vartanyan, the Crisis Group’s senior analyst 
for the South Caucasus, reported in the aftermath of the July clashes, “If anyone was preparing 
for this, they did a bad job.”839 
While the fighting may have begun accidentally, it quickly escalated into the most serious 
round of fighting since the Four-Day War in 2016. In a dangerous environment with trust 
between the two sides almost entirely lacking, the initial confrontation—whatever it may have 
been—became a flash point that coalesced into heavy clashes. Despite the recently created 
communication channels between Armenian and Azeri defense officials, neither side made a 
meaningful attempt to deescalate the situation.840 Instead, the fighting intensified and became a 
“rare instance in which [both] sides used heavy weapons.”841 By the time the fighting had mostly 
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come to an end on July 16, a reported 17 soldiers, 12 Azeris and 5 Armenians, had been killed.842 
Azerbaijan also reported that one Azeri civilian was killed during the clashes, although the 
announcement has since been removed from the Ministry of Defense’s website843 
Among the deaths was Major General Polad Hashimov, a popular figure in Azerbaijan 
who was credited with capturing a strategic post near Talish during the fighting in 2016.844 
Armenian media reported that Hashimov and fellow Azeri officer Colonel Ilgar Mirzoev were 
killed in a drone strike, the first time that an Armenian-produced drone had been used in 
combat.845 Hashimov’s death prompted outrage in Azerbaijan. On July 14, the day Hashimov’s 
death was announced, a funeral held for another soldier killed in the fighting along the border 
devolved into a massive street protest demanding war against Armenia.846 Chanting slogans like 
“Karabakh or death,” tens of thousands of Azeris marched through the streets of Baku 
demanding war. While the demonstration began as show of support for the military and a call for 
war, over the course of the night it gradually transformed into an anti-government protest.847 
Some protestors even broke into the Azeri parliament building, clashing with police who 
attempted to force them back.848 Having long encouraged the Azeri population to see the conflict 
over Artsakh as an existential struggle and telling them the Azeri military could easily 
overwhelm Armenian defenses, Azeri president Ilham Aliyev now faced a population that 
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seemed prepared to mount a challenge to his continued rule if he failed to make good on his 
rhetoric. 
Already dealing with domestic opposition to his authoritarian style of rule, Aliyev seems 
to have taken the protesters’ demand for war seriously.849 While Azerbaijan had been heavily 
investing in its military capabilities for years, preparations for war were significantly accelerated 
in the wake of the July clashes. Just weeks after the fighting had stopped, Azerbaijan held large-
scale joint military exercises with Turkey involving a reported—though likely inflated—11,000 
Turkish soldiers as well as a significant amount of both air and ground military equipment.850 
With the benefit of hindsight, these exercises, the largest of their kind in recent years, now 
appear to have been explicit preparations for Azerbaijan’s invasion. As the Jamestown 
Foundation reported at the time, the exercises were intended “to transfer to Azerbaijan the 
experience [Turkey] has accumulated in the use of attack drones, multiple-launch rocket systems 
(MLRS) and air-defense systems over the last several years.”851 These same Turkish drones, 
possibly also operated by Turkish military personnel, would prove to be a decisive factor in 
Azerbaijan’s favor when the two sides returned to the battlefield  
Along with joint-exercises, Azerbaijan also dramatically increased their spending on 
military equipment between July and September. After spending $9.78 million on Turkish 
weapons imports over the first seven months of 2020, Azerbaijan’s imports of Turkish weapons 
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skyrocketed to $36 million in August and $77.1 million in September.852 Azerbaijan also 
purchased large quantities of arms from Israel—which has replaced Russia as Azerbaijan’s 
leading weapons supplier, and now provides over 60% of Azerbaijan’s weapons—in the build up 
to the invasion.853 While exact quantities or numbers have not been made public, flight trackers 
revealed that two cargo planes likely carrying military equipment flew between Israel and 
Azerbaijan just weeks before fighting began, followed by two more flights during the early days 
of the war.854 Such a dramatic shift in spending strongly suggests that Azerbaijan’s preparations 
for war began following the July clashes. 
Furthermore, Azerbaijan began to recruit and deploy Syrian mercenaries in the months 
following the July clashes. Lindsey Snell, one of the first journalists to break the story, reported 
that rumors of a Turkish-backed effort to deploy Syrians to Azerbaijan had been circulating since 
July.855 While these claims were initially dismissed by the majority of analysts following the 
Caucasus, Snell was eventually proven correct. Turkey and Azerbaijan both continue to 
vehemently deny the involvement of foreign mercenaries, but widespread evidence—including 
intelligence reports from Russia, France, and the United States—contradicts these claims.856 The 
Guardian, one of many newspapers to verify Azerbaijan’s use of Syrian mercenaries, reported 
that they had spoken with several such mercenaries and had confirmed their accounts through the 
                                                 
852 Toksabay, Ece. “Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan surged before Nagorno-Karabakh fighting.” Reuters. October 
14, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-armenia-azerbaijan-turkey-arms/turkish-arms-sales-to-azerbaijan-
surged-before-nagorno-karabakh-fighting-idUSKBN26Z237  
853 Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, Shaiel. “Israel to maintain Azeri edge in Karabakh war.” Asia Times. October 14, 2020. 
https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/israel-to-maintain-azeri-edge-in-karabakh-war/  
854 Melman, Yossi. “As Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Expands, Israel-Azerbaijan Arms Trade Thrives.” Haaretz. 
October 7, 2020. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-israel-azerbaijan-arms-trade-
armenia-iran-1.9212986  
855 Khachatryan, Amalie. “Lindsey Snell: Rumors of Syrian mercenaries started in July.” Mediamax. October 23, 
2020. https://mediamax.am/en/news/special-report/40439/  
856 “Russia, France, and US report transfer of militants from Syria to Karabakh conflict zone” Caucasian Knot. 
October 2, 2020. https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/52322/  
153 
 
use of publicly available flight trackers and geo-located pictures sent to the Guardian.857 
Armenian forces also would later capture two such Syrian mercenaries, whose testimonies 
corroborated the fact that Azerbaijan had recruited mercenaries prior to the start of fighting.858 
According to reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a total of around 2,000 
Syrian fighters were recruited by the Turkish government and sent to Azerbaijan.859  
Lastly, in the days prior to Azerbaijan’s invasion, media outlets across the Caucasus 
began reporting on more immediate signs of military mobilization. On September 21, Meydan.tv, 
a Berlin-based online media platform dedicated to covering Azerbaijan, reported that police in 
Azerbaijan had begun confiscating pickup trucks, telling their owners they were needed by the 
military.860 The same report noted that reserve units in the Azeri military had been told to 
prepare for military exercises, with many Azeris speculating that preparations for mobilization 
were underway. On September 25, the US embassies in both Armenia and Azerbaijan issued 
travel advisories, warning American citizens to “exercise caution due to heightened tensions and 
recent violence along portions of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.”861 As Vartanyan of the 
International Crises Group told NPR a few days later, “The attack was coming. There were 
numerous signals, all saw them and did nothing for weeks.”862 
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War Comes Again 
The invasion arrived on the morning of September 27, with Armenian sources reporting 
that Azerbaijan had launched air and artillery strikes along the length of the line of contact. By 
the end of the first day of fighting, it was apparent that this escalation was very different from the 
skirmishes that frequently took place along the border. Shortly after news of the attack was 
announced, Armenia, Artsakh, and Azerbaijan all declared martial law and began military 
mobilizations.863 Even before the end of the first day, estimates of the casualties from fighting 
had already exceeded 100 dead for both sides.864 In what would become a reoccurring pattern of 
‘mirror propaganda’ throughout the war, Azerbaijan attempted to shift the blame by accusing 
Armenia of firing first. President Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan’s army was undertaking a 
“counter-offensive in response to military provocation.”865 However, at the same time that he 
claimed Armenia was responsible for starting the fighting, Aliyev announced his intention to 
“end the occupation” of Artsakh. While Aliyev’s accusation created enough confusion to initially 
obscure the fact that Azerbaijan was the aggressor, as evidence of Azerbaijan’s preparations was 
made public it became clear that the attack had been carefully planned. 
One of Azerbaijan’s first targets appears to have been Artsakh’s anti-air capabilities. By 
9:10 AM on September 27—just  a few hours into the war—Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense 
announced that what it euphemistically called a “blitz counter-offensive” had succeeded in 
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destroying 12 of Armenia’s OSA anti-aircraft missile systems.866 While it is possible that 
Azerbaijan was exaggerating their success, drone videos released later in the day confirmed that 
at least 3 of these systems had been damaged or destroyed.867 These OSA systems, purchased by 
Armenia in 2019, were widely regarded to be ineffective against the Turkish-produced Bayraktar 
TB2 drones, which “flew too high for these systems to intercept even if they were able to detect 
these relatively small aircraft.”868 While modern anti-air defenses can neutralize drones relatively 
easily, Armenia possessed relatively few of these modern systems and those they did have “were 
deployed late in the conflict, limited in number, and vulnerable to attack themselves.”869 
Furthermore, the Azeri army also deployed “old, remote-controlled post-WWII era air planes, 
which they used to lure out Armenian air defences. Once the latter activated their radars, an 
Azerbaijani drone flying behind the old airplanes locked on to the Armenian location, 
immediately destroying the air defences.”870  
As a result, Azerbaijan was able to make full use of their  “game-changing” drones, that 
granted them “significant advantages in ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] as 
well as long-range strike capabilities.”871 Azerbaijan’s arsenal of drones proved to be perhaps the 
single most decisive factor in their military successes. With the Armenian army lacking the 
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equipment necessary to counter drones, Azerbaijan was able to use them to “stalk and destroy 
Armenia’s weapons systems in Nagorno-Karabakh, shattering its defenses and enabling a swift 
advance.”872 Armenia’s recorded losses—most of which came from drone strikes able to take 
footage of their targets—included “185 T-72 tanks; 90 armored fighting vehicles; 182 artillery 
pieces; 73 multiple rocket launchers; 26 surface-to-air missile systems, including a Tor system 
and five S-300s; 14 radars or jammers; one SU-25 war plane; four drones and 451 military 
vehicles.”873 In contrast, Azerbaijan was recorded as losing just “22 tanks, 41 armored forced 
vehicles, one helicopter, 25 drones and 24 vehicles.”874 While this disparity can be partially 
explained by the fact that Armenian forces used more traditional weapons that do not record their 
strikes, there is little doubt that Azerbaijan’s drones inflicted significant losses of vital Armenian 
equipment.   
Azerbaijan’s offensive was apparently intended to rapidly overpower Artsakh’s defenses, 
pushing them back and conquering the territory controlled by Armenian forces in three to five 
days.875 However, aided by their fortified positions and the region’s mountainous terrain, 
Artsakh’s defense forces offered much fiercer opposition than Azerbaijan had expected. After 
over a week of fighting, observers relying on geolocated videos and images posted by the two 
sides—the most accurate source of information given both governments’ tendency to overstate 
the amount of territory they controlled—estimated that Azerbaijan had only succeeded in 
capturing roughly 145 square kilometers of the territory controlled by Artsakh, just 1.3% of the 
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total area.876 As was also the case during the Four-Day War, these initial gains were concentrated 
in the northeast of Artsakh around and including the villages of Talish and Mataghis, with some 
additional land captured in the south near the Iranian border.877 However, after this initial 
success, the offensive in the more easily defended mountainous and heavily forested northern 
regions of Artsakh bogged down. By the time the war ended over a month later, Azerbaijan had 
made little to no additional progress in the north. 
Instead, Azerbaijan shifted their attention to the southern front, where the flatlands along 
the Iranian border gave defending Armenian forces less of an advantage. Additionally, the 
southern front’s relative lack of trees meant that Armenian positions were especially vulnerable 
to Azerbaijan’s extensive use of drone strikes. While Armenian and Artsakhi soldiers had largely 
succeeded in defending against the initial round of attacks, by October 6, Azerbaijan had broken 
through the defenses along a roughly six-kilometer long portion of the line of contact.878 Having 
penetrated the defensive line Armenians had been fortifying for twenty-five years, the Azeri 
forces were able to advance much more rapidly, capturing significant portions of the Jabrayil and 
Fizuli regions within days. A few days later, in a speech on October 9, Aliyev claimed that Azeri 
forces had captured the town Hadrut, home to around 4,000 people and a strategic position 
controlling the road leading onwards to Shushi and Stepanakert.879 Armenian officials disputed 
Azerbaijan’s claim, with Artsakh’s President Arayik Harutyunyan reporting on October 10th that 
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he had personally visited Hadrut and confirmed it remained under Armenian control.880 Russia 
Today correspondent Igor Zhadanov visited Hadrut on October 12, Tweeting a video and saying 
“The city has not fallen to the Azeri forces - at least not completely” but that fighting for the 
town continued.881  
 At the same time that Armenian and Azeri forces battled for control of Hadrut, diplomats 
from the two sides met in Moscow. Following calls with both Aliyev and Pashinyan, Putin called 
for a humanitarian ceasefire to allow for prisoner exchanges and the retrieval of dead bodies.882 
While Armenian officials signaled that they were ready to agree to a ceasefire, their Azeri 
counterparts “made a potential truce conditional on the Armenian forces’ withdrawal from 
Nagorno-Karabakh,” a request tantamount to a complete surrender.883 Despite this demand, the 
foreign ministers of both Armenia and Azerbaijan traveled to Moscow on October 9 to meet with 
Russia’s Sergei Lavrov. For over 10 hours, the three men met behind closed doors while 
Armenians and Azeris around the world anxiously waited to hear the outcome of their 
negotiations. At around 4:00 AM Moscow time, they emerged with a short statement declaring a 
ceasefire would take effect at noon local time and committing to participate in “substantive 
negotiations…as soon as possible.”884  
For a while it seemed that an end to fighting was possible, but those hopes were quickly 
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cut short. Armenian officials reported that Azeri shelling near Kapan—the provincial capital of 
Syunik, a region of Armenia proper—had killed a civilian within minutes of the ceasefire taking 
effect.885 Shushan Stepanyan also reported that Azeri forces had resumed their offensive “in the 
southern, northern, northeastern and eastern directions.”886Azerbaijan denied these claims and 
“in turn, accused Armenia of striking the Terter and Agdam regions of Azerbaijan with missiles 
and then attempting to launch offensives.”887 While Azerbaijan’s near-constant shelling of 
Stepanakert was halted for a few hours following the ceasefire, the agreement ultimately had 
almost no lasting impact on the course of the war.888  
While it is once again difficult to pinpoint exactly what happened or which side was 
responsible for the ceasefire’s collapse, the evidence points toward Azerbaijan being the likely 
culprit. With Armenian forces still in control of almost the entirety of the former-NKAO and 
most of the surrounding regions they had held since the 1994 ceasefire but facing a clearly larger 
and better equipped military force, the Armenian leadership had little incentive to violate the 
ceasefire. Indeed, as early as October 2, Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had publicly 
announced that it was “ready to engage with the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries to re-
establish a ceasefire regime.”889 Azerbaijan, for its part, had consistently rejected previous calls 
for a ceasefire, with Aliyev demanding that Armenia entirely withdraw its forces as a 
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precondition to any agreement.890 
After the collapse of the ceasefire, fighting quickly resumed its former intensity, 
especially around Hadrut. Azeri forces continued to attack Armenian positions around the town, 
with Armenian sources confirming that they had lost control of the hills to south.891 On October 
10, Russian journalist Alexander Kots reported that a group of 200 Azeri special operation forces 
had attempted to infiltrate Hadrut overnight—the same time that the ceasefire was being 
negotiated and announced.892 In what would become a consistent claim of direct Turkish 
involvement, Semen Pegov, another Russian journalist, noted that there were “grounds to 
suppose that the group of saboteurs… was comprised of Turkish special forces,” although there 
has been no confirmation of this claim.893 With the ceasefire unable to halt the fighting, these 
forces battled the Armenian defenders for control of the town. Fierce fighting over Hadrut 
continued for days with neither side able to establish clear control. However, a video released on 
October 15 showed Azeri forces driving through the town without meeting resistance, leading 
many to conclude that Armenian forces had been entirely pushed out.894 
Not only was the loss of Hadrut and the surrounding heights a strategic defeat for 
Armenians, it was also a significant blow to their morale. As Dimitri Avaliani of JAM News 
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explained, “Hadrut is the first regional center with Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
within the former autonomous region, which the Azerbaijani side announced occupied/liberated” 
and its fall would become “the source of a new, relatively large, wave of refugees.”895 Despite 
frequent claims from Azeri officials that the Armenians of Artsakh would “be treated the same 
way as other citizens of various origins,” almost all of 4,000 of Hadrut’s residents fled, fearing 
for their lives if the town fell under Azeri control.896 The few Armenians who stayed behind 
demonstrated just how well-founded those fears were. On October 10, Artsakh’s Human Rights 
Ombudsman Artak Beglaryan announced that Azeri forces had killed two civilians—a mother 
and her disabled son who had been unable to flee—in their home.897 While that reporting on the 
incident was largely limited to Armenian sources, a second killing of civilians in Hadrut received 
far more international attention.898 
On October 15, the same day that videos emerged showing Azeri control over Hadrut, 
two other videos appeared on Azeri Telegram channels. The first showed two men—who would 
later be identified as 73-year-old Benik Hakobian and 25-year-old Yuri Adamian—being taken 
captive by Azeri soldiers at a site located on the town’s northern edge.899 While the caption 
posted along with the videos claimed the men were Armenian soldiers, neither was armed and 
residents from Hadrut told RFE/RL that the two had been tasked with unloading supply trucks 
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rather than participating in the fighting. The second video, which appears to have been taken 
shortly after the first, shows the same two men sitting on a wall in a small park in the south of 
Hadrut with Armenian flags draped over their shoulders and their hands bound behind their 
backs. After a man behind the camera shouts to “aim at their heads” in Azerbaijani, a barrage of 
shots ring out and the two men fall to the ground.900  
Azeri officials were quick to deny that the videos were real, denouncing them as a 
“provocation,” and Azerbaijan’s prosecutor general announced on October 16 that an 
investigation had determined the videos were fake.901 However, in independent analyses 
conducted by the BBC and Bellingcat, an open-source investigative journalist website, 
concluded that the videos were real, with Bellingcat confirming that the soldiers’ uniforms and 
weapons match those used by the Azeri army and the BBC finding that the voice in the second 
video was likely a “native Azerbaijani speaker.”902 While many Azeri commentators online 
raised objections that the video appeared staged, a British military intelligence officer told the 
BBC “These are real bullets, this is a real killing. This is genuine, and I don't see any reason to 
assume it’s staged.”903 The Council of Europe, Europe’s leading human rights organization, told 
reporters that it was investigating the video and would “take action when [it] deems appropriate,” 
but has yet to announce any further steps taken.904 
 The video from Hadrut was only the first example in a series of videos depicting horrific 
war crimes that would be posted online during and after the war. Other videos “show Azerbaijani 
soldiers taunting, torturing, and executing captured men, as well as mutilating and otherwise 
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degrading human remains.”905 In one of the most gruesome examples, “men in uniforms 
consistent with those of the Azerbaijani military hold down and decapitate a man using a knife. 
One then places the severed head on a dead animal.”906 In another video of an Armenian civilian 
being decapitated by Azeri soldiers, an elderly man can be seen “begging for mercy, repeatedly 
saying: ‘For the sake of Allah, I beg you’” before “One of the men is heard to say, ‘Take this 
one’ and hands a knife over to the other man, who begins to brutally cut the older man’s throat 
before the video abruptly ends.”907 This type of violence directed at captured Armenian civilians 
and soldiers appears to have been widespread, with “numerous videos circulating on Telegram of 
Azerbaijani soldiers beating elderly civilians in central Karabakh. Witness testimonies collected 
by International Crisis Group from civilians who fled the region describe armed men executing 
villagers and burning homes.”908 
 While the Azerbaijan announced in December two soldiers had been charged with 
mutilating the dead bodies of Armenian soldiers, it is unclear what, if any, punishment they 
received.909 Nor does the Azeri government seem likely to investigate the numerous other videos 
of similar war crimes. The Prosecutor’s Office has dismissed most claims of war crimes, alleging 
that it has “determined that many of the videos were fake.”910 Furthermore, there is evidence that 
the government itself might have encouraged some of these crimes. Describing the videos of war 
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crimes, journalist Neil Hauer writes that “A state policy in Azerbaijan of ethnic hatred towards 
Armenians, often dubbed 'Armenophobia', has played a driving role in encouraging these 
crimes.”911 Along with such claims that the government’s encouragement of ethnic hatred leads 
Azeri soldiers to commit acts of violence against civilians and captive soldiers, a Syrian 
mercenary captured by Armenian forces alleged that he had been promised a $100 bonus for 
beheading an Armenian.912 While it was eager to take control of Artsakh and the surrounding 
regions, the Azeri government likely does not want to have to manage a hostile Armenian 
population on its newly captured territory. President Aliyev seems to have expressed such a 
desire to ethnically cleanse the Armenians of Artsakh in a speech in mid-October in which he 
said that “if [the enemies] do not leave our lands of their own free will, we will chase them away 
like dogs and we are doing that.”913 In this light, encouraging violence against civilians and 
captives—either tacitly or explicitly—not only removes the few Armenians who stayed behind, 
but also scares the rest into fleeing ahead of the Azeri army’s advance.  
 While the vast majority of the videos depicting violence against captives show Azeri 
soldiers and Armenian victims, there were also examples of Armenians committing similar 
crimes. One video analyzed by Amnesty International, “shows a man wearing an Azerbaijani 
border patrol uniform lying on the ground, whilst gagged and bound” who is then stabbed in the 
throat by an Armenian soldier.914 However, these examples are relatively rare compared to the 
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videos of Azeri troops. As Andrew Roth of The Guardian  wrote, “While both sides have been 
implicated, online channels are increasingly dominated by videos of Armenian soldiers and 
civilians being abused by advancing Azerbaijani troops.”915  
 
Destruction from Above 
While the videos of a close-quarters executions and torture are deeply shocking, the 
intense shelling of residential areas had an even more devastating impact on civilians. Azeri 
shelling, which had been one of the first signs of renewed violence on September 27, killed a 
woman and child in Artsakh’s Martuni region and infrastructure in many towns was damaged.916 
The shelling of Armenian settlements, concentrated most heavily on Stepanakert but leaving few 
towns unaffected, would continue throughout the entire course of the war. The shelling of 
Stepanakert exacted a heavy toll on the civilian population. On October 3, a week after the start 
of the war, Azeri shells hit the city’s electricity network building, resulting in the first of what 
would be a long series of power outages.917 While some of Artsakh’s residents chose to stay 
despite the shelling, taking refuge in bomb shelters built to endure similar shelling during the 
1990s, roughly 90,000 people—around two-thirds of Artsakh’s entire population—was forced to 
flee the territory entirely, seeking refuge in Armenia.918 
While both Armenian and Azeri forces had used heavy artillery along the front lines, 
resulting in civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, for the first week of the war 
only Azerbaijan targeted civilians by launching attacks on cities well behind the front lines, 
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subjecting them to near-constant bombardment. That changed on October 4 when Harutyunyan 
announced via Twitter that Artsakh’s defense army would begin targeting military objects in the 
“large cities of Azerbaijan” and called for the “Azerbaijani population to leave these cities to 
avoid inevitable loss.”919 At around the same time, three rockets hit a residential section of 
Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second largest city.920 Azeri authorities reported that the attack killed one 
civilian and injured four more—the latter number later rising to 32.921 Taking to Facebook, 
Harutyunyan announced that the missiles had been fired by Artsakh’s forces, writing that 
“At my orders, today the Defense Army delivered several rocket strikes with the purpose 
of neutralizing military facilities deployed in the city of Ganja. As of this moment, I have 
ordered to cease the fire, in order to avoid innocent victims among the civilian 
population. In the event of the adversary not drawing appropriate conclusions we will 
continue proportionate and powerful strikes.”922 
While Armenia denied involvement, contending that Artsakh had unilaterally carried out the 
attack, the close cooperation of the two armies suggests that Armenian officials were likely 
involved in —or at least aware of—the decision to fire the missiles.923 
The same day as the attack on Ganja, Hikmet Hajiyev—presidential aide and 
Azerbaijan’s Head of Foreign Policy Affairs Department—accused Armenian forces of firing a 
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missile that “landed in close proximity of energy block in [the Mingachevir dam]. But did not 
explode.”924 However, the photos released by Hajiyev were widely criticized on social media as 
being staged, with defense technologies specialist Mike Mihajlovic reporting that the pictures 
had likely been “staged for the photo ops” based on the lack of debris around the impact site or 
combustion marks on the rocket engine.925 Hajiyev released a similar claim a few days later, 
writing on October 6, that Armenian forces had used cluster munitions in an attempt to disable 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.926 Once again, the photos of the alleged attack were widely 
accused of being staged, with Mihajlovic noting that the debris in the pictures were consistent 
with Israeli-produced M095 DPICM cluster sub-munitions, which only Azerbaijan had access 
to.927 Furthermore, cluster munitions—which are intended to destroy light vehicles or for anti-
personnel use—would likely not be used in an attack targeting a buried pipeline.928 Finally, 
analyzing a video taken the following day of the same alleged attack, Rob Lee, a military expert 
from the Department of War Studies at King's College London, wrote that “the fact that the 
cluster munitions are so close together (and none apparently detonated) with no sign of the 
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rocket is quite suspicious.”929 
This latter claim by Hajiyev appears to have been an attempted response to reports that 
had emerged a few days earlier that Azeri forces had used cluster munitions in their shelling of 
Stepanakert. By accusing Armenian forces of using cluster munitions, Azerbaijan appears to 
have been attempting to limit the negative press concerning their own use of the widely-
condemned weapons. On October 4, a video filmed in Stepanakert showed a rapid series of 
explosions consistent with the use of cluster bombs.930 The day after the video emerged, 
Amnesty International issued a short statement announcing they “were able to trace the location 
of the footage to residential areas of Stepanakert, and identified Israeli-made M095 DPICM 
cluster munitions that appear to have been fired by Azerbaijani forces.”931 Cluster munitions, 
which cause indiscriminate damage and often leave behind unexploded remnants that can result 
in civilian injuries years after their initial use, are the subject of the 2008 Convention on Cluster 
Munitions which “comprehensively prohibits” their use.932 However, neither Armenian nor 
Azerbaijan has ratified the convention, with both countries pointing to the unresolved conflict 
over Artsakh as a barrier to their accession. Despite this legal technicality, Amnesty declared that 
Azerbaijan’s use of cluster munitions against civilian populations to be “absolutely appalling and 
unacceptable” and the issue was reported by several international news outlets.933 However, the 
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increased international attention did not dissuade Azeri forces from continued use of cluster 
munitions. In late October, Human Rights Watch reported that “Azerbaijan has repeatedly used 
widely banned cluster munitions in residential areas in Nagorno-Karabakh” including four 
instances that were confirmed by an on-site investigation.934 Like other instances in which Azeri 
forces shelled residential areas, the target appears to have been the civilians themselves. As 
Human Rights Watch detailed in their report, they were “not able to identify any military 
equipment or bases in the three neighborhoods where the attacks took place.”935 
As a Human Rights Watch report released after the end of the war detailed, there were 
“numerous incidents in which Azerbaijan’s forces used inherently indiscriminate cluster 
munitions and artillery rockets or other weapons that did not distinguish between military targets 
and civilian objects.”936 Videos and pictures taken by reporters and residents alike show the toll 
that the near-constant shelling had on the city, with craters taking the place of buildings and 
rubble covering the streets. On November 4, a few days before the end of the war, Stepanakert’s 
mayor Davit Sargsyan reported that 40% of the city had been destroyed by Azeri rocket 
attacks.937 Though likely inflated, with Hauer suggesting a more conservative 10%, there can be 
little doubt that Stepanakert and other Armenian cities and villages suffered massive damage 
during the war.938  
Azerbaijan’s bombardment of Armenian towns and cities also focused on high-profile 
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targets, most notably Shushi’s Ghazanchetsots Cathedral, a highly symbolic building for 
Artsakh’s Armenians. On October 8, the cathedral was hit twice by Azeri missiles, with the 
second injuring three journalists who had gathered to report on the initial strike.939 As Human 
Rights Watch reported, the attacks were almost certainly deliberate, as remnants of the missiles 
used are “consistent with a munition capable of being accurately directed at a specific target.”940 
Nor was attack on Ghazanchetsots the only example of Azerbaijan hitting notable non-military 
targets. Along with widespread damage to residences and businesses, other structures hit by 
Azeri strikes included multiple schools and the newly built maternity ward of Artsakh’s 
Republican Medical Center.941 
As the war continued, Azeri citizens were also subjected to sporadic bombardment. In the 
early hours of October 11th, Armenian forces once again shelled Ganja, using a SCUD-B missile 
that hit a residential neighborhood in the north of the city.942 The attack, which damaged or 
destroyed over 20 buildings, resulted in 10 deaths and 34 injuries. Though it is unclear whether 
the missile was launched by forces from Armenia proper or Artsakh, the distinction is largely 
semantic given the close collaboration between the two. It is also unclear whether the missile 
was deliberately targeting residential buildings or if it missed its intended target. In their 
December report on Armenia’s shelling of Azerbaijan, Human Rights Watch reported that 
analysis of satellite imagery “identified military weapons and equipment at sites 700 meters and 
one kilometer from the impact crater… [and] a third site, 200 meters from the October 11 attack, 
that contained transport vehicles” that may have been used for military purposes.943 As SCUD-B 
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missiles are only accurate to within a range of 900 meters, it is possible that any of these three 
sites was the intended target. On October 17, Ganja was once again hit with a SCUD-B missile, 
killing 21 additional Azeri civilians.944 Whatever the intention, the use of a powerful and 
inaccurate weapon in a densely populated area amounts to indiscriminate shelling according to 
the Human Rights Watch report.945 
Then, on October 28, Armenian forces launched an attack on the city of Barda—located 
approximately 30 kilometers from the initial line of contact—using cluster munitions for the 
first, and apparently only, time. The bombardment resulted in significant casualties, killing 21 
people and injuring 70 more.946 While initial reports of the attack were met with some skepticism 
from Armenians given Azerbaijan’s previous false claims, Amnesty International reported the 
following day, their “experts verified pictures (taken by Vice News reporters in the city) of 
fragments of 9N235 cluster munitions from Russian-made 9M55 Smerch rockets.”947 While 
earlier Armenian attacks against Azeri cities were—at least purportedly—intended to hit military 
targets, the use of cluster munitions in the Barda attack seemed to signal that Armenia had 
decided it was willing to inflict civilian casualties on Azerbaijan to force a quicker settlement. 
However, no further such attacks were carried out by Armenian forces and the shelling of Barda 
seems to have had little effect on the willingness of Azeri leaders to continue the war. 
However, even after they approved the attack on Barda, the Armenian leadership decided 
not to take a step that could have potentially had a larger impact on the war’s outcome: striking 
Azerbaijan’s oil and gas pipelines or refineries. Armenia had purchased Iskander missiles from 
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Russia in 2016—unveiling them after the Four-Day War—that were widely perceived to have 
the capability to damage Azerbaijan’s oil infrastructure.948 However, the power of Armenia’s 
Iskanders lay mostly in their threat rather than the actual impact of an attack on Azerbaijan’s oil 
and gas infrastructure. While lasting damage to Azerbaijan’s pipelines could potentially cripple 
the Azeri economy, it likely would have little immediate impact on Azerbaijan’s ability to wage 
war. Instead, it would most likely have only alienated the United States and Europe at a time that 
Armenia was desperate for international support.  
While it must be acknowledged that both Azeri and Armenian forces were guilty of 
indiscriminately shelling civilian population centers, just as is the case in the videos of violence 
against captives, it is clear that Azerbaijan was responsible for a far greater number of such 
attacks. In contrast to the Armenian attacks, which were mostly limited to the specific instances 
mentioned above, Azerbaijan’s shelling of civilians across Artsakh was a regular occurrence 
throughout the entire war. As CivilNet reported after the war ended, the “constant Azerbaijani 
shelling in civilian areas led to mass evacuations and destruction of public facilities.”949 
However, while the frequency and intensity of Azerbaijan’s attacks was much greater, 
Azerbaijan reported 100 civilian deaths compared to 72 such Armenian deaths—of which 41 
were the result of shelling and 31 occurred in captivity.950 While it is possible that Azerbaijan’s 
civilian death toll has been inflated—there has been little independent confirmation of the 
government’s claims, this apparent contradiction can also be explained by the fact that—largely 
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as a result of Azeri shelling—many Armenians fled Artsakh entirely during the war and those 
that stayed behind spent the majority of the war hiding in bomb shelters built during the first war, 
which were not available in the Azeri cities which had not experienced shelling during the 1990s. 
 
Controlling the Narrative 
 As fighting raged on the battlefield, a separate war between Armenians and Azeris played 
out in the news and online as supporters of both sides attempted to craft a narrative favorable to 
their side. From Los Angeles to Moscow to Valence, France, the conflict also spilled into the two 
countries’ diasporas, with—occasionally violent—demonstrations and counter-demonstrations 
intended to bring attention to the war and push foreign countries to support their preferred side. 
This information war was led by government spokesmen on both sides, whose press briefings 
and posts on social media were an opportunity not only to assure their own populations that the 
war was going well, but also a chance to paint the other side in a negative light in the hope of 
gaining more international support.  
 Taking advantage of a lack of available information, the Azeri government released 
several statements that were seemingly entirely fabricated, beginning with their claim that 
Armenian forces had initiated the fighting. Azerbaijan appears to have gambled that—in the 
absence of hard proof—Western journalists would treat the claims of both governments as 
equally credible. While it quickly became apparent to observers of the region that Azerbaijan had 
planned the war in advance, the Azeri government’s gamble paid off and reports of the war in 
Western media generally only reported that both sides blamed the other. Over a week after the 
start of the war, as even the Azeri officials had begun to stop circulating claims that Armenian 
forces had attacked first—although they still did not claim responsibility themselves, The New 
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York Times was still reporting that the cause of the war was “contested” and that “Azerbaijan 
says Armenia fired artillery across the border, while Armenia says it was victim of an 
unprovoked attack.”951 Misleading claims of this sort were not limited to the first days of the 
war. As discussed previously, the Azeri government also appears to have staged fake missile 
attacks and attempted to blame Armenian forces for breaking ceasefire agreements. While the 
former claims went largely unreported in Western media outlets, the allegations that Armenians 
and not Azeris had violated the ceasefire once again created enough uncertainty that journalists 
treated it as an open question, even as the evidence pointed toward Azerbaijan.  
 This misinformation campaign was made possible by a lack of information caused in part 
by the strict control Azerbaijan exercised over journalists within its territory. While freedom of 
the press was not a new issue in Azerbaijan—which was ranked 168 out of 180 in Reporters 
Without Borders’ 2020 index of global press freedom, the government closely regulated what 
foreign journalists reported.952 Catherine Norris-Trent, a reporter from France24 who spent 
much of the war in Azerbaijan, explained, “we have a minder appointed by the Azeri 
government with us pretty much at all times…it’s quite difficult here to really work out what 
exactly is going on beyond this communications battle.”953 By limiting the flow of information 
and continually muddying the waters regarding which side was responsible for what, Azerbaijan 
succeeded in preventing international support from uniting against them while they carried out 
their attempt to conquer Artsakh and recapture the surrounding territories.  
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 Across the front lines in Artsakh, the Armenian authorities also were making a concerted 
effort to manage the flow of information. While Armenia has traditionally had a much freer press 
than Azerbaijan—ranking 61st on the Reporters Without Borders’ 2020 index—during the war 
the government took a more active approach to managing news coverage.954 Armenia was still 
much more open to foreign press than Azerbaijan, granting access to 390 reporters from 90 
countries, but Armenian officials also sought to use information to their advantage.955 However, 
in contrast to Azerbaijan’s misinformation which was largely designed for foreign consumption, 
Armenian officials focused on crafting a narrative for their domestic audience. While they could 
not hide the fact that Armenian forces were losing control of territory, government spokesmen 
assiduously worked to bolster the morale of Armenians by assuring them of the success of the 
Armenian forces, which often meant misleading the public about the true situation on the front 
lines.  
 From the very first day of the war, the Armenian government aggressively promoted the 
slogan “haghtelu enk”—“we will win”—and it quickly caught on among the general public.956 
Even as the war began to decisively shift in favor of Azerbaijan, the Armenian government 
continued to express intense optimism about the military situation. When Azeri forces started 
breaking through the line of contact, the defense ministry began framing the retreat as a strategic 
measure to lure the Azeri army into overextending themselves. For example, on October 5, 
around the same time that Azeri soldiers first captured significant amounts of territory, Shushan 
Stepanyan announced that Armenian troops had carried out a “tactical retreat” and then trapped 
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the advancing Azeri soldiers, killing 200 of them.957 While it is possible that there was a germ of 
truth to this claim, Stepanyan’s report and others from government officials throughout the war 
almost certainly heavily exaggerated the degree to which Armenian forces were in control of the 
situation.  
Through a combination of coercion and appeals to patriotism, the Armenian government 
prevented journalists from reporting on the true extent of the losses. On October 8, the 
government amended the martial law that had been declared at the start of the war to prohibit 
“the publication of reports criticising the actions of the government” and giving police the power 
to request media sites to take down content.958 Later in October, Armenian authorities canceled 
the accreditation of a Russian journalist ostensibly because he failed to complete the necessary 
paperwork, but likely motivated by his reports from Artsakh that suggested Armenia was 
suffering heavier losses than the official account recognized.959 Armenian journalists also felt an 
obligation to support the war effort by focusing on the positive stories released by the Armenian 
ministry of defense. As Tatul Hakobyan explained, there were “times when I preferred to submit 
to propaganda rather than remain in my position as a journalist. And the law on martial law also 
prevented me from doing my job.”960 Karen Harutyunyan, Hakobyan’s colleague at Civilnet, 
expressed a similar sentiment, writing that not only was he “instructed by the state to report 
information only from official sources” but he also operated “under self-censorship, with the 
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principle of ‘do not cause harm.’”961 
Both countries also made extensive use of combat footage to highlight their military 
successes, with both “defense ministries post[ing] gruesome footage on YouTube — complete 
with Wagnerian soundtracks — boasting of battlefield achievements.”962 In this regard, 
Azerbaijan’s extensive use of drones proved to be not only a military advantage, but also a boost 
to morale. Able to take videos as they carried out strikes on Armenian equipment and soldiers, 
the drones provided Azeri authorities with an ample supply of such footage. As Vice News 
reported, “Another lesson learned in Nagorno-Karabakh was the sinister propaganda value of 
drones. Every day, social media accounts linked with Turkish armed forces and the Azerbaijani 
Ministry of Defence pushed out long showreels of deadly strikes against a range of targets 
(which were also broadcast on large public billboards).”963  
 However, the release of videos from the battlefield was only one aspect of the 
governments’ broader efforts to use social media to their advantage. Pashinyan had long been 
active on social media, having made extensive use of it during the 2018 Velvet Revolution.964 
Despite his usual social media savvy, “Pashinyan’s casual approach to social media may have 
led to muddled posts about the conflict. And there was a lack of coordination between Armenian 
authorities’ messaging that provided opportunities for misinformation to spread.”965 Across the 
front lines, Azeri officials blocked most social media platforms as part of their broader effort to 
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control the flow of information, but “made a noticeable push to use Twitter — the only 
unblocked platform.”966 The Azeri government also operated a network of “589 Facebook 
accounts, 7,665 Pages and 437 accounts on Instagram that were involved in coordinated 
inauthentic behavior” according to a report released by Facebook in October.967 While the 
majority of content posted by the network focused on domestic issues, Facebook also reported 
that they “frequently touched on…tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan [and] Armenia’s 
actions during past escalations in Nagorno-Karabakh.”968 The Armenian government operated a 
much smaller network on Twitter, with the platform finding 35 accounts with ties to the 
government that “were created in order to advance narratives that were targeting Azerbaijan and 
were geostrategically favorable to the Armenian government.”969 
However, it was not just government officials that attempted to use social media as a 
weapon in an information war, ordinary Armenians and Azeris sought to use social media “to 
shape public perception of what's happening on the ground.”970 During the July clashes, the 
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Lab had reported that “Both Azerbaijanis and Armenians 
have launched hashtags campaigns focused on the current hostilities,” a strategy that was widely 
used during the war as well.971 However, their analysis found a difference in the way in which 
Azeris and Armenians used social media. In contrast to the pro-Armenians hashtags, which 
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“displayed an ebb and flow in mentions volume more characteristic of organic traffic…the pro-
Azerbaijani hashtags demonstrated sharp peaks — mostly consisting of retweets — at 2 p.m. 
every day,” suggesting an attempt to artificially manipulate Twitter’s algorithm by a coordinated 
group. 972 However, the Digital Forensics Lab concluded that this group was likely “highly 
dedicated human users, many of them college students or belonging to pro-regime youth groups” 
rather than the result of automated ‘bots.’973 
The clash between the supporters of the two sides played out in the real world as well as 
online. Armenians in the Diaspora rallied to Artsakh’s cause, and “pro-Armenian activists” 
around the world “marched, gathered assistance and organized volunteers for the defense of the 
separatist government in Nagorno-Karabakh.”974 While the larger size of Armenia’s Diaspora—
especially in Europe and the United Sates—gave it an advantage, the effort to garner 
international support was by no means limited to Armenians.975 Often pro-Azeri protests took the 
form of counter-demonstrations to Armenian events, and the two groups clashed, sometimes 
violently. In France, Armenian protestors blocking a highway in a bid to raise awareness of the 
war were accosted by “three men armed with knives and hammers [who] attacked the peaceful 
Armenian protest. One of the protesters lost consciousness after being hit in the head. A scuffle 
began between the demonstrators and the assailants, who are said to be Turkish nationals.”976  
Along with demonstrations designed to bring public awareness to the conflict, the 
Armenian Diaspora also attempted to provide more immediate assistance. The Hayastan All-
Armenian Fund, an organization focused on supporting Armenia and Artsakh, received over 
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$100 million in donations for its “We Are our Borders” campaign.977 In October, Azerbaijan 
launched a similar effort to collect donations for its Armed Forces Relief Fund, although was 
unclear how much money raised.978 Armenian activists also attempted to halt the flow of weapon 
to Azerbaijan. Thanks in part to the efforts of its Armenian community, Canada imposed 
restrictions on the export of technology used in drones to Turkey, which produced many of 
Azerbaijan’s drones.979 With some success, the Armenian Diaspora also lobbied private 
companies, particularly manufacturers of drone parts and lobbyists, to terminate their contracts 
with Turkey and Azerbaijan.980 However, while these efforts may constrict Turkey’s production 
of drones in the future, they came too late to impact the actual fighting. 
 
The Missing Response 
 However, despite Armenians’ efforts to bring attention to the war that could pressure 
Azerbaijan into halting their offensive, the response from foreign governments was largely 
muted. Azerbaijan benefited not only from their successful attempts to confuse the situation, but 
also from other events that dominated the attention of foreign governments and the media. As 
Laurence Broers wrote, “concentrating sufficient international attention and commitment to 
renewing diplomacy will be challenging. The fighting coincides with a period of international 
distraction due to the global pandemic, the US elections and a traditional pattern where focus 
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falls away once a ceasefire is agreed.”981 Indeed, it seems likely that Azerbaijan intentionally 
launched their invasion of Artsakh during a period of time in which it knew that the world’s 
attention would be elsewhere, most notably on the coronavirus pandemic and the American 
elections. While international organizations like the OSCE along with world leaders released 
statements urging Armenians and Azeris to end the conflict, they were not accompanied by 
meaningful pressure that could induce Azerbaijan to forsake its goal of conquering Artsakh.982 
 However, while the West’s lukewarm response can be chalked up to distraction and lack 
of political will to become meaningfully involved in a seemingly intractable conflict, the same 
factors cannot fully explain the lack of a reaction from Russia. The South Caucasus are an 
important arena for Russia and war between Armenia and Azerbaijan was widely viewed as not 
serving their interests. Despite this, and in contrast to 2016, when Russia quickly intervened to 
stop the Four-Day War, Russia was seemingly content to largely stay out of the conflict as Azeri 
soldiers pushed further into Armenian-controlled territory. While Russia did negotiate the first 
ceasefire, it came after two weeks of intense fighting and did not deter Azerbaijan from 
continuing the war. Furthermore, in early October, Putin publicly announced that Russia’s 
security guarantees to Armenia did not cover Artsakh.983 In doing so, Putin effectively signaled 
to Azerbaijan that the Russian military would not intervene on behalf of Armenia unless they 
attacked Armenia proper. Although there were rumors that Russia was covertly providing more 
assistance to Armenia that it was willing to admit publicly, no evidence of such an arrangement 
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has emerged and any assistance that Armenian forces may have received certainly was not 
enough to have a meaningful impact on the war.984 Aside from erecting a small base on 
Armenia’s southern border to prevent Azeri soldiers from crossing into Armenia itself, Russia 
seems to have done little in the way of directly supporting Armenia until the last days of the war 
when they brokered the final ceasefire.985 
 Part of Russia’s reaction can be explained by increasing support from Turkey, which 
decreased Russia’s leverage over Azerbaijan. Not only did Turkey recruit mercenaries to fight on 
behalf of Azerbaijan, it also “supplies weapons and training to Azerbaijan, and there are signs 
that it [was] actively engaged in the fighting.”986 The Russian newspaper Kommersant reported 
that military and diplomatic sources claimed that “the current serious aggravation of the conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh was deliberately planned and provoked by Turkey” and that 90 Turkish 
military advisors and 20 drone operators were in Azerbaijan.987 The Armenian government also 
claimed that a Turkish F-16 shot down one of its fighter jets over Armenian airspace.988 In 
response, Azerbaijan’s presidential spokesman Hikmet Hajiyev categorically denied the claim, 
saying that “Azerbaijan doesn’t have F-16s — there aren’t any on our soil or in our airspace” and 
suggesting that the Armenian jet might have “hit a mountain.”989 However, shortly afterward 
satellite imagery confirmed the presence of Turkish F-16s at Azerbaijan’s airbase in Ganja, 
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forcing the Azerbaijani government to admit to their presence.990 Given Turkey’s strong support 
for Azerbaijan, it is possible that Russia lacked the leverage necessary to force a ceasefire as it 
had done in 2016. 
 Another possible explanation for Russia’s apparent indifference is the change that 
occurred in Armenia between 2016 and 2020: the 2018 Velvet Revolution. While commentators 
in 2018 had hailed Pashinyan for effecting a democratic transition without drawing Russia’s 
opposition, there is little doubt that Pashinyan’s relations with Russia were not as friendly as 
Sargsyan’s or Kocharyan’s. Although he did not fundamentally re-order Armenia’s foreign 
policy, Pashinyan focused more on forging relations with Europe than his predecessors. As the 
European Policy Centre noted in May 2020, there had been an “increased intensity in EU-
Armenian relations since Pashinyan became prime minister… The European Union (EU) has 
played a crucial role in supporting Pashinyan’s ambitious reform agenda.”991 In 2019, Armenia 
broke with Russia on a UN resolution affirming the right of Georgians from South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia to return to their homes.992 While Armenia abstained from the vote rather than directly 
crossing Russia and supporting the resolution, the move likely was not well-received in Moscow. 
With Armenia seeming to drift away from its close alignment with Russia, it is possible that 
Russia no longer felt the same urgency to support its ally.  
 Furthermore, Pashinyan also did not have the same personal relationship with Putin that 
Sargsyan did. While Putin was personally close to both Sargsyan and Kocharyan, he does not 
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seem to have the same friendly attitude toward Pashinyan.993 Pashinyan’s crackdown on 
corruption implicated many pro-Russian oligarchs—most importantly CSTO head Khachaturov 
and Kocharyan.994 In addition, while Pashinyan’s revolution was not anti-Russian, Putin “tends 
to take this issue [of revolution] personally, still feeling the old profound shock from watching 
helplessly as angry crowds marched by the Dresden KGB headquarters.”995 At best, Pashinyan 
lacked the relationship and political skill that would have helped secure Russian support and at 
worst, Russia intentionally allowed Armenia to suffer a military defeat to increase the latter’s 
dependence on Moscow and weaken Pashinyan. 
 While Russia certainly did not provide the level of assistance to Armenia that it had in 
2016, it does appear that Russia presented a ceasefire deal to Armenia that was rejected by 
Pashinyan. Speaking after the end of the war, Putin claimed that “Armenia had the chance to stop 
the war in mid-October and maintain control of the key city of Shusha” if they agreed to allow 
Azeri refugees to return, including to Shushi.996 While it is unclear what the exact terms of the 
deal were and Pashinyan has stated that he never was presented with an opportunity to end the 
war that did not include surrendering Shushi, it does appear that Armenia would have been able 
to secure a more favorable ceasefire deal if Pashinyan had been willing to make concessions 
earlier in the war.997 In a more general sense, Putin’s claim—if it is indeed true—indicates that 
Russia may have been working behind closed doors to broker a ceasefire well before the end of 
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A Triumph and a Defeat 
 While the Azeri army’s territorial gains had been relatively slow for the first two and a 
half weeks of the war, by mid-October it began advancing much more rapidly. Having spent two 
weeks bombarding Armenian positions and destroying immense quantities of military equipment 
in drone strikes, the Azeri forces were able to push back the Armenian defenders. On October 
17, Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to a second ceasefire agreement—this time negotiated by 
France.998 However, once again, the ceasefire was broken within minutes, again likely by 
Azerbaijan, although Baku also accused Armenia of restarting the violence.999 By October 18, 
Azeri forces had seemingly captured almost the entirety of the Fizuli and Jabrayil regions in the 
south along the Aras River that marks the Iranian border.1000 Three days later, on October 21, 
Azeri forces had advanced to roughly seven kilometers from the border with Armenia proper and 
had taken control of an estimated 9.9% of the territory originally under Armenian control.1001 
Azerbaijan’s rapid advances across the southern regions were likely aided by the fact that 
Armenians had begun retreating toward the forested mountains further north rather than being 
forced to defend against Azerbaijan’s better equipped army on terrain that gave them no easily 
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defensible positions.1002  
 However, the advances of the Azeri army were not entirely limited to the south. By 
October 21, they had also begun advancing up the Hakari river valley, reaching positions that 
placed them within 10 kilometers of the crucial Lachin corridor.1003 The site of the only major 
highway connecting Artsakh to Armenia, the Lachin corridor was of vital strategic importance 
for the Armenian forces. From the start of the war, Azerbaijan had demonstrated its intent to stop 
the flow of reinforcements and supplies from entering Artsakh. On September 29, an Azeri drone 
strike blew up a bus in Vardenis—within Armenia proper—in an apparent attempt to stop 
Armenian reinforcements.1004 A few days later, on October 2, Azerbaijan attempted to sever the 
connection by striking a bridge with an Israeli-produced Long Range Attack (LORA) missile.1005 
While little footage emerged to document a continued Azeri advance up the valley, on October 
26, a reporter from France24 interviewed the mayor of a village in Hakari valley who said that 
the Azeri forces “are near. They are trying to advance but they have not been able to do so 
because we are counter-attacking.”1006 While France24 did not reveal the name of the village at 
the mayor’s request, the description of “50 small, one-storey houses [that] have recently been 
built there, all identical with tiled roofs and a garden” strongly suggests that the location in 
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question is Ariavan—also known as Aghavno after the Armenian name for the river—a village 
of 50 identical houses built in 2016.1007 With Ariavan located just under six kilometers away 
from the town of Lachin and almost directly next to the main highway, the France24 report 
indicates that Azeri forces were on the verge of cutting off Artsakh’s connection to the outside 
world. However, it appears that the villagers of Ariavan—likely aided by more regular Armenian 
forces—succeeded in holding off the Azeri army. By the time the war ended a little over two 
weeks later, Armenians were still in control of the village, with the Armenian newspaper Aravot 
reporting in March 2021 that “most of the families in the village were forced to leave their 
homes, but nine defiant families chose to stay, determined to defend their land and property 
against the enemy’s advances.”1008 
A third ceasefire—negotiated by the United States—on October 25 once again failed to 
prevent the continuation of fighting, quite literally falling apart before it even started.1009 Like 
the previous two ceasefires backed by the other two Minsk Group co-chairs, this penultimate 
ceasefire had almost no effect on the fighting and both sides once again accused the other of 
violating the agreement.1010 However, in an apparent attempt to preempt any Armenian 
accusations that Azerbaijan was responsible for violating the ceasefire, at exactly 8:00 AM—the 
very minute that the ceasefire was scheduled to take effect—the Azeri ministry of defense 
released a message via Telegram alleging that Armenian forces had violated the ceasefire.1011 
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Evidently realizing their mistake, the message was soon deleted and reposted 10 minutes later, 
but Azerbaijan’s lack of intention to uphold the ceasefire had already been revealed.1012 
Apparently the result of changing strategic priorities, the Azeri offensive following the 
ceasefire shifted away from the Lachin corridor, instead focusing on capturing territory further to 
the east. The new Azeri offensive led north from Hadrut and east from the Hakari valley toward 
the symbolic city of Shushi.1013 As Richard Giragosian wrote on October 26, Baku faced a 
choice between “following military logic and sound strategy or opting instead for a decision with 
greater political and diplomatic dividends.”1014 While the “Military logic suggests a choice of 
focusing on targeting the Lachin corridor, the critical lifeline between Karabakh and Armenia… 
The capture of the historic cultural center of Shushi, known to Azerbaijanis as Shusha, would 
offer significant political rewards for the government of President Ilham Aliyev.”1015 Aliyev 
seems to have chosen the latter option, and Azeri forces began driving toward Shushi. 
However, the routes toward Shushi took the Azeri army through mountainous and 
heavily forested terrain that gave the Armenian defenders an increased advantage and mitigated 
the effectiveness of Azerbaijan’s drones. As a result, beginning on October 30, Azerbaijan began 
dropping white phosphorus munitions on the forests around Shushi to eliminate tree cover.1016 
This campaign appears to have achieved its intended goal, with the Atlantic Council’s Digital 
Forensic Research Lab (DFR Lab) reporting in November that “large areas of forest in 
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Armenian-controlled territory showed extensive fire damage at the same time as the videos 
alleging Azerbaijan’s phosphorous munitions use appeared.”1017 While Azerbaijan predictably 
denied these reports, instead accusing Armenian forces of using white phosphorus munitions, the 
DFR Lab concluded that “open-source evidence suggests that Azerbaijan used extreme and 
indiscriminate tactics against Armenian forces, causing high-collateral damage to the 
environment.”1018 This conclusion was strengthened by later reports from Armenian doctors who 
were treating soldiers with injuries consistent to the effects of exposure to white phosphorus.1019 
While the deforestation efforts likely aided in Azerbaijan’s drive toward Shushi, they still 
faced an uphill—literally and figuratively—battle. In late October, Armenia reportedly began 
using the Russian “Krasukha” or “Belladonna” electronic jamming system, with the Russian 
press claiming it had downed nine Bayraktar TB2 drones.1020 Although the use of the Krasukha 
system remained limited to near the Russian military base in Gyumri, they disrupted surveillance 
efforts, which had been ongoing above the Turkish-Armenian border, and the possibility that 
Russia would allow Armenia to deploy them closer to the front lines likely served an implicit 
threat to Azerbaijan.1021 The final barrier the Azeri offensive faced was the terrain. Along with 
Shushi’s reputation as a “unassailable city,” perched on a plateau above steep cliffs to the south, 
Azeri troops would have to approach the city without the benefit of the main highway, which 
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Armenian troops still controlled.1022 
The Azeri army appeared to take significant losses in its push to Shushi. Armenian 
defense officials released a video that “purportedly shows a column of destroyed Azeri armored 
vehicles including a T-72 main battle tank, two BMP-2s and several Israeli-manufactured 
SandCat MRAPs surrounded by scattered bodies of Azerbaijani soldiers. The video was geo-
located to the gorge south of Berdzor, which Armenian MoD spokeswoman Shushan Stepanyan 
has nicknamed ‘Death Valley.’”1023 However, even as Armenian officials maintained a confident 
tone and assured the public that Azerbaijan’s attacks were being repelled, it was becoming clear 
that the Azeri army was advancing toward Shushi. On October 29, Harutyunyan had announced 
that Azeri forces were just five kilometers away from the city and urged “each and every one of 
you [Armenians] to unite and defend our Shushi, our Artsakh, our national dignity.”1024 By 
November 4, Azeri troops had reached the outskirts of the city, but had approached from the 
south, leaving them at the bottom of Shushi’s cliffs.1025 From the base of the cliffs, Azeri troops 
concentrated on capturing the road leading into the city from Lachin—part of road that led not 
only into Shushi but also onward to Stepanakert.1026 Armenian journalist Tatul Hakobyan would 
later write that as of November 6, fierce fighting was taking place on the outskirts of Shushi, 
with the Azeri forces already above the cliffs.1027 In footage from the outskirts of Shushi 
apparently taken on November 7, Armenian forces could be seen firing in the direction of the 
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city, suggesting that Azeri troops had entered the city or were at least in control of parts of the 
highway.1028 By the following day, Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan was in control of Shushi, a 
claim that was denied by Armenia.1029 As late as November 9, Pashinyan and other Armenian 
officials remained outwardly optimistic about the Armenian force’s positions, with Pashinyan 
announcing on his Facebook page that the “Battles for Shushi continue.”1030 However, as 
Harutyunyan would admit after the end of the war, “We argued whether we had Shushi or not, 
but we lost the main control from November 5, and from November 7 completely.”1031 
 The loss of Shushi was a death knell for the Armenian forces both psychologically and 
strategically. In terms of strategic importance, Azerbaijan’s control over Shushi gave it the 
ability to isolate Stepanakert and prevent supplies or troops from reaching the city. It also meant 
that Azeri forces were under 10 kilometers away from Stepanakert, with a modern highway 
directly connecting them to Artsakh’s capital. Indeed, Harutyunyan would later allege that Azeri 
troops were just 2-3 kilometers away from Stepanakert when the ceasefire was signed.1032 The 
loss of Shushi, which has long been regarded by both Armenians and Azeris as the spiritual and 
cultural center of Artsakh, was also a significant blow to the morale of Armenian forces. The 
immense importance of Shushi—in both a strategic and physiological sense—is encapsulated in 
a centuries old Armenian expression known to Armenians and Azeris alike: Whoever controls 
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Shushi, controls Artsakh.1033 
 With Azerbaijan in control of Shushi and threatening to take Stepanakert and the rest of 
Artsakh, Armenia’s leaders were forced to seek peace at almost any cost. However, on 
November 9, while the final peace deal was likely being negotiated, a Russian military helicopter 
was shot down by Azeri soldiers near the border between Armenia and Nakhichevan.1034 Later 
the same day, Azerbaijan took responsibility for the apparent mistake that had killed two Russian 
soldiers, apologizing and offering to pay Russia compensation.1035 While it is unclear how far—
if at all—negotiations had progressed by that point, the incident likely provided some pressure 
on Azerbaijan to accept a peace deal, as it threatened to bring Russia more directly into the 
conflict. Finally, after 44 days of war, approximately 7,000 deaths—4,000 Armenians and 3,000 
Azeris, and three failed ceasefires, Pashinyan announced on his Facebook page that he had made 
a “difficult, incredibly difficult decision for myself and for all of us.”1036 A few hours later, the 
text of the joint statement was released, bringing an end to the war. 
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Peace Breaks Out 
 In order to secure a ceasefire, Pashinyan was forced to accept extremely harsh terms that 
amounted to a surrender. Not only did Armenia ratify Azerbaijan’s control of the territory 
captured during the war—most notably Shushi, they also had to agree to return all the territory 
outside the borders of the NKAO that was still under Armenian control.1037 Dates were set for 
the return of each region, with the last, Lachin, set to be evacuated by December 1.1038 In 
addition, the ceasefire proclaimed that “All economic and transport connections in the region 
shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport 
connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Republic.”1039 While the agreement provided no clarification regarding the form 
that such transportation should take, Azeri officials were quick to claim the right to establish a 
corridor across southern Armenia.1040 In exchange for these drastic concessions, Armenians 
would maintain control over the parts of the NKAO still under their control and be allowed to 
use the Lachin corridor, both of which would be protected by approximately 2,000 Russian 
peacekeepers.1041 
 Armenians, who had largely believed their government’s optimistic reports about the 
situation on the front lines, were taken by surprise by the terms of the deal. Angry protestors 
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“spilled into the streets of the Armenian capital of Yerevan in the wee hours of the morning, 
storming both Pashinyan’s official residence and the parliament, while an angry mob beat 
parliamentary Speaker Ararat Mirzoyan so badly he required minor surgery.”1042 For days after 
the ceasefire, thousands of Armenians remained in the streets of Yerevan, demanding that 
Pashinyan—who they argued had betrayed Armenia by giving up Artsakh—resign.1043 
Pashinyan responded by arresting several opposition leaders and posted a video on Facebook 
directed at soldiers in which he said he was “waiting for you in Yerevan.”1044 The opposition 
accused Pashinyan of attempting to incite a civil war and several members of his own My Step 
coalition resigned or left the party.1045 
 While opposition to a peace agreement—which almost certainly would have to include 
significant Armenian concessions—was likely inevitable, Pashinyan made two mistakes that 
contributed to the explosive reaction to his announcement of the ceasefire. First, his government 
had misled the public about the true nature of the war, hiding the severity of Armenian losses 
until he was forced to suddenly reveal the full severity of the situation to justify the peace deal. 
As Artsakh’s president Arayik Harutyunyan—who also faced calls to resign—explained, “If the 
fighting continued at a similar pace, then within days we would have lost all of Artsakh and 
would have had more casualties…If we lost Stepanakert, what would become of the soldiers on 
the front line in the Askeran and Martuni area?”1046 While the terms ceasefire were likely a 
necessary sacrifice to ensure that Artsakh was not entirely conquered by the Azeris, to the 
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Armenian public that was not yet fully aware of how dire the situation on the frontline had 
become it seemed like a sudden act of capitulation. 
 On a more strategic level, Pashinyan waited too long to make the decision that Armenia 
needed to be willing to make drastic concessions to secure a lasting ceasefire. Azerbaijan’s clear 
military advantage had become apparent early in the war, making an Armenian victory unlikely. 
Although Armenians sources have yet to confirm it and the details remain vague, Putin’s claim 
that Russia brokered a ceasefire deal in mid-October that Armenia rejected suggests that 
Pashinyan was not willing to make concessions until it was too late.1047  While it is likely that 
Pashinyan would also have faced opposition if he had made significant concessions to secure 
peace before the defeat of Armenian forces had become assured, he would have been able to 
explain the necessity of doing so by revealing the situation on the front lines.  
 While Pashinyan resisted the calls for his resignation, periodic protests continued over 
the next several months. A movement calling itself the Homeland Salvation Movement was 
formed to pressure Pashinyan to resign, and influential figures in Armenia including “the Chief 
of the General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces, top military brass, the country’s president, 
the Catholicos and others continued to demand that he step down.”1048 In December, the extent 
of the opposition to Pashinyan was made strikingly clear when, “he attempted to travel to 
southern Armenia to meet with residents of villages newly abutting Azerbaijani forces, but was 
forced to turn back when angry residents – including local officials – blocked the way.”1049 
However, while opposition to Pashinyan had certainly increased, he had not completely lost his 
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supporters. In December, Pashinyan offered to discuss the possibility of early elections with the 
opposition, although he seemed reluctant to resign—a necessary step to trigger snap elections 
under Armenia’s constitution.1050 Then, in late January, former president-Robert Kocharyan 
announced his intention to participate in any upcoming elections, and Pashinyan seemed to 
backtrack on the possibility of early elections.1051 However, Pashinyan soon reasserted his 
willingness to face elections and in March he announced that he would resign in order to trigger 
elections, a step he took on April 25, 2021.1052 
 With elections scheduled to be held on June 20, Armenia appears poised for a showdown 
between Pashinyan and Kocharyan, both of whom are deeply divisive figures. Furthermore, 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, another former president, announced in mid-May that he also intends to 
participate in the election as the rerpresentative of the Armenian National Congress, although he 
likely has a smaller base of support than either Kocharyan or Pashinyan.1053 A poll held in 
February asking Armenians about their view of the Prime Minister’s office, which was then still 
occupied by Pashinyan, revealed a divided population with 29 percent of respondents reporting a 
“very favorable” view and 28 percent reporting a “very unfavorable” view.1054 While the results 
of the election are far from certain, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract appears to still be the most 
popular political party, with 33 percent reporting that they would vote for the party in upcoming 
elections.1055 In contrast, only 2 percent said they would vote for Kocharyan and a further 1 
percent expressed support for the Republican Party.1056 Rather, the most significant conclusion 
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of the poll is the extent of political disillusionment in Armenia. 42 percent of respondents—by 
far the leading answer—said that they would not vote for any candidate with a further 14 percent 
uncertain or refusing to answer.1057  
An Unlikely Victor 
 Just as Armenia was clearly the loser of the war, Azerbaijan emerged as a clear winner, 
having successfully regained control of the seven surrounding regions as well as the 
psychologically important city of Shushi. Artsakh, which had been a “smoldering symbol of 
national shame and humiliation in Azerbaijan” for the past twenty-five years, now has been 
transformed into a source of national pride as the country “erupted in wild celebrations.”1058 
While the war has been seen as a victory by the overwhelming majority of Azeris, perhaps more 
than anything, it was a victory for President Ilham Aliyev. The war “transformed President Ilham 
Aliyev’s political stature,” dramatically increasing his popularity among the Azeri people.1059 
According to Azeri political commentator Bahruz Samadov, “Aliyev’s domestic political goal 
before Baku’s battlefield victories had been to maintain ‘the hegemony of the ruling party’--
cracking down on his political opponents…‘Now he actually enjoys popular support.’”1060 
 However, while Azerbaijan is currently gripped with jubilation at their military victory, it 
is possible that with time this triumph will be tempered. Azerbaijan captured the majority of the 
territory previously under Armenian control—taking more than 8,000 square kilometers of 
territory during the war and as a result of the peace agreement.1061 However, that still leaves just 
                                                 
1057 Ibid. 
1058 Editorial Board. “A Quick End to a Dangerous War.” The New York Times. November 20, 2020. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/20/opinion/armenia-azerbaijan-peace-deal.html  
1059 Synovitz, Ron. “Analysis: Nagorno-Karabakh War Transforms The Legacy Of Azerbaijani President Aliyev.” 
RFE/RL. December 17, 2020. https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-legacy-azerbaijani-president-
aliyev/31006302.html  
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Martirosyan, Sona. “Op-ed: myths that replaced reality led to Armenia's defeat in Karabakh war.” JAM News. 
January 25, 2020. https://jam-news.net/tatul-hakobyan-causes-of-myths-in-the-karabakh-war-in-armenian-society/  
198 
 
under 4,000 square kilometers under the control of Artsakh’s government—territory that is now 
protected by Russian peacekeepers.1062 Azerbaijan had long resisted the deployment of 
peacekeepers—especially Russian peacekeepers, believing that their presence would fortify the 
Armenians’ positions. Already, there have been reports that Azeris are dissatisfied with what 
pro-Azeri sources have called “The one-sided and partial attitude of Russian military 
elements.”1063 While the current deal only provides for the peacekeepers to stay for five years, 
their deployment can be extended and it is unlikely that Russia will easily give up the influence 
that having their soldiers in the region provides.1064 While the war certainly was a victory for 
Azerbaijan, it was not the complete victory that Aliyev was pressing for during the first weeks of 
fighting. 
 Indeed, it is perhaps Russia that stands to benefit the most from the war’s aftermath. As 
Simon Ostrovsky explains, Turkey—for all its efforts to support Azerbaijan—gained little 
additional influence in the Caucasus, but, “One country did, however, increase its footprint: 
Russia, the power that most recently ruled both Armenia and Azerbaijan and, incidentally, was 
the only major arms supplier to have sold copious amounts of weaponry to both sides.”1065 While 
Armenia may have been gradually shifting away from Russia before the war, with a weakened 
military and a border with Azerbaijan that has increased by hundreds of kilometers, the country 
is more dependent than ever on Russia’s support. Furthermore, the presence of Russian 
peacekeepers, who can exercise significant influence over which side controls a given stretch of 
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territory, gives Russia leverage over Azerbaijan as well.1066 Finally, the failure of Western 
countries to make meaningful contributions to the peace process once again demonstrated 
Russia’s geopolitical dominance in the Caucasus. In an evaluation of the political situation of 
Artsakh written after the peace deal, The New York Times concluded that “the fact is that Russia 
was the only power capable of putting an end to what could have become a dangerous regional 
clash.”1067 Just as was the case after the Russian-brokered Bishkek Protocol, “the Minsk Group is 
now facing – like no other actor engaged in this conflict – a crisis of relevance” after failing to 
have a significant impact on the war’s outcome.1068 As Laurence Broers writes, after six weeks 
of relative restraint, “Moscow added Azerbaijan to the list of states where it has boots on the 
ground in the South Caucasus, shut out the West, put Turkey in its place and made plain that it 
remains the dominant power in the South Caucasus.”1069 
 Russia’s victory seems to have been largely the result of a successfully taking advantage 
of a dynamic situation rather than a scripted approach. As it had for the past twenty-five years of 
the conflict, Moscow avoided decisively taking either side throughout the war until “the prospect 
of a complete Azerbaijani military victory forced Russia’s hand.”1070 Russia’s intervention 
“saves a future for Moscow’s relationship with Yerevan” by protecting the remaining portion of 
Artsakh while also not alienating Azerbaijan “by preserving a truncated Nagorno-Karabakh to 
which former residents may not feel incentives to return, and mandating a five-yearly veto power 
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for both Baku and Yerevan on the renewal of the peacekeeping mandate.”1071 
 
The Conflict Continues 
 The aftermath of the war has also witnessed the rise of new issues that have further 
increased tensions between Armenians and Azeris. While the November 10 agreement called 
upon both sides to release any prisoners of war, Azerbaijan continues to hold nearly 200 
Armenians in captivity, including 57 that they captured after the war had already ended.1072 
Extremely troubling reports have emerged that Azerbaijan has subjected these prisoners of war 
to torture. Human Rights Watch interviewed four Armenians who had been held captive by 
Azerbaijan, who “all described prolonged and repeated beatings. One described being prodded 
with a sharp metal rod, and another said he was subjected to electric shocks, and one was 
repeatedly burned with a cigarette lighter.”1073 Most shockingly, in May it was revealed that 19 
Armenian prisoners of war—twelve civilians and seven soldiers—had been killed while in Azeri 
custody.1074 Azerbaijan appears to be attempting to use the remaining prisoners of war to gain 
leverage over Armenia.  
 A second new source of tension has been Azerbaijan’s destruction of Armenian religious 
and historical sites in its newly-won territories. Vandalism or complete destruction of Armenian 
khachkars or other monuments appears to have been widespread both during the war and 
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afterwards.1075 Azeri soldiers also completely leveled an Armenian church in Jabrayil after 
taking control of the city.1076 Similarly, two Armenian churches in Shushi, Ghazanchetsots 
Cathedral and the smaller Kanach Zham, have both had their distinctively-Armenian pointed 
domes removed, apparently in an attempt to erase the Armenian elements of the city’s 
history.1077 Lastly, analysis of satellite imagery conducted by Caucasus Heritage Watch—an 
organization created to monitor cultural heritage sites in the wake of the war—has revealed that 
Azerbaijan destroyed two Armenian cemeteries in the village of Mets Tagher and in Shushi.1078 
This continuation of Azerbaijan’s lengthy history of cultural erasure targeting Armenian sites has 
angered many Armenians, making peace a more remote prospect.    
 However, by far the most concerning new source of tension has been the process of 
delineating the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan along the formerly Armenian-controlled 
territories that border southern Armenia. The process is complicated by the fact that the border 
was drawn by the Soviet Union and—because Armenian forces took control of the Azeri 
territories in the 1990s—has never functioned as a truly international border. Not only do the two 
countries dispute the location of the border in many places, but they have also had to confront the 
fact that the border was drawn in “a different period in history, when the boundaries between 
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union republics were less important and were unproblematically tangled with infrastructure like 
roads and irrigation canals, or grazing land.”1079 Critically, “The most important road in southern 
Armenia—the highway between Syunik’s two largest cities of Goris and Kapan—repeatedly 
crosses the official border.”1080 While the Armenian government has signaled that it plans to 
construct a new highway that bypasses the border, the current necessity of frequent border 
crossings has caused tensions between the two sides.1081 Further increasing tensions at the 
border, Azeri leaders, including President Aliyev, have even begun referring to southern 
Armenia as “‘historical Azerbaijani territory’ and hinting at irredentist ambitions there.”1082 
 The danger of these uncertain border was perhaps best revealed on May 12, when Azeri 
forces “advanced up to 3.5 kilometers toward Armenia from their previous positions and crossed 
Armenia’s border.”1083 A hostile confrontation that has yet to be resolved ensued. Although the 
conflict has not turned violent, it is not difficult to envision a scenario in which a dispute 
between soldiers on an unmarked border escalates into a conflict that puts Armenia and 
Azerbaijan on the path to another war. As the situation currently stands, Armenia has invoked 
the CSTO’s collective defense measures, although Pashinyan has sought aid under Article 2 of 
the treaty, which commits the organization to undertake “joint consultations” in the face of a 
threat to a member, rather than the more severe Article 4.1084 Whether the CSTO will come to 
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Armenia’s aid—and the ultimate conclusion of the incident—remains to be seen.  
 While the presence of Russian peacekeepers does provide a significant deterrent to a 
return to war in the short term, in the longer term the November 10 peace deal has done little to 
resolve the underlying conflict. In fact, tensions between Armenians and Azeris are higher than 
ever as a host of new issues have emerged in the months following the war. Furthermore, the 
fundamental issue that has driven conflict since its inception—which side will control Artsakh—
remains an open question. Azerbaijan may have conquered Shushi and other parts of the region, 
but a 4,000 square kilometer territory with almost 100,000 Armenian residents remains.1085 The 
current term of the Russian peacekeepers’ deployment only lasts for five years and while 
Moscow and Armenia are likely to push for it to be renewed, Azerbaijan has the option to 
exercise its veto. Without a negotiated solution that both Armenians and Azeris are satisfied 
with, something that is extremely unlikely without substantial international involvement, the 
threat of violence will continue to hang over Artsakh and war will almost certainly return to the 
region.  
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